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FROM IDEA TO PRODUCT – TRANSLATING KNOWLEDGE  
BETWEEN THE LAB AND THE CLINIC 




This dissertation is composed of three essays looking at innovation at 
Academic Medical Centers. It tries to empirically explore the problem of 
translating knowledge from the laboratory bench to the clinic and from the clinic to 
the bench.  
 
Chapter 1, co-authored with Iain Cockburn, establishes the importance of in-
house complementary knowledge in firm decision to license an invention from an 
Academic Medical Center. By using patent data to describe the technology 
portfolio of firms who look at patents and then decide whether to license them or 
not we are able to provide a description of demand in Markets for Technology. We 
show that firms license inventions that are similar to own technology portfolio 
when such similarity is measured at a broad level using International Patent 
Classes. However, controlling for such broad level proximity, firms are less likely 




Chapter 2 asks: “Are inventions by teams from Academic Medical Centers 
that combine cross-domain knowledge at a higher hazard of licensing than 
inventions by single domain teams?” Inventors’ educational background is used to 
assign them to the clinical (MDs) or the research domain (PhD). Contrary to our 
expectations, we find that inventions by cross-domain teams are at a lower hazard 
of licensing. Similarly, inventions by cross-domain integrated teams (at least one 
MD/PhD) are at a lower hazard of licensing than inventions by cross-domain 
distributed teams (MD and PhD on team but no MD/PhD). However, medical 
device inventions tend to be at a higher hazard of licensing if invented by cross-
domain teams.  
 
Chapter 3, co-authored with Rob Huckman, looks at how the routine clinical 
work of cardiac surgeons at Academic Medical Centers can impact their innovative 
performance as measured by quantity and quality of academic articles that they 
publish. We use the procedures that these cardiac surgeons perform every year to 
create a measure of clinical focus to understand whether diversity of work impacts 
innovation. Using a panel data with surgeon fixed effects we find that early career 
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 1. BUYER BEHAVIOR IN MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: TECHNOLOGY 
PROXIMITY BETWEEN FIRM PORTFOLIO AND IN-LICENSED PATENTS 
Ayfer Ali         Iain Cockburn 
 
 
1.1       Abstract  
 
Markets for technology promise to increase productivity by better allocating innovative 
capacity across firms.  Research on the demand side of these markets, however, has been limited. 
In this paper, we use a new dataset of patents available for licensing from a large, innovative 
academic medical center (AMC) to understand the structure of these markets. Our data includes 
information on all firms that showed interest in these patents by signing a confidentiality 
agreement and later decided whether to license or not license the focal technology. Strikingly, we 
find that of the 285 patents we observe, about 30% of patents available for licensing are never 
even looked at, and of those that are looked at about 25%  are not eventually licensed. Firms with 
a higher number of own patents and older firms are more likely to take a license.  A licensed 
patent is looked at on average 3.24 times, compared to 2.23 times for patents that have been 
considered but never licensed.  
Because market safety issues are ameliorated in this market, we hypothesize that the lack 
of demand is due partly to the necessity for complementary technologies in the licensing firm. 
We measure technology complementarity by utilizing widely recognized technology similarity 
measures which calculate the overlap of International Patent Classes (IPC) between the AMC 
patent and the firm’s own patent portfolio. We find that technological proximity1 is indeed a 
determinant of the decision to in-license once a patent has been looked at. Firms are more likely 
to license technologies that are similar – i.e. “close” – to their own.  While this is true when the  
proximity measure is computed at the broader subclass level of the IPCs, we note that at the 
                                                            
1 We use technology proximity and technology similarity interchangeably.  
1
 more granular, main group level, conditional on subclass-level proximity, greater similarity 
between the licensee’s patents and the AMC patent makes execution of a license agreement less 
likely. This implies that “close” fit is good but “very close” fit is detrimental for in-licensing. 
Additionally, we offer improved measures for technology proximity between patent portfolios.  
 
1.2       Introduction 
 
Markets for technologies (MFT), where ideas and early stage technologies are traded, 
promise substantial allocative efficiencies and opportunities for productivity growth by 
promoting gains from trade and specialization of innovative labor (Arora and Gambardella, 
2010).  They are needed when the locus of innovation is outside of the firm best fit to 
commercialize it.  Suppliers of technology can be lone inventors or users uninterested in 
entrepreneurship, not-for-profit institutions specializing in publicly funded academic  research or 
firms that do not possess the downstream assets to commercialize their technologies in any or all 
markets (von Hippel, 1976; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; Teece, 1986;). On the demand 
side, potential efficiencies also exist as firms with downstream assets could use their strengths by 
buying (better) technology from outside instead of (only) relying on their own R&D capabilities 
(Pisano, 1990).   
The potential benefits of markets for technologies can only be realized if they can 
efficiently provide stable matching between each idea for sale and the firm best fit to 
commercialize it (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth, 2008). Market design theorists have pointed out 
a few characteristics of markets that are needed for such efficiency – thickness, lack of 
congestion and safety. A market is thick if a large proportion of the potential buyers and sellers 
participate in the market. It is not congested if it gives each participant an opportunity to consider 
multiple transactions. And, finally, it is safe for participants when they choose the market over 
2
 other ways of transacting and reveal their true preferences without engaging in welfare reducing 
strategic behavior (Roth, 2008).  
Gans and Stern (2010) highlight the three main characteristics of ideas that can prevent 
markets for technologies from operating efficiently – idea complementarity, user reproducibility 
and value rivalry.  Idea complementarity is the notion that ideas are only useful in combination 
with other complementary ideas. Its existence reduces the number of potential matches to any 
given buyer or seller and increases the requirements for market thickness. User reproducibility 
refers to the fact that once disclosed, ideas can easily be reproduced and the buyer can then 
become a seller or not pay for the idea (Arrow, 1962). Value rivalry is the fact that value gained 
by one user may diminish as others also use the idea. User reproducibility and value rivalry can 
reduce market safety by inducing strategic behavior by the participants which would result in 
overall reduction of welfare (Roth, 2008) 
Strategy research related to Markets for Technologies has concerned itself mostly with 
market safety issues that may force firms to choose to not transact in the market or can make 
them engage in strategic behavior (Arrow 1962; Pisano, 1990; Gans et al, 2008; Anton and Yao, 
1994; Arora and Fosfurri, 2003; Teece, 1986; Zeckhauser, 1995) In this study we are able to 
abstract from market safety issues and concentrate on idea complementarity and its significance 
for market thickness.     
In our paper we explore a small market for technologies in the context of technology 
licensing from an Academic Medical Center . We observe not only all concluded licenses but 
also the population of all firms who showed an interest in our sample of patents by signing a 
confidentiality agreement, evaluative material transfer agreement or an option to an exclusive 
3
 license. This allows us to describe the structure of demand in a market for technology, something 
that has never been accomplished before.  
This market is special in that problems of safety and congestion in markets for 
technologies are alleviated or non-existent. Our ideas are patented providing a good degree of 
appropriability and reducing issues of reproducibility by non-licensees. Second, while our seller 
is interested in generating income its overarching goal in licensing is to see these technologies 
commercialized and serving the greater good. As a result, it is willing to negotiate with the buyer 
and price is not the reason why a license is not concluded with a potential buyer. Licensing 
officer incentives are aligned with the goal of commercialization, not profit maximizing, and 
significant resources and effort are expended in attempt to commercialize these inventions. 
Furthermore, the institution is in the business of research and patient care and will not compete 
with the licensor downstream. As a result, it has no strategic reasons to withhold invention 
related information from the potential buyer. Additionally, asymmetric information problems, 
especially with regard to uncertainty regarding the technology quality are attenuated – the 
inventions come from one of the largest and most respected research institutions in the world.  
Given the elimination of many market safety and congestion issues however, we are still 
faced with a puzzle: of our sample of 285, approximately half (47%) are never licensed and some 
85 (30%) are never even looked at.  Of those that are looked at, but not licensed, the first firm to 
look arrives, on average, 2.75 years after the patent has been filed, or approximately 4-4.5 years 
after the invention disclosure. Of those that are licensed at least once, first license occurs at 4 
years after patent filing or approximately 5.5 years from invention disclosure on average. A 
patent that has been looked at, but not licensed, gets 2.23 looks, while one that has been licensed 
has been considered for licensing by 3.24 firms and licensed by 2.02 on average.  
4
 In this study we show that even when market safety issues have been substantially 
alleviated, markets for technologies remain thin in the sense that a large number of inventions 
remain not only unlicensed but also never looked at. This leads us to focus on the importance of 
idea complementarity for the efficient working of these markets. We explore the topic by asking 
the following research question:  “How does technology complementarity affect firm decision to 
buy a specific idea in markets for technologies?”  
We hypothesize that a firm’s decision to license a particular invention is dependent on 
how technologically close its patent portfolio is to the patent under consideration. Using widely 
accepted measures of technological distance we show that firms license inventions that are close 
to what they own at the broad level of measurement indicating that idea and asset 
complementarity are important in their decision making process.  However, we also find that 
controlling for broad level fit, a very close fit at the more granular level of measurement lowers 
the likelihood of a license due to potentially duplicating in-house efforts.  
 
1.3       Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
1.3.1 Markets for technologies 
The volume of trade in markets for technologies has been expanding in recent years. 
Arora and Gambardella (2010) review recent data from various sources to arrive at a market size 
of approximately $100 billion globally in 2002 which is about double their earlier estimate of 
$35-50 billion in the mid-1990s. They also estimate that the market has grown at a higher rate 
than the average global GDP growth rate in the last two decades (Arora et al. 2001; Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010, cf. Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Robbins, 2006). Other survey based studies 
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 point to the increasing importance and rate of out and in-licensing by firms (Sheehan et al, 2004; 
Zuniga and Guellec, 2008; Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2007; Tsai and Wang, 2009) 
There is some evidence, however, that not all technologies supplied get licensed. Using 
PatVal survey data Gambardella et al. (2007) show that 11% of firm-owned patents in the sample 
are licensed but another 7% remain unlicensed even when the firm wants to license them.  While 
there is no information on firm effort in the licensing process, patent quality differences explain 
the firm’s willingness to out-license a particular patent but not whether a license actually occurs. 
This leads the authors to speculate that it is market and organizational inefficiencies that result in 
such a licensing shortfall. The result is consistent with other findings that firms are unable to find 
interested parties with whom to even start negotiations in 75% of the cases in which they want to 
license and are able to conclude licenses for only 4% of the technologies they wish to license. 
They often cite high search costs for licensees as the reason (Razgaitis, 2004). 
1.3.2 Demand in Markets for Technologies 
There is little information regarding firms’ demand for outside technologies in the 
literature. The few available studies are mostly based on survey data on firm practices rather than 
specific licenses, use different definitions of in-licensing and are difficult to generalize by 
geography or industry. Using data from a survey on low and medium technology firms from 
Taiwan, Tsai and Wang (2009) find that 95% of the 753 firms in their sample licensed 
technology from outside. Rate of in-licensing also appears to differ by country. While attitudes 
towards in-licensing are similar between Japan and the UK, for example, the incidence of in-
licensing is higher in Japan where companies also search more for technology to in-license 
(Pitkethly, 2001).  
6
 Some studies imply passivity on the demand side of these markets and show that the 
party that initiates the licensing contact is often the supplier (Atuhanegima and Patterson, 1993).  
Ford (1988), however, provides statistics without a source that claim that 66% of technology 
sellers and 45% of technology buyers report that the buyer is the one that initiates the technology 
deal.  Those who in-license seem to value the technology that they have acquired. In a survey of 
firms using university technology, Thursby and Thursby (2004) find that more than half of the 
respondents use university technology in new product development and 23% note that in-
licensed patents from universities were crucial in the development of their products.   
A large portion of the research on the demand side of markets for technologies has 
focused on the firm’s decision to “make” or “buy” outside technologies and the factors that 
influence that decision. Pisano (1990) shows that the firm’s choice of external or internal 
sourcing of R&D depends on considerations of market safety, specifically concerns of 
appropriability and future hold up due to small-numbers bargaining. Firms are more likely to 
acquire external technology to shorten product development times and gain competitive 
advantage especially in fragmented IP-regimes (Atuahenegima, 1993; Kurokawa, 1997; 
Cockburn et. al 2010). 
Other studies however show that the success of a strategy of external technology 
acquisition depends on in-house R&D investment indicating that the two are complements rather 
than substitutes (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Tsai and Wang, 2007). 
Internal R&D is necessary not only to be able to absorb technologies that the firm has decided to 
acquire but also to monitor the state of the technology outside the firm’s boundaries and evaluate 
potential technology acquisitions (Rosenberg, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994).  
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 With our study we contribute to this literature by describing the structure of demand in a 
market for technologies. We use a new dataset of patents from an academic medical center and 
observe all instances when a firm showed an interest in a technology and its decision to conclude 
or not a license for that technology later.  While the supply side studies have focused on the 
importance of the product and its attributes to understand this market, our demand-side focused 
study lets us also explore firm characteristics in the licensing decision. Specifically we are 
interested in the importance of technology complementarity in firm decision making. We are 
able to look at complementary technological capabilities in the firm in a very concrete way by 
observing the patents that the firm already owns and their characteristics.  This allows us to 
answer the question: “Does the technology developed inside the firm influence its decision to 
acquire a specific outside technology, given interest in the technology.”  
1.3.3 The Importance of Complementary Technologies 
The importance of complementary assets in firms’ technology acquisition decisions has 
been explored before (Teece, 1986; Pisano, 1990). Two studies by Killing (1978) and Caves et 
al. (1983) look at how in-licensed technologies relate to a firm’s current products and 
capabilities. They provide descriptive statistics on the type of technologies that firms in-license 
using a convenience sample of 34 licensee companies in the UK and Canada with over 80 
licenses in 1974. They find that 22 percent of the licenses were concluded to strengthen the 
firm’s existing products and 70 percent complemented their current capabilities. However, they 
only rely on licensee survey reports rather than a technology proximity measure and their 
definition of proximity relates to the products and firms’ capabilities rather than the firms’ 
existing technologies.   
8
 Little is known about the influence of a firm’s technology portfolio in acquiring 
innovation from outside.  Related studies have looked at the importance of technological 
proximity for firms’ diversification decisions. Breschi et al. (2003) find that a firm’s 
diversification decision is path dependent and firms expand into related fields.  Building on the 
resource based view of the firm, Silverman (1999) also shows that firms diversify into areas 
where their existing technological resources are most relevant.  Furthermore, in the context of 
strategic alliances, firms whose technologies are more similar to their alliance partners’ prior to 
the alliance tend to “absorb capabilities” from their partners (Mowery et al., 1996).  In fact 
technological proximity has been used to quantify spillovers (Jaffe, 1987).   
In a recent study, Laursen et al (2010) assume that firms license technologies that are 
close to what they currently hold and show that firms with a more diverse current portfolio of 
technology, implying higher “monitoring” and "assimilation” capacity, will license technology 
that is further away from their current in-house expertise. However, while shedding some light 
on the importance of absorptive capacity for in-licensing, their study uses a control group of 
firms that do not license at all in the period under study. This could lead to significant selection 
problems. Firms that never showed an interest in licensing may be different at some unobserved 
level. Our sample, in that sense, provides a significantly better way of understanding the 
relationship between firms’ own technology and what they eventually license as we observe both 
firms that license and those that show an interest but later withdraw from the market.   
Based on findings above that firms may be more willing to diversify into technologically 
closely related areas, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1: Firms are more likely to license inventions that are close to their own technological 
portfolio, ceteris paribus.  
9
 We expect that a firm is better able to know about available technology in an area that is 
closely related to its current knowledge base, reducing search costs for outside inventions. 
Furthermore, once such inventions are identified, it will be less costly for the firm to correctly 
evaluate it and assimilate such outside technology into its current portfolio (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Arora and  Gambardella, 1994). The firm’s existing technological capabilities 
will then help it extract the most value from it (Silverman, 1999). In this study we don’t witness 
a firm’s search for new technology since we only observe firms in the “evaluation” stage. 
Additional data, in terms of commercialization outcomes will let us observe the process of 
“value extraction” from the firm’s current resources as well.  
More importantly however, technology similarity is necessary because ideas are often 
only useful with other ideas (Gans and Stern, 2010). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argue that 
especially in biomedical research, inventions are so interdependent that when intellectual 
property rights are held by different entities, commercialization can effectively be blocked in 
case of coordination failure. Such idea complementarity makes inventions only relevant to a few 
buyers which further lowers chances of a match in the marketplace. As such, the existence of 
complementary ideas evidenced by technology similarity will be crucial in a firm’s decision to 
license an invention.  
Licensing ideas complementary to the ones that it already owns can greatly benefit a firm 
that is developing new products. However, we expect that technologies that are very similar to 
what the firm owns in the sense that they can be substitutes to in-house developed inventions will 
not be licensed. Let’s assume that the quality of the in-house and the in-licensed technology are 
similar and perfectly observable to the firm. The firm has already incurred significant costs for 
its version of the invention and expects to receive the full amount of the future revenue stream. If 
10
 it decided to in-license a very similar technology, however, it would most likely pay future 
royalties to the licensor. As a result, it would choose not to license.  
The difficulty of evaluating early stage technologies and the costly transfer of tacit 
knowledge associated with outside inventions will further lower the chances of a firm licensing 
even if the quality of the outside invention was better  (Polanyi, 1966; von Hippel, 1994; 
Agarwal, 2006). Furthermore, it is possible that many firms have incentives that reward company 
scientists for advancing their own technology to the product stage rather than in-licensed 
technology. Those same scientists are most likely the ones who are evaluating outside 
technology as well. Behavioral issues such as the so-called “not-invented-here” syndrome which 
may cause scientists to evaluate outside inventions as inferior to their own have also been 
pointed out as potential reasons for preferring in-house technologies  (Katz and Allen, 1982).  
This leads us to our second hypothesis:  
H2: Firms are less likely to license inventions that are technologically very close (i.e. 
potential substitutes) to their own technology portfolio, ceteris paribus.  
We are able to distinguish between H1 and H2 by using an improved version of a widely 
accepted measure of technological proximity - the cosine, i.e. the uncentered correlation between 
the technological classes of a focal patent and the firm patent portfolio (Jaffe, 1986). Instead of 
USPTO patent classes however we use International Patent Classes that have a nested structure 
and allow us to measure proximity at different levels of granularity. As suggested by previous 
scholars, we also improve on proximity measures by using all of the IPC codes assigned to a 
patent rather than the main IPC code (Benner and Waldfogel, 2008). 
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 1.4 Data  
1.4.1 Research Setting 
The main dataset for our study comes from the technology licensing office (TLO) of a 
large Academic Medical Center. It contains 285 patents filed and granted from 1980 to 2008 and 
the associated 307 agreements -- options, confidentiality agreements or licenses -- signed with 
interested firms for those patents between 1980 and 2010. These patents are the result of 
employee research and invention. Each employee or affiliate is required to assign to the AMC all 
rights to all intellectual property developed while at the institution or with funds administered 
through the institution.  
The invention commercialization process starts with an invention disclosure from which 
a patent is filed which then is licensed through the TLO. When an employee thinks she has 
developed an invention worth protecting she files an invention disclosure form with the TLO. 
The invention is then reviewed by a TLO officer with expertise in her subject area who takes on 
the case. After further consultations with the inventor and further research with respect to the 
invention’s commercialization potential a decision is made on whether to file a patent or release 
the invention into the public domain. An outside legal firm is then retained to do a patentability 
search and do the patent filing. As soon as the patent process has been started, the TLO starts 
looking for potential licensees who will develop their technology further and bring it to market.   
There are a few ways in which potential licensees can learn of the invention and these 
have changed over the years based on new technologies and TLO learning. Brief, non-
confidential descriptions of the invention are sent to potential licensees by the case manager after 
market and industry research. The same description is put on the TLO website where firms can 
search for it. Firms can also find out about new research results and inventions through research 
12
 articles and conference presentations by the inventors, through published patent applications or 
granted patents and of course through direct contacts with the inventor.  
Once a firm decides it is interested in a technology, representatives sign a confidentiality 
agreement (CDA) which gives them access to the confidential description of the research which 
often includes the patent application and sometimes the invention disclosure as well.2 The patent 
application contains valuable information about the invention and the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) protection strategy.  The signing of a CDA does not involve a fee and does not provide an 
exclusive right to the technology. In fact CDAs with multiple firms at the same time are 
common. It does however allow the TLO to know of a firm’s interest.  
Once a CDA has been signed, the firm may return to explore the technology further and 
reserve the right to license it by signing an option. Options involve some (albeit minimal) fees 
and often a requirement that the optionee reimburse unreimbursed past and current patent filing 
and maintenance costs. Amounts can be negotiated and waived if the firm is cash-restrained 
which is sometimes true of startups. Options normally last less than a year but can be extended 
for up to an additional year given the right reasons.  
A firm can bypass the option stage and decide to sign a license for an invention. Licenses 
can be non-exclusive, exclusive in field (e.g. diagnostic uses only, a specific treatment area), 
exclusive, co-exclusive and end user licenses. Licenses usually, but not always, require the 
licensing firms to reimburse all or a portion of patent expenses and give them the right to 
participate in decision making on patent prosecution.  Licenses provide revenue to the TLO 
through a combination of a license issue fee, license maintenance fees, milestones payments, 
                                                            
2 Note that the American Inventors Protection Act granted the USPTO the right to publish patent applications after 18 
months from first filing (priority) date. However, it also gives the right to the applicant to request that the application not be 
published  “but only if the invention has not been and will not be the subject of an application filed in a foreign country that 
requires publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority date) or under the Patent Cooperation Treaty” - 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp - accessed on November 23, 2011 
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 percentage of sublicensing fees and royalties. License terms are quite standard based on the 
technology type but negotiation and variation are possible. Licenses also require that a firm not 
shelve the technology it is licensing and in addition to maintenance fees and milestone payments 
may ask for due diligence reports and other evidence of development efforts.  
The TLO works with the licensing firm throughout the life of the patents licensed. An 
exclusive license can be terminated by the firm for any reason and may be relicensed to another 
firm for development. Amendments can be signed to change due diligence terms or royalty 
agreement.  Sublicenses may be concluded with firms that will develop the invention further or 
will sell a product in a different market. The TLO does not routinely terminate licenses but if due 
diligence milestones are not met has the right to.  
It is important to note that the licensor in this process is a non-profit institution that does 
not have the willingness or the ability to compete downstream with potential licensees. One of 
the explicitly stated goals of the licensor is to see that the technology serve the greater good by 
being commercialized. As a result, the licensor is interested in maximizing not only the revenue 
from a potential licensing deal but also gets utility from seeing the technology brought to market 
and curing human disease or facilitating further research.  TLO officers have incentives aligned 
with those goals.  
As is the case with most TLOs, if a conflict occurs between academic and commercial 
goals, academic goals take precedence.3  In fact, in all licenses the hospital retains the right to 
practice the invention for research and educational purposes. When a government funded 
                                                            
3 Please see a presentation by an officer from another TLO (MIT) for standard TLO goals,  http://web.mit.edu/e-
club/www/presentations/tlo.pdf 
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 research is licensed, the government also gets a non-exclusive royalty free (NERF) right to the 
invention and retains march-in rights in service of the greater good. 4 
What this implies for our dataset is that when a license does not occur, it is almost never 
due to the parties not being able to reach an acceptable price – i.e. negotiate terms. It is because 
the potential licensee decided that it was no longer interested in the technology for reasons other 
than price. This is also seen through qualitative data in the case files - comments by officers 
about why the potential licensee may not have returned for a license after signing a CDA never 
list price as the reason. Of course, at the very least, to break even the TLO would like to get 
reimbursed for incurred patent expenses. The utility of the AMC is subject to the costs of 
patenting, licensing and infringement and license monitoring.   
1.4.2 AMC Data  
Our data contains all the solely AMC-owned patents that were filed since 1980, after the 
Bayh Dole act, and were granted by mid-2008.  Patents that are jointly owned with other 
institutions such as universities or companies were excluded as licensing or development activity 
by the co-owner is not observed in such cases. Patents that are the result of for-profit sponsored 
research are similarly excluded because sponsorship by industry almost always results in an 
automatic exclusive option to all the patent rights and in some cases an automatic license with 
pre-agreed terms which takes the patent off the market. If the sponsoring company did not desire 
a license after the invention disclosure was made, then that is a signal to other potential licensees 
that the new technology may not be of high quality since the sponsor would have better private 
information than a potential licensee that was not involved. In either situation, these patents 
                                                            
4 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxl_35_U_S_C_203.htm - accessed November 24, 2011 
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 would not have been directly comparable to the rest and useful for our analyses. This leaves us 
with 285 patents available for licensing.  
The data also includes all the agreements that were signed with for-profit institutions that 
have the ability to commercialize an invention protected by a patent. These include 
confidentiality agreements (CDAs) which indicate that a company has shown interest in a certain 
patent, material transfer agreements (MTAs) for evaluation of biomaterials or prototypes, options 
to a license for a certain period of time, end-user licenses, non-exclusive licenses, exclusive 
licenses, sublicenses and patent assignments.  
A unique agreement per company and patent was selected if multiple agreements were 
signed within 5 years of the first agreement with the same company. For example, if a company 
signed a confidentiality agreement, then followed up with an option and finally signed an 
exclusive license for the same patent, only the last was selected.  If a company signed a CDA but 
not a license and then 6 years later signed a license, we included both the original CDA and the 
license as separate agreements. Similarly, amendments to agreements were not included unless 
they included additional patents and in that case were only included for the new patent.   
For our purposes, agreements were divided into two categories – “deals done” and “deals 
not done.”  If a license was signed, the agreement was considered a “deal done” and this 
included exclusive and nonexclusive licenses and sublicenses. Agreements were classified as 
“deals not done” if they indicated an interest in the patent through a CDA, MTA or option but no 
license was concluded.  This resulted in 307 agreements and overall 600 patent–agreement pairs 
since many agreements have multiple patents under them and many patents have been looked at 
and licensed multiple times.  
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 1.4.3 Firm Data 
Each firm’s technology profile at the time of agreement signing was compiled using 
patent data.  We matched licensee names to patent assignee names conducting assignee name 
disambiguation by manually going through more than 450 000 company names and by searching 
for common misspellings.  This is important as company names are not standardized at the 
USPTO. For example, Microsoft patents can be under Microsoft, Microsoft Inc., Microsoft Inc, 
Micosoft (misspelling) and direct matching to Microsoft Inc. would exclude multiple patents 
under the other names. In addition, certain companies patent under subsidiary names. For 
example Zeneca Plant Science and Zeneca Pharmaceuticals are part of the same company and we 
assume that patents assigned to Zeneca Plant Science are also available for use to Zeneca 
Pharmaceuticals and vice versa without a license.   
Alternative automated ways for name matching are available and we used the ‘soundex’ 
function that assigns a string consisting of a letter and numbers to words based on how they 
sound.  We also tried matching using the SAS ‘COMPGED’ function which measures the “edit 
distance” between two strings – i.e. the number of deletions, insertions, or replacements in the 
characters of a word required to arrive at the observed word.5 In our case, both were inferior to 
manual matching as they excluded many relevant observations and included irrelevant ones.  
For the purposes of this paper, we defined a company’s technology position as a stock of 
patents filed before the time of agreement signing and did not use a depreciation factor for older 
patents. There are a few studies that show that learning depreciates over time (e.g. Benkard, 
2000) and company focus may change and lead to a different technological expertise now from 
                                                            
5http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/lefunctionsref/63354/HTML/default/viewer.htm#p1r4l9jwgat
ggtn1ko81fyjys4s7.htm accessed October 1, 2011. 
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 the one many years ago. However, it is not clear how long it takes for such technological 
expertise to change or expire.  
One way to determine how long certain technological expertise is relevant for the 
company is to look at patent validity – if the patent is still valid, then the firm still has that 
technological ability. However, data limitations prevent us from finding out what patents are still 
‘alive’.  Computation of patent validity at a point in time is impossible without the availability of 
patent priority data which determines patent term. We have manually gathered that data for 
AMC patents but we don’t have such data for firm patents. In addition, not all patents are 
maintained to the end of their term. The assignee needs to pay a certain fee to keep a patent alive 
3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after it is granted.6 Such payment data is also not available in an 
aggregated form.  Furthermore, some patent terms are adjusted because it takes the USPTO 
longer to review them. That information is not available in an aggregated form, either.  
One difficulty with determining patent portfolio size and content for the companies that 
are party to these agreements is that most of them are in the pharmaceutical and biotech industry 
which have seen many mergers and acquisitions in the last few decades. We could not find data 
on such M&A activity until 1992 and the post-1992 data is not complete for all of the companies 
so was not included in this version of the paper.7 The available data is often difficult to interpret 
as many companies sell or acquire specific plants or businesses such as the “vaccine business” or 
their “nutritional business” but it is unclear what patents are licensed or sold off with these 
divestitures and acquisitions. The only exceptions to the exclusion of M&As from our dataset are 
the top 10 pharmaceutical companies that have seen multiple large mergers and acquisitions in 
                                                            
6 This term can be extended to 4, 8 and 12 years with the payment of a fine in the six months between 3.5th 
and 4th anniversary.  
 
7 For post-1992 we were able to find some data through Lexis-Nexis Company Dossier service but the data 
was not complete, especially for non-US firms 
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 the 1990s – 2000s. Acquisitions of large companies or mergers between two or more large 
companies were tracked using the web, mainly through company history pages, and verified 
through Lexis-Nexis Company Dossier service for M&As after 1992.  Examples of these include 
the acquisition of Hoechst by Aventis, the merger of Glaxo Wellcome with SmithKline Beecham 
and so on.  
It is important to note at this point that four companies and two joint ventures with eight 
agreements and twelve patent-agreement observations were excluded because the company data 
was not reliable.  Regarding the two JVs, it was not clear what kind of parent company patents 
and knowledge they had access to.  Considering them completely unrelated to the parent 
companies was probably not correct either. All 4 of the remaining companies are highly 
diversified, with over 30,000 patents each and two of them have a pharmaceutical or medical 
device business but the majority of their business is in other industries such as electronics, 
manufacturing, household goods, aviation, and finance.  One of these companies was so large 
that it had completed 982 acquisitions and divestitures in the 18 years since 1992. Another one 
had a very common name and it was not possible to disambiguate the name from the other 
companies in the patent assignee file with the limited resources we had. By mistakenly including 
patents of unrelated companies, we would mischaracterize the licensee’s technological position.  
Including these diversified companies would have made them not comparable to the other 
companies and would have distorted our results. This brought down our sample size to 295 
agreements and 588 patent-agreement observations.  
1.4.4 Patent data 
We use patent data to characterize the technology position of a company and the specific 
AMC technology (Jaffe, 1987; Silverman, 1999).  It has been noted that patents are an 
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 incomplete indicator of a firm’s stock of knowledge as they don’t account for expertise that is 
not protected by a patent. However, multiple studies have used patent data as a proxy for a 
company’s knowledge base using the argument that measures based on knowledge protected by 
a patent are highly correlated with uncodified and unpatented knowledge (Silverman, 1999; Patel 
and Pavitt, 1994; Narin et. al., 1987).  
Patent data have an advantage in that they are reliably available since 1963 and contain 
information that can be used to characterize the specific inventions in various ways. The most 
important information for our analyses is the technology class which has been assigned to the 
patent. Unlike many other papers that have relied on the USPTO classification system, we use 
the International Patent Classification (IPC) codes assigned to our patents by the EPO as found 
in the PatStat database.8 We also use all of the patent IPC codes rather than assigning the first 
one to be the ‘main’ IPC code. Since the EPO itself does not assign a main IPC code we do not 
worry about weighting one IPC code more than another (Benner and Weldfogel, 2008). 
The IPC codes are different from the USPTO classification codes in multiple ways.  Most 
importantly, each IPC code has five nested levels of detail from broad to detailed –  section, 
class, subclass, main group and subgroup level. USPTO classification provides only a class and a 
subclass. Furthermore, IPC codes divide the technology spectrum into finer slices - at the IPC 
subclass level which is comparable in the level of detail to the USPTO class level: there are 640 
unique subclasses while the USPTO has only about 400 unique classes (Hall et al. 2001, WIPO 
website9).  This nested quality is important for our analyses because it lets us measure 
technology fit at various levels of detail. Furthermore, with the exception of the finest level of 
                                                            
8 Pat Stat website at:  http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-24.html, accessed January 
2012 
  
9 WIPO website, FAQ, http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/faq/index.html accessed Sept 9, 2011 
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 measurement – the subgroup level (which we don’t use) - patent IPC codes are not laterally 
nested.10 USPTO patent classes are often laterally nested at the subclass level.  
Another important piece of information that is available on a patent are the citations a 
patent makes to other patents and the citations future patents make to a focal patent.  In addition 
to providing links to other patents such citations are used to determine whether a patent 
represents a pioneering or more incremental invention. Unlike citations in academic articles, the 
citations to previous patents, also referred to as prior art, delineate and limit the scope of a 
patent. If a patent cites a prior patent, it means that it cannot lay a claim to the invention in the 
previous patent. Normally, the more prior art a patent has, the more incremental it is considered 
and the more developed the technological area to which it belongs. Conversely, fewer backward 
citations imply that a patent is pioneering. Similarly, forward citations are used to determine the 
importance of the patent and are correlated with the value of inventions (Trajtenberg, 1990). If a 
patent is cited by numerous patents, it indicates that many inventors are building on the original 
invention and hence the invention is more significant (Hall et al., 2001). Furthermore, while only 
authors can add citations to papers, patent citations are added to the patent both by the patent 
filer and the patent examiner.   
In our paper we use count of patents cited by the focal patent as one of our explanatory 
variables. The use of forward citations of the focal patent, however, presents some difficulties. 
To receive forward citations a patent has to be published and the longer a patent has been 
published the higher chance it has of being cited (Mehta et al., 2001).  Through analysis of the 
                                                            
10 What this implies is that two patent IPC codes that appear next to each other are not nested within each 
other at t any of the levels except the subgroup level, which we do not use. For example A61F 2/04 is a subset of 
A61F 2/02 at the subgroup level. However, A61F 2 and A61F 3 (at the main group level) are not nested within each 
other.  See at 
http://www.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=symbol&notion=scheme&version=20120101&symbol=A61F0002940000, 
accessed January 11, 2012.  
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 overall US patent data Hall et al. (2001) show, that the average patent receives just one half of its 
lifetime citations by the tenth anniversary of its publication. About 48% of our hospital patents 
have been granted since 2000 and as such have likely not received even 50% of their expected 
lifetime citations (Hall et al., 2001). Our data is right censored - the last patent in our dataset was 
granted in July 2008 and has had only two years to get cited. Because we can’t compare total 
citation count, we construct a variable that measures ‘citations per year.’ The cites per year 
variable makes patents of different ages comparable with regards to their forward citations but at 
the expense of making a strong assumption that the distribution of forward citations is uniform 
with regard to time. It would, for example, underestimate the importance of younger patents that 
receive fewer citations early but become very important later on.  
A combination of patent citation and patent technology class information has led to the 
creation of other, composite measures to describe patents.  Two important ones are patent 
originality and patent generality. The patent originality measure uses the sum of the squared 
shares of cited patents that belong to a certain technology class to create a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) over all technology classes. The measure is 1 minus that HHI. Since we use multiple 
technology classes per patent, our measure is modified to include not the share of patents in each 
class but the share of  patent IPC codes assigned to the cited or citing patents. The fewer 
different IPC codes the cited patents belong to, the smaller the originality measure and less 
original the patent is considered to be. For example, if a patent that belongs to organic chemistry 
cites patents that are in software, organic chemistry and aviation, that would be considered a 
more original patent than one that cites only patents in organic chemistry (Hall et al., 2001).11  
The generality measure is created in a similar way – only this time, forward cites are used 
and the HHI is created over the squared share of each IPC code summed over all citing patent 
                                                            
11 We used the correction in Hall et al., 2001 for the calculation of these measures.  
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 IPC codes and subtracted from one.  A focal patent that is prior art to patents in multiple 
different classes is considered more general as it is a platform for multiple technologies in 
different fields. An example of a very general patent here could be an invention in molecular 
biology that has been cited by patents in classes as diverse as plants, drugs, electricity, 
manufacturing and electronics. Compare that to a less general molecular biology patent that is 
only cited by other patents in the molecular biology field (Hall et al., 2001).  The generality 
measure has a serious shortcoming because most patents have not received all of their future 
cites at the time of observations and hence their generality may be underrepresented.  
Another composite measure created from patent statistics is the patent scope. It is defined 
as the number of IPC codes assigned to a patent. The more IPC codes a patent has, the broader 
its scope is considered to be. It has been shown to determine patent valuations by venture 
capitalists and patent licensing outcomes (Lerner, 1994; Gambardella et. al., 2007; Decheneaux 
et al., 2008)  
1.4.4.1 Technology Similarity/Proximity Measures 
The main independent variables that we construct using patent data are our technology 
proximity measures between the focal AMC patent(s) and the patent portfolio of the interested 
firm. For this purpose we use the cosine measure pioneered by Jaffe (1986) but with 
modifications that utilize all IPC codes instead of the main USPTO patent class and at different 
levels of detail of the IPC code - subclass and main group.  
The cosine measure calculates the angular distance between two vectors that characterize 
the firm’s and the AMC patent’s position in a technology space defined by patent classes.  For 
this purpose we create a technology position vector for a firm’s portfolio Fi=(Fi1, Fi2, Fi3… Fik), 
where each ‘entry’ is the share of a firm’s patents (in our case IPC codes since one patent may 
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 have multiple IPC codes) in a certain technology class k. A technology position vector, Fj  is also 
created for the specific hospital patent under the firm’s agreement. The angular distance between 
the two vectors is then the measure of technology similarity and it ranges between zero and one, 
one being a perfect fit and zero being no overlap in technology.  It is calculated using the 




, 0 ൑ ௜ܲ௝ ൑ 1 
For companies that did not have patents filed before the date of the agreement the cosine 
measure is not defined. We replace the proximity measure for such observations with zeros 
indicating no fit and run results with and without replacement.  We also provide descriptive 
statistics and models where we exclude observations for which the cosine measure is not defined.  
We modify the cosine measure further by computing a “within section” cosine measure 
constructed based on the above formula, except we exclude all IPC codes in the firm patent 
portfolio which do not match the AMC focal patent IPC codes at the section levels. For example, 
if the AMC patent under consideration has the following two IPC codes A61K 9/12 and C07B 
12/07, we only keep the firm IPC codes that are in the A and C sections deleting IPC codes in B, 
F, G and H. This measure looks at proximity of the closest part of a company’s technology 
portfolio to the focal patent. Again firms that are left with no IPC codes that are in the two 
sections will get a cosine measure of zero.  
Both the broad and the within section cosine measures are calculated at the group and 
subclass IPC code level. However, in our models we use the regular cosine measure at the 
broader level and the within section cosine measure at the more detailed, main group, level. Our 
results do not change in direction or magnitude if we replace the within-section cosine measure 
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 at the main group level with the regular cosine measure at the main group level (i.e. without 
excluding the sections that do not match the AMC patent IPC code sections) 
1.4.5 Control Variables 
For each patent – agreement pair, we also calculate a technology age measure which is 
the time in years from the hospital patent’s patent priority date to the agreement date. The 
priority date is the date on which the first patent on a certain invention disclosure was filed with 
the USPTO. This original patent can then be divided into multiple patents if the USPTO deems 
that it contains more than one separate invention. Continuation patents can be filed from the 
original patent and continuation-in-part patents, in particular, can add some new matter. 12 Since 
the priority date is closest to the invention disclosure date, technology age calculated with the 
priority date rather than patent filing date is an indication of how mature the technology is. 
Technology risk is more likely to be resolved for older inventions as inventors or others have 
developed it further to bring it closer to market.  
An indicator variable for device was generated by looking through each patent’s claims. 
Claims of an apparatus with human body contact or some sort of an implant were marked as 
devices. The criterion was whether the invention would have required an approval by the FDA as 
a device in order to be used in the market. For example, an apparatus for growing cells would not 
be considered a device but rather a research tool. Devices include stents, artificial joints, 
catheters, surgical instruments, MRI machines and so on.  
To describe the technology further, we used indicator variables for the IPC code sections 
to which the patent belongs. Since many patents have multiple IPC codes that sometimes  belong 
                                                            
12 Note that the priority date is NOT the same date as a provisional patent date.  For more information on 
priority dates, please see http://www.yale.edu/ocr/pfg/guidelines/patent/continuation.html, accessed November 29, 
2011 
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 to different sections, we made them into mutually exclusive categories i.e. patents in section A 
only, patents in section A and C only and so on. Most of our patents are in section A – “Human 
Necessities” which includes class A61 – “Health; Life Saving; Amusement” which includes most 
drugs and medical devices. The next important section in our data is section C – “Chemistry; 
Metallurgy” which under classes C07 and C12 includes organic chemistry and biochemistry, 
molecular biology and genetic engineering.  Section G – “Physics” includes patents related to 
imaging, ultrasound and measuring.  The omitted category in our models is “C&G only” with 22 
observations and 4 additional patents that include IPC codes in B or F section.    
We also compute a few firm level variables based on patent measures. Because many of 
our firms, especially those that appear multiple times in our data undergo mergers and 
acquisitions, we are not able to include firm fixed effects. Furthermore, even though some firms 
have multiple agreements, most firms have only one or two. Our main concern in controlling for 
firm differences was to separate the old pharmaceutical companies whose expertise is mostly in 
small molecule drugs from the biotechnology companies that are specialized in molecular 
biology.  To be able to do this, we created two variables – R&D age at time of agreement and 
total number of granted patents applied for before time of agreement. The R&D age is defined as 
the time from the first filing of a patent by the firm to the time that it signs the specific agreement 
with the AMC. Unfortunately, our patent data goes only to 1963 so big pharmaceutical firms that 
have been in existence since the 1800s and licensed a technology in 1990 will be at a similar age 
with a firm that was created in 1980 and licensed a technology  in 2007. Similarly R&D age is 
not defined for firms with no patents.  
Another firm level variable that is better at distinguishing the old pharmaceutical 
companies from the young biotechnology companies is the number of firm patents at the time of 
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 agreement. Since old pharmaceutical companies have undergone multiple mergers, they have a 
substantially larger number of patents than young biotech firms. In that sense the “number of 
patents” variable is a proxy for both size and age.  Because there is a high correlation between 
R&D age and number of patents, we only include the number of patents variable in our models. 
Because we expect non-linear effects as well, since this variable’s range is very high, we also use 
its square in our analyses. 
We are interested in how the influence of proximity on licensing varies with age and size 
– i.e. with the type of the firm.  Because we have two proximity measures, interaction effects 
will be difficult to interpret. For that reason, we separate our firms in three groups based on age – 
early startups, growth startups and old companies where early startups will have filed their first 
patent between 0 and 10 years before an agreement was signed with our AMC.  Mature startups 
will have filed their first patent between 10 and 20 years before the agreement and old firms 
would have filed their first patent more than 20 years before the agreement.  Based on size, we 
split the firms in two groups – those that have fewer than 500 patents and those that have more 
than 500 patents. Those that have fewer than 500 patents are generally biotech or medical device 
firms. The other group contains all the small molecule pharmaceutical companies.  
1.4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
1.4.6.1 Patent Level Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistics for the patent level dataset are included in Tables 1.1a and 1.1b. The 
patents are separated into three different groups – those that were never looked at, those that 
were looked at but were never licensed and those patents that were licensed at least once. 
Significance levels of two tailed t-tests of comparisons between the first two groups and the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 example, the stars next to the mean value of the variable “Number of Cited Patents” in the 
“Never Looked At” group indicate that the difference of the means of the “Number of Cited 
Patents” between the “Never Looked At” and “Licensed At Least Once” groups is statistically 
significant. 
The cohort variables in Table 1b that group patents into cohorts based on their priority 
date show an interesting story– 88% of the patents that were looked at but not licensed have a 
priority date after 1995 compared to only 40% of those that have never been looked at and 25% 
of those that have been licensed. It is important to point out this can influence how the rest of the 
variables are distributed across group. This observation is not surprising because we expect that 
patents that have been only recently filed pose a higher risk for commercialization as the 
technology has not yet been tested and proven. We expect that the probability of licensing 
increases up to a certain patent age and then decreases as the remaining patent life becomes too 
short for high investments to be recovered.  
The “lead inventor experience” variable is defined as the number of inventions that the 
inventor has previously disclosed and patented at this specific technology licensing office (TLO). 
It is a proxy for the inventor’s experience both innovating and navigating the licensing process. 
Many firms can view an inventors’ previous experience as a signal of the quality of the invention 
and its commercialization potential. Furthermore, a larger number of inventions can imply 
stronger and broader IP rights if the inventor has worked on similar problems before and his 
previous inventions are related to the current ones.  We note that, as expected, the “lead inventor 
experience” variable is smaller in the “never looked at” group than in the licensed group and this 
difference is statistically significant. The patent scope variable, defined as the number of unique 
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 IPC classes on each patent (Lerner, 1994) is also intended to measure breadth of IP rights. In this 
case we find that it differs significantly between the “never looked at” and “licensed” group.  
As expected, forward cites per year and two year forward cites are largest among the 
licensed patents indicating that those are more important and more inventions build on them. 
However, the result is only statistically significant for the difference between the “Looked At, 
Not Licensed” group and the “Licensed” group.  
“Number of Cited Patents” is an indicator of how pioneering the technology is. Radically 
innovative patents would have little or no prior art because if a patent cites a previous patent, it 
means that it builds on it. We note that while 92% (140 out of 152) patents in the “Licensed” 
group cite prior patents, only 77% (66 out of 85) do in the “Never Looked At” group. This 
indicates that the more pioneering a patent is, the less likely it is to be looked at or licensed and 
the trend holds over all groups. This also implies that university technology is ahead of industry 
developments. 
This implication that firms prefer to license in more established technologies even if that 
leads to narrower IP rights is confirmed by the average age of patents cited by the AMC patents 
under the agreements. We note that of those patents that cite at least one prior work those in the 
“Never Looked At” group cite on average younger patents than those in the other groups and this 
difference is statistically significant.  
Patent originality and generality use the IPC classes to which forward cites or backward 
cites belong. As such when patents have no prior art or no forward cites as of yet, their generality 
and originality measures are undefined. As a result there are fewer observations in these 
categories. For originality, we substitute one which equals fully original for patents that have no 
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 prior art. While it does not follow the formula by which originality is calculated, it follows the 
intuitive understanding of originality.  
Our generality measure depends highly on the age of the patent. Patents that are younger 
may not even have a generality measure that is defined because they don’t have citations. Older 
patents, on the other hand, are expected to be on average more general as they have more 
citations which will have a higher chance of belonging to multiple unique classes. In fact, in our 
dataset we see that while only 25% of the whole set of  patents are missing a forward citation and 
a generality measure, only 50% of the ‘looked but not licensed category’, with the youngest 
patents on average, have any forward cites. And while we see that as a whole they have the 
highest mean generality measure, this may reflect the influence of outliers in a smaller sample.  
We can’t replace the generality measure with a zero for patents that have no future citations 
because it is possible that such citations will be received in the future. As such, we don’t use the 
generality measure in most of our models since it significantly reduces our sample size.  
Interestingly, while 38% of the patents in the ‘never looked at’ group are devices, only 
29% and 20% in the ‘looked at but not licensed’ and ‘licensed’ categories respectively are 
devices, indicating that devices are much less likely to be licensed. Licensed patents also have a 
higher number of agreements associated with them – on average 3.24 compared to only 2.23 for 
the ‘looked at but never licensed’ group and this finding is statistically significant.  
1.4.6.2 Patent-Agreement Level Descriptive Statistics  
The next level of descriptive statistics is at the agreement – patent level. In this dataset 
there are 588 observations and each observation is a patent agreement pair. Each agreement is 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 patents also have multiple agreements on them, a patent may be in the ‘deal not done’ column 
with a certain agreement and in the ‘deal done’ column with a different agreement.  
Our most important independent variables are the proximity measures. The cosine 
measure at the subclass level defines the overall broad-level proximity between a firm and a 
patent while at the main group level it represents proximity at a finer detail.  The main group 
level cosine measure is more appropriate for “within section” fit. Both measures have a range 
between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating a perfect similarity and 0 indicating no similarity between the 
focal patent and the firm patent portfolio. We note that our cosine measure at the subclass level is 
smaller in the “no deal” group than in the “deal” group, indicating that firms license technologies 
that are closer to the technology that they own. At the cosine main group level measured within 
the AMC patents’ sections, there seems to be no difference between the two groups.  
It is important to note that the cosine measures are not defined for agreements with firms 
that have no patents as they don’t have IPC classes for matching with the AMC patent. In Table 
1.2a, we first show the mean of this variable after we replace the cosine measure with a zero 
indicating no similarity between the patent and firm technology for firms that have no patents. 
The difference of the means of the cosine subclass level between the “deal” and “no deal” groups 
is statistically significant in this sample. We then exclude those observations where the cosine is 
not defined and calculate the means without replacement. The means of the cosines are not 
significantly different between the groups any more.  
Firm R&D age differs significantly between the two groups, with older firms more likely 
to conclude licenses. In fact, it is firms that are younger than 10 years that drive this result as 
seen in Table 1.2b. They are likely to look at patents but not license. This is also true for firms 
that have no patents which could be very young i.e. startups but which could also be firms that 
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 are not engaged in R&D such as contract research organizations (CROs). Similarly, firms with 
more patents are more likely to license. The results are also confirmed by the age and size 
distribution of firms in the “deal” and “no deal” groups in Table 1.2b. In fact, Table 1.2b shows 
that a larger share of the “no deal” than of “deal” observations are with firms that have no patents 
or have fewer than 500 patents.   Finally, licensing agreements (“deals”) include more hospital 
patents than “no deal” agreements, indicating that firms prefer to license large portfolios of 
patents indicating more complete intellectual property rights for related inventions.  
In confirmation of our previous result on the age of technology offered for licensing, we 
find that “deals” are significantly more likely to occur when the technology is older, indicating 
again that firms prefer more established inventions. They also prefer inventions with higher 
impact indicated by the difference between means in the two groups along the “citations 
received” variable. As expected from the patent dataset devices represent a higher percentage of 
the “deals not done.”  
The last set of descriptive statistics is at the agreement level. The difference from the 
previous table is that we are counting each agreement only once. We started with 307 agreements 
and excluded 12 firms for a sample size of 295 agreements. Again we report cosine statistics 
with replacement and no replacement. The cosine statistics at the agreement level are calculated 
over all the IPC codes over all the patents that the hospital has under the agreement. Also, at the 
agreement level we do not report a within section cosine, but rather a regular cosine at the group 
level. The results are in the same direction as the ones at the patent-agreement level but the 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 1.5 Results:  
1.5.1 Patent Level Models 
Because we have some patents that are “never looked at”, some that are “looked at but never 
licensed” and some that are “licensed at least once”, we run a number of analyses to understand 
what patent characteristics may influence licensing or interest in an invention in general. We run 
a multitude of regressions using the variables that we have described above. The results are in 
Tables 1.4a and 1.4b.  
The first models we run, reported in Table 1.4a try to explain what variables influence 
whether a patent has been looked at by a firm, how many times it has been looked at and how 
much time has passed before the first look. Each agreement, whether a CDA, MTA, option to 
license or a license is a “look”. The second set of models, in Table 1.4b has licensing outcomes 
as the dependent variable – whether a patent has been licensed, how many times it has been 
licensed and time to first license. The first models in Table 1.4a and 1.4b are logit models where 
the dependent variable is whether a patent has an agreement on it i.e. has been looked (Table 
1.4a) and whether a patent has a license on (Table 1.4b). Interestingly, we see that the variable 
that measures the number of citations received, an indication of importance, is not statistically 
significant in explaining whether a patent is looked at or licensed. However, the number of 
previous cites is positively related to whether a patent is looked at or licensed, indicating that 
more established technologies are more likely to be successful in markets for technologies. We 
also note the significance of the lead inventor experience pointing to the importance of quality 
signals in a market with a lot of product uncertainty 
Similar to the descriptive statistics, we see that patents that are devices are less likely to 
































Number of Patents Cited 0.0837*** 0.0311*** 0.0346*** 0.0225*** ‐0.110* 0.013 0.020 0.0219*
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.113 0.276 0.083
Patent Citations Received Per Year 0.023 0.042 0.058 0.039 ‐0.737 0.006 0.342* ‐0.009
0.818 0.134 0.230 0.162 0.292 0.875 0.0621 0.903
Patent Scope 0.103 ‐0.0388** ‐0.037 ‐0.0456** ‐0.16 ‐0.0952*** ‐0.007 ‐0.031
0.263 0.045 0.234 0.019 0.405 0.005 0.919 0.515
Lead Inventor Experience 0.118*** 0.0349*** 0.0380** 0.011 ‐0.293*** 0.000 0.115 0.030
0.002 0.000 0.011 0.265 0.00264 0.978 0.144 0.348
Patent Originality 0.318 0.208 0.309 0.560*** 2.399 0.0381 ‐0.976 ‐0.107
0.582 0.261 0.298 0.009 0.186 0.909 0.189 0.833
Device ‐1.047** ‐0.824*** ‐0.844*** ‐0.972*** ‐12.59 ‐0.125 ‐34.3 ‐0.523
0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.58 1.000 0.215
IPCs in Section A Only 0.425 0.234 0.289 0.409* 1.166 0.370 ‐0.099 ‐0.273
0.558 0.305 0.399 0.093 0.423 0.325 0.898 0.554
IPCs in Section C Only 0.398 ‐0.048 0.024 0.161 0.208 ‐0.040 ‐0.096 ‐1.226**
0.615 0.851 0.949 0.553 0.891 0.925 0.916 0.031
IPCs in Section G Only ‐0.250 ‐0.620** ‐0.457 ‐0.565* ‐12.69 ‐0.287 ‐0.550 ‐0.826
0.761 0.035 0.271 0.059 0.988 0.521 0.595 0.164
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 0.404 0.152 0.166 0.183 ‐0.617 ‐0.060 ‐0.151 ‐1.309***
0.576 0.507 0.626 0.449 0.678 0.875 0.841 0.006
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 1.318 0.795*** 0.826* 0.680** ‐24.07 0.397 ‐0.445 ‐0.565
0.207 0.005 0.061 0.019 1 0.424 0.729 0.404
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 1.827 0.843*** 0.946** 0.779*** ‐0.836 0.117 ‐0.566 ‐0.6
0.147 0.002 0.031 0.006 0.633 0.817 0.643 0.407
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 ‐0.901 0.646*** 0.305 0.749*** 3.522 0.346 ‐1.815 0.614
0.245 0.001 0.394 0.001 0.111 0.414 0.285 0.378
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 ‐0.481 0.062 ‐0.132 ‐0.006 1.798 ‐0.286 ‐3.095** ‐1.127**
0.389 0.743 0.633 0.976 0.376 0.361 0.041 0.029
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 0.163 ‐0.085 ‐0.139 ‐0.165 1.193 ‐0.711** ‐2.789** ‐1.177**
0.765 0.642 0.601 0.390 0.565 0.023 0.050 0.021
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 ‐0.001 0.413** 0.415 0.461** 2.454 0.307 0.105 0.177
0.998 0.016 0.109 0.010 0.216 0.298 0.924 0.708
Constant ‐0.923 ‐0.025 ‐0.132 0.109 ‐2.673
0.380 0.939 0.785 0.757 0.323
lnalpha ‐0.457***
0.006










































Number of Patents Cited 0.0926*** 0.0307*** 0.0305*** 0.008 ‐0.286*** 0.010 0.036 0.006
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.224 0.001 0.280 0.140 0.694
Patent Citations Received Per Year 0.048 0.0695** 0.0819* 0.038 ‐2.630** ‐0.027 0.339 ‐0.060
0.650 0.031 0.066 0.288 0.012 0.567 0.125 0.394
Patent Scope 0.143 0.005 0.007 ‐0.020 ‐0.397 ‐0.021 0.031 0.029
0.111 0.827 0.823 0.435 0.164 0.567 0.685 0.566
Lead Inventor Experience 0.103*** 0.0330** 0.0304* ‐0.008 ‐0.193** ‐0.0374* 0.269** ‐0.045
0.003 0.015 0.076 0.596 0.036 0.083 0.040 0.200
Patent Originality 0.384 0.389 0.417 0.267 ‐1.486 ‐0.101 0.299 ‐0.617
0.527 0.150 0.215 0.441 0.297 0.830 0.712 0.266
Device ‐1.014** ‐1.013*** ‐0.973*** ‐1.181*** ‐0.444 ‐0.210 ‐39.300 ‐0.775*
0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.684 0.454 1.000 0.082
IPCs in Section A Only 2.641*** 1.310** 1.331** 1.022* ‐0.841 ‐2.254*** 0.267 ‐1.915*
0.004 0.011 0.016 0.067 0.695 0.005 0.830 0.063
IPCs in Section C Only 3.429*** 1.375*** 1.425** 0.710 ‐4.456* ‐2.894*** 0.676 ‐2.987***
0.001 0.010 0.014 0.225 0.084 0.000 0.623 0.006
IPCs in Section G Only 1.869* 0.619 0.653 0.570 ‐0.271 ‐2.799*** 0.602 ‐2.048*
0.075 0.291 0.304 0.368 0.914 0.002 0.720 0.079
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 3.083*** 1.248** 1.321** 0.566 ‐5.361** ‐3.264*** ‐0.390 ‐3.839***
0.001 0.015 0.017 0.312 0.024 0.000 0.745 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 3.711*** 2.097*** 2.202*** 1.097* ‐32.300 ‐2.662*** 0.631 ‐3.023***
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.067 1.000 0.002 0.712 0.008
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 3.355*** 1.216** 1.234* 0.556 ‐4.815** ‐3.808*** ‐0.044 ‐2.919**
0.004 0.039 0.058 0.379 0.049 0.000 0.978 0.011
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 1.438* 1.873*** 1.787*** 1.644*** 1.010 ‐0.316 ‐19.160 ‐0.946
0.080 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.689 0.542 0.253
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 1.743*** 1.471*** 1.436*** 1.191** ‐0.864 ‐0.212 ‐19.67*** ‐1.096
0.005 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.692 0.624 0.000 0.108
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 2.239*** 1.518*** 1.559*** 1.136** ‐2.809 ‐0.831* ‐18.09*** ‐0.898
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.196 0.064 0.000 0.183
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 0.401 1.110*** 1.092** 1.371*** 2.358 0.077 ‐20.93*** ‐0.617
0.493 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.247 0.862 0.000 0.365
Constant ‐5.715*** ‐3.190*** ‐3.251*** ‐1.472* 7.626**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.033
lnalpha ‐0.893***
0.002






 developments (Chatterji et al 2008). It could, however be due to the fact that new devices do not 
always require AMC resources or government funding to develop and the best ones may be 
patented outside of the AMC technology commercialization process. Alternatively, the 
successful ones could be developed in close collaboration with industry under sponsored 
research agreements and may thus be excluded from our dataset.  
The results are repeated in the next two models – the Poisson and negative binomial- 
where the dependent variable is the number of times a patent has been considered for licensing or 
licensed.  Because from Table 1.1a we see that both dependent variables “times looked” at and 
“times licensed” are over-dispersed with the standard error slightly higher than the mean, we 
conduct a likelihood ratio test which shows that the negative binomial, rather than the Poisson, is 
the appropriate model. 
We also run a zero-inflated version of these models because we have an excess number 
of zeros in both variables (number of times looked and number of times licensed). In our sample 
of 285 patents, 85 patents have never been looked at and 132 have never been licensed (includes 
not looked at and looked at but not licensed). This zero-inflated models have two parts –a 
Poisson model and a logit model.  The dependent variable in the Poisson part of the model is the 
number of times a patent has been looked at or licensed, conditional on being looked at or 
licensed, respectively. The separate inflation model which is a simple logit explains the excess 
zeros. Even though the zero inflated negative binomial model would be more appropriate, it 
doesn’t converge and we report results from the zero inflated Poisson. A Vuong test shows that 
the zero inflated model is more appropriate than the regular Poisson.  
The results from the zero-inflated Poisson models are similar to the previous three 
models.  Interestingly, once controlled for the number of patents cited, a higher patent originality 
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 predicts more agreements, conditional on there being at least one agreement on the patent. The 
lack of lead inventor experience seems to determine whether a patent is never looked at or 
licensed but not the number of times it has been looked at or licensed. Our patent scope results 
contradict previous literature and seem to influence our dependent variables negatively and in 
some models at a statistically significant level (Lerner, 1994; Decheneaux, 2009; Gambardella et 
al. 2007) 
The last three models are Cox hazard models. Here the dependent variable is time to first 
agreement. Positive results indicate that as the independent variable increases, so does the hazard 
of an agreement. Note, however, that for ease of interpretation beta coefficients are reported 
rather than hazard ratios.  Hazard ratios can be calculated by raising e to the power of the 
reported coefficient.  We report a regular Cox hazard model in the first column, then stratified by 
lead inventor and then by a shared frailty (the equivalent of a random effects model) where each 
group is identified by a lead inventor and includes said lead inventor’s patents. Our results are 
similar to those from the previous models but are not statistically significant in the same manner.  
The models in Table 1.4b are the same as the ones in Table 1.4a, except that the 
dependent variables are related to licensing – i.e. licensed, times licensed, and time to license. 
The direction and the significance of the results are practically the same as well, except for the 
scope variable which is no longer negative and statistically significant. Another difference is that 
the “patent cites per year” variable is now positive and statistically significant in two of our 
models.  
1.4.2 Patent-Agreement Level Models 
Our patent-agreement level analyses are our main results. They test our hypothesis that 
technology proximity between a focal patent and a potential licensee’s patent portfolio is a 
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 determinant of whether a license will take place. All our models are logistic regressions (logits) 
with a dependent variable – “deal” – that is equal to one if a license was signed and zero if a deal 
was not done. Our full model is the last one in the respective table and it includes all our control 
variables. We start with a logit of our dependent variable with only the respective 
proximity/similarity measures. We then try a bare-bones proximity and licensee variable model. 
For our remaining models we start again with the fit measure and add patent citation based 
measures such as forward cites, backward cites and scope. We then add patent variables 
constructed based on cites and IPC codes - originality measure, generality measure.  Technology 
type controls are added next – i.e.  a device indicator variable and mutually exclusive dummy 
variables based on IPC classification by sections. Age variables are included next - technology 
age at time of agreement and cohort dummies for each 5 year period since 1980 based on the 
patent priority date. Finally, we add licensee variables – the number of granted patents that the 
licensee had filed before the time of the agreement and the square of the number of such patents.  
Our main models in Table 1.5a test our hypotheses above that firms are more likely to 
license inventions that are similar but not too similar. We operationalize our technology 
proximity measures using the cosine variables described above. This model includes our entire 
sample with 588 patent–agreement level observations. We replace the cosine measures with 0s in 
cases in which they are not defined because the agreement firm has no patents. In table 1.5b we 
exclude those observations with undefined cosine measures and are left with 424 observations. 
As seen from the tables, the sign and statistical significance of our proximity coefficients is 
unchanged.  
We see in these models that a higher technological proximity between the firm and the 
AMC patent, measured at the IPC code subclass level, is more likely to be associated with a 
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 5.1a  5.2a  5.3a  5.4a  5.5a  5.6a  5.7a  5.8a
Cosine Subclass Level 1.157*** 1.285*** 1.127*** 1.977*** 1.361*** 1.238*** 1.085** 1.276***
0.006 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.008
Within Section Cosine, Group Level -0.921** -1.056** -0.968** -2.079*** -1.259*** -1.031** -0.856* -1.042**
0.032 0.014 0.028 0.001 0.010 0.037 0.094 0.041
Patent Scope 0.050 0.051 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.271*** 0.260***
0.122 0.229 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.000
Number of Patents Cited 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.004 -0.004 -0.006
0.948 0.375 0.526 0.637 0.763 0.643
Patent Citations Received Per Year 0.373*** 0.218** 0.404*** 0.378*** 0.264** 0.272**
0.001 0.043 0.000 0.001 0.037 0.033
Patent Originality -0.195 1.014** 0.853 1.310** 1.291**
0.717 0.047 0.101 0.028 0.032
Device -0.332 -0.308 -0.180 -0.110
0.274 0.321 0.612 0.765
IPCs in Section A Only 1.539*** 1.492** 1.746*** 1.570**
0.009 0.012 0.009 0.018
IPCs in Section C Only 2.551*** 2.454*** 3.264*** 3.199***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section G Only 0.768 0.828 1.588* 1.519*
0.344 0.286 0.055 0.076
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 1.573*** 1.408** 2.133*** 1.923***
0.008 0.017 0.001 0.004
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 1.948*** 1.737** 2.096** 1.889**
0.005 0.013 0.013 0.020
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 0.266 -0.134 -0.552 -0.605
0.701 0.852 0.510 0.464
Technology Age in Years 0.0760*** -0.005 -0.006
0.001 0.837 0.812
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 1.888*** 2.038***
0.004 0.002
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 2.088*** 2.122***
0.000 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 2.762*** 2.793***
0.000 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 -0.075 -0.063
0.884 0.906
Lead Inventor Experience -0.022 -0.015 -0.019 -0.033 -0.017 -0.019 -0.037 -0.027
0.204 0.413 0.297 0.132 0.398 0.340 0.120 0.263
Number of Firm Patents 0.000156* 0.000265**
0.065 0.013




Constant 0.110 -0.131 -0.325 0.347 -2.805*** -2.965*** -4.666*** -4.709***
0.526 0.484 0.170 0.586 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 588 588 588 440 588 588 588 588
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5a This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. "deal") 
and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal").  Each observation corresponds to a patent-agreement pair - a patent can 
have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital 
patent which is under the agreement. Firms for which a cosine measure was not defined because the firm has no patents of its own 
were assigned a cosine measure of 0 in these models.  P-values  under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
44
5.1b 5.2b 5.3b 5.4b 5.5b 5.6b 5.7b 5.8b
Cosine Subclass Level 1.039** 1.430*** 0.928** 1.905*** 1.434*** 1.149** 1.234** 1.683***
0.019 0.001 0.040 0.003 0.009 0.040 0.034 0.006
Within Section Cosine, Group Level -0.983** -1.033** -1.046** -2.287*** -1.508*** -1.193** -1.211** -1.375**
0.023 0.017 0.019 0.000 0.006 0.034 0.042 0.022
Patent Scope 0.0694* 0.054 0.108** 0.0879* 0.324*** 0.308***
0.057 0.293 0.019 0.063 0.000 0.000
Number of Patents Cited -0.003 0.009 0.012 0.008 -0.008 -0.010
0.778 0.436 0.282 0.486 0.599 0.525
Patent Citations Received Per Year 0.440*** 0.387** 0.541*** 0.492*** 0.356** 0.383**
0.001 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.019
Patent Originality 0.729 1.492** 1.199* 1.755** 1.902**
0.327 0.018 0.064 0.024 0.019
Device -0.631 -0.605 -0.343 -0.235
0.100 0.121 0.408 0.583
IPCs in Section A Only 1.773** 1.682** 2.107** 1.953**
0.037 0.045 0.024 0.042
IPCs in Section C Only 2.723*** 2.596*** 3.492*** 3.495***
0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001
IPCs in Section G Only 0.364 0.555 1.529 1.358
0.783 0.645 0.198 0.288
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 1.854** 1.673** 2.591*** 2.374**
0.031 0.048 0.007 0.016
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 2.922*** 2.746*** 3.320*** 3.135***
0.004 0.006 0.006 0.009
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 0.446 0.102 -0.730 -0.746
0.653 0.922 0.564 0.562
Technology Age in Years 0.104*** -0.010 -0.015
0.000 0.778 0.687
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 1.721** 1.847**
0.018 0.014
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 1.819*** 1.708**
0.006 0.011
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 2.170*** 2.148***
0.000 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 -0.747 -0.792
0.190 0.179
Lead Inventor Experience -0.016 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.016 -0.005
0.432 0.727 0.785 0.754 0.748 0.855 0.607 0.881
Number of Firm Patents 0.000184** 0.000268**
0.039 0.019




Constant 0.168 -0.304 -0.337 -0.233 -3.500*** -3.598*** -5.053*** -5.342***
0.435 0.226 0.250 0.766 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Observations 424 424 424 304 424 424 424 424
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5b This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. "deal") 
and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal").  Each observation corresponds to a patent-agreement pair - a patent can 
have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital 
patent which is under the agreement. Firms for which a cosine measure was not defined because the firm has no patents are excluded 
from these models. P-values  under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 license i.e. a “deal.”  Holding subclass level proximity constant, however, a higher technological 
proximity measured at the main group level of the IPC codes is less likely to result in a deal.  
This result is hard to comprehend because of the complexity of the measures. A stylized 
example may be useful to let us abstract from the details of the patent classes by using more 
easily understandable consumer product categories that may be protected by these patents. Note 
that this is a simplification for clarification purposes– our IPC subclass level and IPC main group 
levels do not necessarily correspond to the product categories described here, including their 
breath and generality.  
  Imagine a medical device company A that has 10 patents - 5 for metal and 5 for ceramic 
prosthetic hip implants. These technologies are all in the ‘prosthetic hips’ area at the broad level 
of measurement but different at the more granular level – ‘type of prosthetic hip.’ Another firm 
B also has 10 patents but all 10 for plastic hip implants. A third firm C, also a medical device 
company has patents for stents and catheters but none in the hip implants area. All three firms 
have signed confidentiality agreements showing interest in an AMC patent of a plastic hip 
implant.   If we only looked at the broad level measures, both firm A and firm B would be more 
likely to license the new plastic hip implant patent that is offered by our AMC than firm C – their 
technology proximity measure to the patent offered is higher than that of  firm C. Also, firm A 
would be as equally likely to license it as firm B as their proximity measure values are the same 
at this level.  
Now let’s look at firm A and firm B, at the more granular level of proximity, controlling 
for the higher level proximity. Based on our results we would expect that firm A is more likely to 
license the AMC patent than firm B. While firm B already has plastic hip implant patents, firm A 
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 has none, so at the granular level of measurement, firm B’s portfolio is closer to the focal patent 
than firm A’s portfolio which makes it less likely to license it.   
These results are in fact intuitive. A match at the broad level (i.e. hip implants) is useful 
since it indicates that both firms may have specific complementary technologies to the focal 
patent. One example would be that both firms have their own technology that deals with specific 
implant shape (i.e. implant is hollow inside to enhance movement) or components needed to 
attach the implant. These broad level technologies would be likely relevant to implants of any 
materials. In general, their existing broad level complementary technologies will increase their 
marginal benefit of licensing any patent for which they are relevant. However, firm B already 
has its own plastic implant technology. If it licensed our focal patent, it would most likely be 
duplicating its own technology at a cost. Furthermore, choosing outside plastic hip technology 
over internally developed one may be harder given the lack of knowledge about the outside 
technology and the difficulty in transferring tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; von Hippel, 1988; 
Agarwal, 2006). This implies that a higher similarity measured at the more granular, detailed 
level is likely to not result in a license.  
To understand whether these results are different for different types of firms, we split our 
sample by firm R&D age and by firm size. Our goal is to separate firms that are based on 
different types of technology platforms - young biotech firms that do mostly large molecule drug 
development and older pharmaceutical firms specializing in small molecule drug discovery. Our 
samples are not entirely “clean” in the sense that there are also medical device and software 
companies in both groups. Furthermore, the distinction between biotech and pharmaceutical 
firms has grown blurrier over the years as pharmaceutical firms have also developed large 
molecule drug technologies and young biotechnology companies who started based on one 
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 specific invention have developed related expertise. Interaction effects would have been better 
for these exercises but they would have complicated interpretation significantly because we have 
two different variables we want to interact with multiple size and age variables.  
In Tables 1.6a through 1.6c we split our sample in different groups by age - firms with an 
R&D age of less than 10 years, those with an R&D age between 10 and 20 years and firms older 
than 20 years. We note that our results have the same sign as in the full sample models but are 
not statistically significant in many of the models in the first age group, especially the measures 
based on more granular IPC code slices at the IPC main group level. Our results are, however 
very strong in terms of both size and statistical significance in the 10-20 year old firms group. 
They are also strong in a few of the models in the older firm group. Note however, that the 
addition of technology age and technology cohort variables changes the value and significance of 
the proximity measures indicating that they are related. It is also interesting to point out here that 
technology age is negative and significant among medium aged firms (10-20 years of R&D) and 
positive and significant for older firms (20+ years of R&D). This implies that older firms are 
more likely to license older and more established technologies, while younger firms may be 
more willing to undertake risks. This result is not driven by inventor startups, however, as those 
would have no patents at the time of licensing and would not be in any of the age groups. Note 
that several of our control variables for IPC code section and cohort drop resulting in smaller 
sample sizes for some of the models.  
We then go on to split our samples by size. By looking at firm names and the number of 
patents that they own at time of licensing we find out that most biotechnology firms have fewer 
than 500 patents and most big pharmaceutical companies have more than 500 patents. Again, this 
division is not “clean” in the sense discussed above. The sign of our major results hold again. 
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 6.1a  6.2a 6.3a 6.4a 6.5a 6.6a 6.7a  6.8a
Cosine Subclass Level 0.763 0.818 0.959 1.529 2.012* 2.007* 2.919* 2.934*
0.333 0.315 0.232 0.239 0.096 0.098 0.051 0.079
Within Section Cosine, Group 0.455 0.533 ‐0.158 ‐0.776 ‐1.631 ‐1.614 ‐3.708* ‐3.305
0.584 0.528 0.861 0.552 0.242 0.259 0.075 0.108
Patent Scope ‐0.079 ‐0.159 ‐0.197 ‐0.198 ‐0.190 ‐0.200
0.603 0.472 0.453 0.456 0.502 0.536
Number of Patents Cited ‐0.029 ‐0.018 ‐0.036 ‐0.035 ‐0.048 ‐0.046
0.236 0.517 0.311 0.343 0.341 0.368
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.686** 0.525 1.143*** 1.132*** 1.211** 1.469**
0.026 0.114 0.002 0.003 0.027 0.022
Patent Originality 0.459 0.634 0.615 ‐0.859 ‐0.627
0.723 0.647 0.662 0.598 0.736
Device 1.327 1.311 1.660 1.009
0.131 0.140 0.225 0.474
IPCs in Section A Only 15.49*** 16.36*** 18.64*** 19.40***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section C Only 15.67*** 16.54*** 20.15*** 21.22***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section G Only 13.95*** 14.84*** 17.67*** 18.13***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 16.76*** 17.63*** 21.89*** 22.24***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 15.17*** 16.03*** 0.006 1.687
0.000 0.000 0.998 0.578
Lead Inventor Experience ‐0.004 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.011
0.919 0.904 0.845 0.773 0.976 0.980 0.998 0.863
Number of Firm Patents 0.062 0.107*
0.103 0.091




Technology Age in Years 0.006 ‐0.097 ‐0.085
0.934 0.319 0.462
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 18.24*** 17.63***
0.000 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 1.112 0.963
0.366 0.481
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 ‐2.200** ‐2.520**
0.037 0.019
Constant ‐1.077** ‐1.661*** ‐1.114 ‐0.173 ‐17.47*** ‐18.34*** ‐19.05*** ‐20.76***
0.042 0.007 0.137 0.906 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 110 110 110 76 105 105 98 98
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.6a Sample of firms that are older than 0 and younger than 10 years at time of agreement
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. 
"deal") and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal"). Each observation corresponds to a patent-agreement 
pair - a patent can have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. The sample is 
restricted to agreements where the firm technology age (i.e. time between the first patent that the firm filed and the agreement 
that it signed for the AMC patent)  is smaller than 10 years. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital patent which is 
under the agreement. P-values under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 6.1b  6.2b 6.3b 6.4b 6.5b 6.6b  6.7b 6.8b
Cosine Subclass Level 1.610** 1.787** 1.930** 2.634*** 2.172** 3.022*** 4.013*** 4.397**
0.021 0.046 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.027
Within Section Cosine, Group -2.331*** -2.456** -2.533*** -3.507*** -3.074*** -4.145*** -3.993*** -3.781***
0.002 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006
Patent Scope -0.129 -0.158 0.023 0.087 0.542* 0.593
0.333 0.364 0.901 0.624 0.092 0.118
Number of Patents Cited 0.039 0.053 0.031 0.024 0.0935* 0.111*
0.159 0.138 0.425 0.585 0.056 0.075
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.196 0.139 0.425 0.472* 0.404 0.482
0.501 0.710 0.137 0.095 0.205 0.174
Patent Originality -1.115 0.691 1.434 0.483 1.305
0.502 0.733 0.505 0.815 0.571
Device -0.541 -0.984 -2.839** -2.752**
0.459 0.210 0.017 0.046
IPCs in Section A Only 2.611** 3.501*** 18.70*** 17.98***
0.032 0.005 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section C Only 3.341*** 3.901*** 20.70*** 20.42***
0.010 0.003 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 1.288 1.915* 17.51*** 16.99***
0.273 0.092 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 2.730 4.103** 19.30*** 18.72***
0.108 0.021 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 0.958 1.817 16.74*** 16.02***
0.469 0.150 0.000 0.000
Lead Inventor Experience 0.014 0.015 -0.034 -0.052 -0.051 -0.045 -0.065 -0.100
0.762 0.743 0.539 0.397 0.358 0.416 0.308 0.186
Number of Firm Patents -0.001 -0.00803**
0.581 0.020




Technology Age in Years -0.179*** -0.182** -0.254**
0.00484 0.042 0.024
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 -1.687 -0.577
0.395 0.832
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 -1.366 -1.210
0.392 0.534
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 -3.448** -3.653*
0.0245 0.063
Constant 0.432 0.461 0.558 2.174 -2.183 -2.668 -17.56*** -17.02***
0.342 0.349 0.434 0.276 0.386 0.297 0 0.000
Observations 134 134 134 108 133 133 114 114
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.6b: Sample of firms that are older than 10 and younger than 20 years at time of agreement
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. 
"deal") and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal"). Each observation corresponds to a patent-
agreement pair - a patent can have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. The 
sample is restricted to agreements where the firm technology age (i.e. time between the first patent that the firm filed and 
the agreement that it signed for the AMC patent)  is larger than 10 and smaller than 20. Patent level measures correspond 
to the hospital patent which is under the agreement. P-values under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 6.1c  6.2c 6.3c 6.4c 6.5c 6.6c 6.7c  6.8c
Cosine Subclass Level 2.116** 2.827*** 1.998* 2.893* 3.256*** 0.802 0.747 2.926*
0.024 0.002 0.055 0.060 0.007 0.538 0.531 0.078
Within Section Cosine, Group ‐1.626** ‐1.336** ‐1.571** ‐2.974** ‐2.970*** ‐1.626 ‐1.238 ‐1.678
0.018 0.045 0.040 0.018 0.004 0.180 0.373 0.253
Patent Scope 0.142** 0.173* 0.123 0.142 0.300** 0.467**
0.011 0.053 0.107 0.176 0.042 0.018
Number of Patents Cited ‐0.011 ‐0.006 0.0377* 0.013 ‐0.003 ‐0.006
0.432 0.748 0.058 0.573 0.887 0.847
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.533** 0.613** 0.970*** 0.941*** 0.668** 0.826**
0.013 0.041 0.002 0.001 0.036 0.015
Patent Originality 1.759 2.738** 2.780* 2.344 2.780
0.141 0.041 0.055 0.180 0.174
Device ‐3.125*** ‐2.463** ‐1.232 ‐1.058
0.001 0.020 0.294 0.472
IPCs in Section A Only ‐0.084 ‐0.156 ‐1.048 ‐1.640
0.937 0.856 0.413 0.192
IPCs in Section C Only 2.171* 2.056** 1.225 1.989
0.054 0.027 0.302 0.108
IPCs in Section G Only 3.818** 3.891** 1.352 1.069
0.011 0.038 0.512 0.631
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 0.673 0.549 ‐0.181 ‐1.204
0.514 0.518 0.896 0.379
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 2.360* 2.712** 1.785 1.779
0.086 0.019 0.370 0.349
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only ‐0.364 0.167 ‐0.152 ‐0.675
0.801 0.911 0.915 0.669
Lead Inventor Experience ‐0.010 ‐0.029 0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.031 0.014 ‐0.003 0.036
0.780 0.441 0.938 0.960 0.543 0.799 0.956 0.588
Number of Firm Patents 0.0003** 0.00076***
0.037 0.000




Technology Age in Years 0.319*** 0.217*** 0.316***
0.000 0.007 0.001
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 4.381** 5.029***
0.024 0.010
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 2.655 2.935
0.155 0.113
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 1.324 1.601
0.458 0.357
Constant 0.274 ‐0.718 ‐0.558 ‐1.112 ‐3.258** ‐5.041*** ‐5.579*** ‐9.334***
0.416 0.106 0.238 0.369 0.033 0.001 0.001 0.000
Observations 180 180 180 120 180 180 180 180
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.6c: Sample of firms that are older than 20 years at time of agreement
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. 
"deal") and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal"). Each observation is a patent-agreement pair - a 
patent can have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. The sample is restricted 
to agreements where the firm technology age (i.e. time between the first patent that the firm filed and the agreement that it 
signed for the AMC patent)  is larger than 20 years. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital patent which is under 
the agreement. P-values under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 7.1a  7.2a  7.3a 7.4a 7.5a 7.7a 7.7a  7.8a
Cosine Subclass Level 0.956* 0.915* 1.074** 2.043*** 1.498** 1.466** 1.325* 1.455*
0.080 0.091 0.048 0.008 0.028 0.034 0.081 0.075
Within Section Cosine, Group ‐0.278 ‐0.349 ‐0.436 ‐1.598* ‐0.766 ‐0.741 ‐0.801 ‐1.289
0.646 0.563 0.483 0.058 0.320 0.341 0.377 0.199
Patent Scope ‐0.176* ‐0.167 ‐0.111 ‐0.114 0.334** 0.331**
0.057 0.162 0.285 0.276 0.033 0.032
Number of Patents Cited ‐0.014 0.005 ‐0.008 ‐0.007 ‐0.005 ‐0.008
0.299 0.767 0.672 0.698 0.820 0.745
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.470*** 0.353* 0.585*** 0.566*** 0.272 0.413*
0.008 0.089 0.000 0.001 0.158 0.059
Patent Originality 0.285 1.760** 1.683** 2.000** 1.806*
0.746 0.019 0.027 0.028 0.070
Device ‐0.386 ‐0.377 ‐0.514 ‐0.714
0.333 0.343 0.301 0.175
IPCs in Section A Only 1.733* 1.707* 2.458** 2.233**
0.058 0.062 0.015 0.037
IPCs in Section C Only 1.890* 1.892* 3.583*** 3.574***
0.057 0.055 0.002 0.002
IPCs in Section G Only ‐1.329 ‐1.266 0.818 0.651
0.395 0.413 0.602 0.684
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 1.149 1.138 2.556** 2.494**
0.211 0.214 0.015 0.023
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 2.452** 2.377** 2.450* 2.987**
0.033 0.041 0.091 0.041
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only ‐0.374 ‐0.425 ‐0.841 ‐0.915
0.744 0.718 0.540 0.526
Technology Age in Years 0.018 ‐0.042 ‐0.053
0.633 0.382 0.270
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 1.241 1.310
0.198 0.185
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 1.485* 1.049
0.065 0.189
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 2.219*** 2.398***
0.003 0.001
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 ‐1.132* ‐1.310*
0.078 0.052
Lead Inventor Experience ‐0.007 ‐0.005 ‐0.016 ‐0.011 ‐0.013 ‐0.013 ‐0.003 0.002
0.794 0.839 0.589 0.761 0.704 0.704 0.934 0.963
Number of Firm Patents 0.005 0.0147**
0.225 0.011




Constant ‐0.331 ‐0.396 0.038 0.292 ‐2.953** ‐2.955** ‐5.220*** ‐5.073***
0.251 0.210 0.930 0.771 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.002
Observations 266 266 266 191 266 266 266 266
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7a Sample of firms that have more than 0 and less then 500 patents at time of agreement
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a 
license (i.e. "deal") and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal"). Each observation corresponds 
to a patent-agreement pair - a patent can have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with 
multiple patents. The sample is restricted to agreements where the firm has more than 0 and less then 500 patents. 
Patent level measures correspond to the hospital patent which is under the agreement. P-values under coefficients. 
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7.1b  7.2b 7.3b 7.4b 7.5b 7.7b  7.7b  7.8b
Cosine Subclass Level 1.510 1.683 0.335 0.315 3.400* 0.493 1.803 7.380***
0.237 0.159 0.819 0.866 0.061 0.812 0.365 0.008
Within Section Cosine, Group ‐2.406*** ‐1.996*** ‐2.605*** ‐4.194*** ‐4.014*** ‐2.920** ‐2.787** ‐3.484***
0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.024 0.004
Patent Scope 0.171** 0.159* 0.056 0.057 0.257 0.475**
0.013 0.050 0.511 0.582 0.121 0.047
Number of Patents Cited 0.006 0.017 0.0619*** 0.0443* 0.016 0.034
0.661 0.453 0.007 0.078 0.532 0.343
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.667** 0.868* 1.367*** 1.257*** 1.113*** 1.446***
0.025 0.053 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002
Patent Originality 1.469 2.614 2.615 1.548 3.103
0.387 0.107 0.128 0.464 0.311
Device ‐3.683*** ‐3.017** ‐1.310 ‐1.775
0.004 0.018 0.317 0.286
IPCs in Section A Only 13.60*** 13.53*** 9.123*** 9.607***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section C Only 16.44*** 15.46*** 12.29*** 14.25***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Section G Only 18.15*** 17.64*** 12.49*** 13.81***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 14.38*** 14.10*** 10.46*** 10.48***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 16.85*** 16.95*** 13.47*** 15.03***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 14.57*** 14.51*** 11.17*** 12.00***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Technology Age in Years 0.247*** 0.260*** 0.275**
0.000 0.007 0.013
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 4.600** 7.769***
0.048 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 3.913* 5.313***
0.054 0.005
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 1.843 2.079
0.366 0.270
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 1.495 1.150
0.470 0.556
Lead Inventor Experience ‐0.004 ‐0.009 0.022 0.017 ‐0.032 0.008 0.033 0.040
0.918 0.815 0.614 0.768 0.601 0.895 0.691 0.659
Number of Firm Patents 0.000 0.00108***
0.321 0.001




Constant 0.797* 0.066 ‐0.166 ‐0.210 ‐16.71*** ‐17.56*** ‐15.89*** ‐23.23***
0.069 0.910 0.755 0.890 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 158 158 158 113 158 158 158 158
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7b Sample of firms that have more than 500 patents at time of agreement
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. 
"deal") and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal"). Each observation corresponds to a patent-agreement 
pair - a patent can have multiple agreements and each agreement can be associated with multiple patents. The sample is 
restricted to agreements where the firm has more than 500 patents. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital patent 
which is under the agreement. P-values under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 Interestingly, the results are only statistically significant for the cosine measure at the subclass 
level in the smaller sized group and only for the cosine measure at the more granular, main group 
level for the larger firms. This implies that finding a closely related technology is more important 
for smaller firms while not duplicating efforts may be more important for larger firms. Note, 
however, that controlling for size in the sample of firms with more than 500 patents gives us very 
large and highly significant coefficients for both proximity measures in the full model.  
The next set of models in Table 1.8 includes only the first agreement that is signed for a 
patent whether it is a “deal” or “no deal.” We are interested in these results because we are 
concerned that whether the first agreement is a “deal” or “no deal” may signal patent quality and 
may influence future licenses, especially non-exclusive licenses of which there may be 
potentially many per patent. An exclusively licensed invention, on the other hand, takes the 
patent off the market. Of the 200 patents that have at least one agreement, 6 are excluded 
because of licensee issues (discussed in the data section) and we are left with 194 patent-first 
agreement pairs. Our technology proximity results from the previous models still hold in this 
sample and are statistically significant indicating that the results are robust and are not driven by 
a few patents that have been licensed multiple times since each patent appears only once in this 
dataset.  
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we addressed a gap in the literature on markets for technology by taking a 
close look at the demand for technology. While this has been attempted in previous papers, our 
unique dataset that includes not only firms that licensed technologies but also showed interest in 
them but did not license provides an important control group for our description of the structure 
of such markets.  We showed that proximity matters in the technologies firms decided to license. 
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8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.8
Cosine Subclass Level 2.095** 1.465* 1.664* 3.993*** 1.847* 1.722 2.725** 2.744**
0.017 0.090 0.065 0.002 0.090 0.114 0.021 0.021
Within Section Cosine, Group ‐2.651*** ‐1.856** ‐2.325** ‐4.984*** ‐2.507** ‐2.519** ‐2.473** ‐2.460**
0.002 0.033 0.011 0.001 0.029 0.022 0.018 0.031
Patent Scope 0.101** ‐0.003 0.145* 0.106 0.438** 0.448***
0.042 0.971 0.051 0.252 0.011 0.009
Number of Patents Cited ‐0.001 ‐0.012 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.012
0.943 0.608 0.540 0.618 0.731 0.660
Patent Cites Received Per Year 0.299 0.062 0.344 0.350 ‐0.137 ‐0.134
0.186 0.531 0.128 0.113 0.109 0.110
Patent Originality 0.207 0.964 0.935 0.953 1.159
0.861 0.252 0.287 0.494 0.469
Device 0.097 0.031 0.343 0.380
0.857 0.957 0.645 0.603
IPCs in Section A Only 2.117** 2.331** 3.986** 3.803**
0.020 0.031 0.010 0.013
IPCs in Section C Only 3.147*** 3.164*** 6.434*** 6.290***
0.002 0.006 0.003 0.002
IPCs in Section G Only 1.287 1.287 4.725** 4.085**
0.258 0.311 0.016 0.022
IPCs in Sections A and C Only 2.074** 2.057* 4.641** 4.441**
0.022 0.053 0.015 0.018
IPCs in Sections A and G Only 1.924 1.993 3.914 4.154
0.135 0.154 0.136 0.146
IPCs in Sections A, C and G Only 2.584** 2.772** 4.991** 6.382*
0.028 0.035 0.023 0.054
Technology Age in Years 0.161** ‐0.058 ‐0.132
0.021 0.588 0.410
Patent Priority Date in 1981-85 3.338** 3.556**
0.027 0.039
Patent Priority Date in 1986-90 5.322*** 5.178***
0.000 0.000
Patent Priority Date in 1991-95 4.809*** 4.518***
0.000 0.001
Patent Priority Date in 1996-00 ‐0.249 ‐0.300
0.788 0.760
Lead Inventor Experience ‐0.026 ‐0.0989** ‐0.024 ‐0.024 ‐0.065 ‐0.064
0.436 0.038 0.518 0.528 0.233 0.258
Number of Firm Patents ‐0.000661** ‐0.001
0.010 0.306




Constant 0.576*** 0.515** 0.267 4.183** ‐2.811** ‐3.138** ‐7.631*** ‐7.324**
0.006 0.022 0.480 0.014 0.026 0.035 0.010 0.014
Observations 194 194 194 145 194 194 194 194
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8 First Agreement Models
This table shows logit models with a dependent variable equal to 1 if the FIRST confidentiality agreement became a license (i.e. "deal") 
and 0 if the agreement did not result in a license (i.e. "no deal").  Each observation corresponds to a patent-agreement pair. Only the first 
agreement for each patent was selected. Patent level measures correspond to the hospital patent which is under the agreement. Firms 
for which a cosine measure was not defined because the firm has no patents of its own were assigned a cosine measure of 0 in 
these models. P-values  under coefficients. Robust Standard Errors
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 Our identification comes from variation within a group that showed at least a threshold level of 
interest in the technology by contacting the licensing office and signing a confidentiality 
agreement. Future research will expand on this by identifying a larger population of potential 
buyers in this market based on some other measure of interest –  we currently do not include 
informal channels through which information may have been obtained or inquiries that did not 
result in signing of a confidentiality agreement.  
We also contribute to the literature on measurement of technology proximity by using a 
new patent statistic – the international patent class which with its nested structure allows for 
proximity measurement at the broad as well as granular level between different (portfolios of) 
patents. We also improved on existing measures by including multiple classes rather than just 
one, resulting in more robust results (Benner and Weldfogel, 2008). Further comparison and 
validation of these new measures is in order.   
Ultimately the real question is whether these technologies make it to the product market 
once they are licensed and how the technology proximity, either at the broad or the granular level 
influences that outcome. It would be interesting to know whether in-licensed technologies that 
are very close to the licensee’s in-house developed technology are strategically shelved or 
perhaps not absorbed by the firm due to behavioral resistance to outside innovations, the so 
called “not-invented-here” syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982; Thursby and Thursby, 2004). We 
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 2. TRANSLATING INVENTIONS INTO PRODUCTS: INVENTORS’ EDUCATIONAL 




The great leaps that have been made in basic life sciences in recent decades have brought 
to light the need for translating these research findings into practical applications.1 NIH’s support 
for translational research emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary team 
collaboration as well as training of interdisciplinary researchers, specifically people who are 
educated both in the clinical and research domains. In this paper I use invention and patent data 
from two large Academic Medical Centers with over $1.2 billion in combined research revenue 
in 2011. My goal is to understand whether inventions created by inventors with boundary 
bridging, cross-domain2 educational background are at a higher hazard of licensing. I use 
licensing as a proxy for translating an invention into a product. 
I find that, contrary to expectations, inventions created by teams with cross-domain 
expertise– i.e. a combination of clinical and research education as proxied by an MD, PhD or 
MD/PhD degree in team members, have a significantly lower hazard of licensing compared to  
inventions by teams that are made up solely of clinicians or solely of bench researchers.  
2.2 Introduction 
Large amounts of money have been given in grants in recent years for translational 
research aimed at turning basic scientific knowledge into practical applications. Yet, we know 
                                                            
1 See for example overview of Translational Research as part of the Clinical Research Roadmap Initiative 
at: http://commonfund.nih.gov/clinicalresearch/overview-translational.aspx, accessed February 19, 2012  
 
2 I use the term domain to refer to the clinic or the research bench as the use of discipline could be confused 
by discipline within science for example. Cross‐domain then refers to teams that combine inventors with clinical and 
research backgrounds. This is also different from the term cross-functional as it relates not to the type of job role one 
is occupying within a company but to the knowledge background of the inventor measured by their education. 
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 little about what makes the process of translation successful. A recent study of the life cycle of 
translational research for medical interventions notes that the average “translation lag” – i.e. the 
median time from earliest publication or patenting to time of first licensed clinical use was 24 
years with an interquartile range of 14 to 44 years (Contopoulos-Ioannidis et al., 2008; cf. 
Morris, 2011). 
The NIH has placed an emphasis on “nurtur[ing] a cadre of well-trained multi- and 
interdisciplinary investigators and research teams” and “synergiz[ing] multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary clinical and translational research and researchers to catalyze the application of 
new knowledge and techniques to clinical practice at the front lines of patient care.”3 It has been 
hypothesized that collaboration between the clinical and research domains is necessary for the 
translation process because very often clinicians are not only users of research but they possess 
unique expertise and knowledge by virtue of their interaction with patients (Demonaco et al., 
2006; Baldessarini, 1985). Such knowledge can be crucial in informing further research and 
understanding ways in which basic research can be used in the clinic. 
 This emphasis is also based on the finding that the “burden of knowledge” has increased 
over time as knowledge in a field has become “deeper,” thus forcing researchers to specialize 
more narrowly in their fields (Jones, 2009; Baumol et al. 2009). Such narrow specialization, 
especially in the life sciences and in times when knowledge creation has increased tremendously, 
may prevent one from seeing the interdependencies among different scientific and clinical 
findings. Thus, integration of knowledge becomes necessary for translation of basic science into 
the clinic (Kelley et. al. eds and IOM, 1994). 
                                                            
3 “Focus on NINR and the NIH Roadmap,” http://www.ninr.nih.gov/NR/rdonlyres/2C476ABF‐E1F7‐4BA3‐
B6F5‐06EDF71225DE/0/RoadmapFocusFINAL113006.pdf accessed Feb 19th, 2012. 
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  Interdisciplinary teams and individuals trained in both the clinical and research domains 
have been thought to be the ones who can accomplish the enormous task of translating science 
into the clinic and have had significant support.4 Of the 129 medical schools in the country, 109 
had an MD/PhD program as of 1990 and the NIH had invested $400 million in its own MST 
(MD/PhD) program from its inception to 1990 (Kelley et. al. eds and IOM, 1994). In addition, 
research has shown that first time NIH R01 grant applicants with an MD/PhD are significantly 
more likely to receive funding than those with an MD only or a PhD only. And among those that 
obtained such first funding, MD/PhDs were significantly more likely to get a second such grant 
compared to single degree researchers (Dickler at al., 2007). 
 In this paper, I explore whether teams with cross-domain knowledge are indeed faster to 
translate their inventions into the clinic compared to single-domain teams. For this task I use a 
dataset of 691 patents assigned to two Academic Medical Centers (AMCs). I am testing 
hypotheses that inventions by cross-domain teams (teams with both an MD and a PhD or an 
MD/PhD inventor) are at a greater hazard of being licensed, controlling for the type of invention, 
the scope of the patent, the innovativeness of the ideas and the experience of the lead inventor. 
Licensing is a way for new inventions to become products and is my proxy for translations of 
inventions into the clinic. 
 Surprisingly, I find that cross-domain teams are at a significantly lower hazard of 
licensing their inventions compared to single domain teams. As expected, I find that the 
experience of the inventor is positive and significant and leads to faster licensing as does the size 
of the team. 
 
                                                            
4 By interdisciplinary here I mean teams that combine clinical and research backgrounds i.e. are comprised 
of members with MD degrees and PhD degrees. 
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 2.3 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
The influence of team diversity on productivity has been an important topic in the 
management literature. Theoretical models of team diversity have shown that a randomly chosen 
group of diverse problem solvers can outperform a group of high-ability problem solvers (Hong 
and Page, 2004).  Empirically, teams that combine individuals with different information 
backgrounds based on their functions in the organization, also called cross-functional teams, 
have been studied extensively in the management literature for over half a century (e.g. 
Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Keller, 2001; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Galbraith, 1973; 
Kanter, 1988). In an innovative organization it has been argued that their importance stems from 
the need to “integrate expertise”, “obtain and use distributed information” and provide for 
“speedy interdepartmental transfer” (Edmondson and Nembhard, 2009). Such a need is said to 
arise because of the different access to information and models of the world with which different 
departments operate inside the organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969). 
The research on whether cross-functional new product development (NPD) teams are in 
fact more innovative and faster to deliver new products has resulted in mixed findings. Some 
studies of cross-functional teams have found no effect (Cady and Valentine, 1999), but the 
majority have found a negative effect of functional diversity on performance (McDonough, 
2000; Horowitz and Horowitz, 2007; also see reviews by Bettenhausen, 1991 and Williams and 
O’Reilly, 1998). Most of the studies that find a positive effect of team functional diversity on 
performance have been able to do so through mediator and moderator variables relating to group 
processes, task and group environment. 
 One of the key studies in this research stream looks at both direct and indirect effect of 
functional diversity on team performance for new product development teams (Ancona and 
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 Caldwell, 1992). It finds that diversity has a direct negative effect on performance as evaluated 
by managers, particularly on dimensions of innovation. Team members’ own evaluation of team 
performance is also negatively related to team diversity. The indirect effect of team diversity in 
this study, however, was positive as rated by managers. This effect was mediated by external 
communications. Groups that had higher levels of external communication were more highly 
rated and functionally diverse groups were more likely to communicate more externally.  
 Diverse teams face many challenges. Conflicts between different departments and 
functions within an organization may exhibit themselves in a cross-functional team. Task 
conflicts can further exacerbate the performance of a team (Pelled et al., 1999). In-group and out-
group stereotyping can hinder communication and problem solving (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 
2002; Rico et al., 2007).  
 Diverse teams face informational challenges as well – they are not always able to 
communicate with the other team members to share the diverse information that they bring. 
Empirical studies have shown that group members often share only information that is common 
to all group members and are willing to discount their own knowledge and experiences in order 
to conform to group beliefs or hierarchy (Sherif, 1936; Asch, 1955; Nembhard et. al., 2006).  
Furthermore, it is not possible to encode and share all knowledge that an individual possesses, 
which limits the ability to use all available information in the group for problem solving 
(Polanyi, 1967; von Hippel, 1994).  
 The theoretical advantage of diverse knowledge in problem solving could be realizable if 
it were possible to integrate the diversity within one person on the team. Conflicts would be 
alleviated and information sharing would be less costly because the person who possesses 
diverse knowledge can serve as a “translator” thus mitigating team based challenges. The effects 
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 of intrapersonal diversity – i.e. diversity within one person because of the person’s educational or 
job background - has been studied previously. One study shows that in top management teams 
(TMTs) intrapersonal functional diversity on the team has a positive effect on information 
sharing and unit performance while interpersonal diversity had a negative effect (Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe, 2002). Similarly, the proportion of multi-knowledge individuals has an indirect 
positive effect, through information sharing, on product innovativeness and a direct positive 
effect on time efficiency of new product development teams as rated by managers (Park et al, 
2009).  
These results are based on innovation in companies, however, and on team performance 
as defined by speed or “innovativeness” and judged by managers who have appointed the teams 
rather than by more solid measures of innovative output. Managers may select teams to match 
the type of problem – i.e. select teams with intrapersonal diversity if such diversity is expected to 
help problem solving. Such selection is impossible to control for, except in experimental settings. 
One study shows that selection, or self-selection in this case, can lead to such positive findings. It 
finds that people with a more varied experience select to be entrepreneurs but conditional on 
being entrepreneurs, those with more varied experience earn less (Astebro and Thompson, 2011). 
As all non-experimental studies, my study doesn’t entirely do away with selection but I use 
various controls and robustness checks to alleviate such concerns.  
Furthermore, innovation in companies may be different from academic innovation. 
University inventions have tended to be on average much more important and general – i.e. 
basic, than industry inventions as indicated by patent citation measures. (Henderson et. al., 1997) 
The results could be different when bridging cutting edge science in very specialized and 
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 different domains such as the clinic and the research bench. Yet, this question has not been 
explored in the university technology transfer literature.  
University patenting, licensing and technology commercialization have been studied 
extensively, mostly with aggregated survey data gathered by the Association of University 
Technology Managers (AUTM) and with patent and licensing data from MIT (Shane, 2002; 
Decheneux et. al, 2008; Nerkar and Shane, 2007; Thursby et.al. 2004). Most of the research, 
however, has been based on the importance of patent characteristics and citation based measures 
of innovativeness. For example, Nerkar and Shane (2007) find that more pioneering inventions 
and patents with a wider scope are more likely to be commercialized, once licensed. Elfenbeim 
(2004), using Harvard University inventions, finds that the hazard of licensing increases in the 
inventor’s prior publications as firms are more aware of such research.  
 Inventing team characteristics, however, have been largely ignored. Similarly, Academic 
Medical Centers (AMCs) have not figured extensively in the research on University innovation. 
This is surprising as AMCs tend to receive almost three times as much federal funding as regular 
universities and a higher amount of licensing income from their technologies (AUTM, 2006). In 
2007, for example, of the universities that received over ten million in licensing income, all but 
two were Medical Schools (AUTM, 2007). 
 Academic Medical Centers represent the ideal setting in which to explore the interaction 
of the clinical and research domains and its influence on the translation of inventions into 
products. As institutions, AMCs combine both clinical practice and research labs and are 
therefore expected to spur interdisciplinary research and attract individuals with cross-domain 
expertise such as MD/PhDs. Such a research setting lets me explore the influence of team 
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 characteristics along with invention characteristics to understand the translation of new 
technologies to the market and from there to the clinic. 
 The main question that I am trying to answer in this paper is whether inventions by cross-
domain teams are at a greater hazard of being licensed than inventions by teams where all 
members come from the same domain.  Furthermore, I explore whether having at least one 
person with a dual domain expertise on the team provides an added benefit to just having team 
members from different domains working together. Individuals with dual domain expertise could 
be able to integrate the different needs and knowledge of their domains to come up with 
inventions that can more easily be introduced into the clinic.  
 In an interview, an inventor with an MD/PhD from one of the AMCs in my dataset 
mentioned that he was better able to understand how a particular product will be used in the 
clinic because of his clinical experience. He gave examples of his own inventions from before he 
became a clinician which, he claimed, had suboptimal designs because he did not have a good 
understanding of how clinicians would use the product. After getting his MD he was able to 
adapt the design or the specific features of the cutting edge devices that he was developing to be 
more useable in the clinic. He argued that this leads to his current inventions becoming products 
faster than inventions that he created before he received his medical degree. Had he just worked 
with an MD instead of getting such a degree himself, he was afraid he may not be able to 
understand the different clinical need as well as he does now.  
These anecdotal experiences lead me to develop the following hypotheses that can be 
tested using the dataset that I have:  
Hypothesis 1: Teams with cross-domain expertise come up with inventions that are at a greater 
hazard of licensing than teams with single-domain expertise. 
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 Hypothesis 2: Teams with an MD/PhD on the team come up with inventions that are at a greater 
hazard of licensing than teams with single-domain expertise and teams with cross-domain 
expertise lacking an MD/PhD. 
2.4 Data 
To test the above hypotheses I use invention data from a technology licensing office 
(TLO) that is in charge of the intellectual property of two academic medical centers (AMCs). 
Each observation in the data is a patent that has been applied for and granted between 1977 and 
2008. That data is supplemented with patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and licensing data from the same TLO as well as inventor data from various 
sources described below.  
2.4.1 Research Setting 
The employees of both AMCs are required to submit an invention disclosure to the TLO 
if they believe they have conceived of an idea that is novel and has a potential for 
commercialization. In the last decade the disclosure filing has been simplified through the 
availability of online forms. Once this disclosure is received at the TLO it is reviewed by a case 
manager who completes any missing information. Extensive research is then conducted by the 
TLO regarding the novelty of this invention, the quality and the potential for commercialization. 
A decision is made about whether to file an application for one or more patents based on this 
invention disclosure and a patent attorney from an external firm is retained to conduct a 
patentability opinion and proceed with patent filing. The case manager, inventor and the outside 
firm then coordinate to make any further decisions on the filing with the USPTO or patenting 
authorities in different countries.  
70
  The TLO also actively researches potential licensees for the invention. This involves 
finding out what other firms are doing research in this field and the general state of the art in the 
relevant technological area. Often, companies that may be interested are contacted. Inventors can 
and do initiate contacts to help commercialization as well since they jointly receive 25% of all 
income above expenses that is generated by the patent and another 25% goes to their lab. A short 
description of the invention is also available online for interested parties who can independently 
search for technologies from this TLO. Firms interested in the invention sign a confidentiality 
agreement to learn more about it before they decide to take an option or a license.  
2.4.2 Invention Data 
 In the analysis for this paper my level of observation is a patent that has been granted in 
the United States to one of these two institutions. It becomes at-risk for licensing from the 
patent’s priority or provisional filing date.5 This is the closest date to the invention disclosure 
date and is different from the listed filing date in over 70% of the cases in my dataset. This 
discrepancy results from the fact that many patent applications result in multiple patents – 
divisions, continuations and continuation-in-parts of the parent application.6 The expiration of a 
patent is determined by the priority date which is the earliest filing date in cases where a 
provisional patent has not been filed.7 
                                                            
5 A priority date is the date on which the first patent from a particular invention was filed. Later that first 
patent may be abandoned and other divisions or continuations filed from it. Note that after June 8, 1995 inventors 
were allowed to file provisional patents which provide them with a year to decide whether a patent is going to be 
filed or not. The provisional patent date is not the same as the priority filing date from which the patent term is 
calculated.   
 
6 Talks with TLO officers indicated that I should use the filing date rather than the patent grant date as they 
start marketing an invention soon after the provisional patent is filed.  
 
7 A patent expires 20 years from the first filing date if that filing date is after June 8th, 1995. If the patent 
was filed before Jun 8, 1995, the term is either 20 years from the first filing date or 17 years from the grant date 
whichever is longer. A patent that has expired cannot be licensed as it is free for anyone to use.  
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  Each patent publication on the USPTO web site also contains information on the 
inventors that are associated with it. This information can differ from the invention disclosure 
form because if an invention disclosure is split in different patents, the participation of team 
members on each patent can differ. For example, one inventor could have participated in 
inventing one of the claims in one patent but none of the claims in another. As such, data on the 
inventors listed on the patent publication is more accurate than TLO inventor data. In addition, 
while scientific papers may contain numerous authors who contributed little to the final product, 
a patent inventor, by law, must have contributed “to the conception of the invention” i.e. to at 
least one of the claims of the patent. If an inventor is not named on the patent or if someone who 
did not contribute an idea is named, the patent could be invalidated.8 
 The USPTO web site also contains information on the assignee of the patent. This is 
particularly important in the cases where inventions are the result of collaboration between 
members of different institutions, such as other companies or universities. I exclude patents that 
have as assignees or co-assignees institutions outside of the two AMCs that I am considering. 
When multiple institutions are assignees, they each have the right to license the patent without 
consulting with the co-assignees and licenses done by a different entity would not necessarily be 
observed by me.  Often, co-assignees sign inter-institutional agreements to market and license 
the technology together but that can delay the time to licensing. An indicator variable for “more 
than one assignee” would not be useful to control for inventions handled by different or multiple 
TLOs as the outside institutions would be different. However, I include patents that were 
assigned together to the two AMCs that are in my dataset as they are managed by the same TLO 
and I observe all their licensing agreements. 
                                                            
8 For more information see: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2137_01.htm, 
Accessed January 14, 2010. 
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  There are patents in this dataset that were invented through collaborative efforts with 
companies or that resulted from sponsored research agreements (SRA) where a company gave 
money or equipment to support the research of a specific inventor or a department. These SRAs 
can be very specific – i.e. designing a prototype of an invention or very broad – i.e. supporting a 
lab’s research without interference in the research direction. Patents resulting from SRAs are 
excluded from my dataset for a few reasons. First, they have a high rate of licensing (95%), 
almost invariably to the company that sponsored the research. Second, the company that 
sponsors the research will sometimes insist on patent filing for inventions that they are interested 
in licensing even if the TLO would not have filed a patent otherwise and I am not able to 
ascertain when that is the case. Third, while most SRAs give right of first refusal to the company, 
some give them automatic licenses at terms decided at the time of SRA signing and I cannot 
separate out inventions resulting from such SRAs since I don’t have the text of every SRA. After 
I exclude all joint or sponsored patents I end up with 691 patents for my dataset.  
 On the USPTO website I am also able to observe abandonment dates for patents for 
which the maintenance fees have not been paid. This happens if the TLO decides after the patent 
is granted that it is unprofitable for them to maintain it by paying the maintenance fees. 
Maintenance fees in the US are due 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after the patent has been granted.9 As 
abandonment is equivalent to expiration, an abandoned patent is not available for licensing. I 
supplement the USPTO data which is not always updated online by data from IP Thompson’s 
Delphion website.10 
                                                            
9 Fees for 2007 depending on the size of the entity that owns the patent are as follows: at 3.5 years after 
first patent grant ‐ $465 or $930 for small and large entity respectively, at 7.5 years $1190 and $2380, at 11.5 years 
$1965 and $3930.  When the fees are not paid, the patent is abandoned at the 4th, 8th or 12th year respectively. If fees 
are paid with an additional fine sometime between year 3.5 and 4, the patent is not abandoned.  
Source: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr32285.pdf 
 
10See at:  www.delpion.com accessed January, 2010 
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  Additional patent data, specifically patent cites, was obtained from the NBER patent 
dataset (Hall et. al, 2001). International Patent Classification (IPC) codes for each patent were 
obtained from the PatStat database by the EPO.11 Patent cites are different from research article 
cites in that when a focal patent cites a previous patent it means that it is building on the previous 
invention. It further means that the material protected in the previous invention is limiting the 
scope of the current patent because the current patent cannot lay a claim on it. Furthermore, cites 
are added to the patent not only by the entity that files the patent but also by the patent examiner. 
A patent that cites multiple patents is believed to be less pioneering and narrower. Previous 
studies have found that a more pioneering university patent is more likely to get licensed (Nerkar 
and Shane, 2007; Dechenaux, 2008). A patent that is cited multiple times is considered important 
and valuable (Hall, 2005).  
 However, it is also well known that inventors tend to cite their own prior patents as they 
build on their inventions. This would mean that an invention with a higher number of prior self-
citations or future self-cites will indicate a stronger research portfolio of the inventor and a 
stronger protection of intellectual property. Licensing agreements often include multiple patents 
and inventions in the same area and by the same inventor and firms will often license subsequent 
inventions by an inventor if they already have licensed one, especially if it enhances the 
protection to the first patent. This will speed up the time to licensing of inventions that are part of 
a stronger research portfolio which can be positively correlated with patent prior art. As a result, 
the predictions on the influence of prior art will depend on what portion of it is based on self-






  I use the number of IPC codes on each patent as a measure of its scope. A patent with a 
larger scope will be more likely to be licensed because it would give a better protection and will 
be more valued by a potential licensor. Lerner (1994) shows that patent scope is related to a 
higher valuation by VCs in funding new firms. He finds that a one standard deviation increase in 
patent scope results in a 21% higher valuation for the firm. A larger patent scope has also been 
shown to increase the hazard of licensing an invention and commercializing it once it has been 
licensed in the university licensing setting (Elfenbeim, 2004; Nerkar, 2007).  
 To control for technology type, I use the main USPTO assigned patent classes and 
categorize the patents into six main groups – drugs, molecular biology, surgery, chemistry, optics 
and electricity and other with other including only 6% of patents. Appendix 2.1 provides a 
description of patent classes that are included in each category.   
 An alternative control for technology type uses all the IPC codes assigned to each patent 
at the subclass level. I select the 15 IPC codes at the subclass level that most frequently appear in 
my dataset. The 691 patents in my dataset have altogether 2074 IPC codes with 62 unique values 
at the subclass level. The top 16 of these unique values by frequency account for 91% of all IPC 
subclass level codes. I create a dummy variable for each of these 16 subclass level IPC codes. A 
17th category of “other” is a dummy for patents that do not belong to any of the 16 categories 
above – there are 33 patents in my dataset whose IPCs belong exclusively to the “other” 
category. Because a patent can have multiple IPC codes, a patent can belong to different 
categories as defined above. 
 This classification is important because the probability of licensing and the time to 
licensing depend on the type of technology being considered. For example, a medical device may 
be licensed faster than a drug molecule because it has a different clinical trial and FDA approval 
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 timeline and return on investment. Furthermore, different types of firms will consider devices 
and drugs. Even within the large category of medical devices, some may be very different in 
terms of licensing than others – for example, software for an MRI machine will most certainly 
differ in licensing probability from a new catheter. Similarly, a research tool such as a 
genetically altered mouse may have an entirely different licensing profile than a drug molecule. 
Measuring these using various patent class measures provides further robustness.  Since patented 
inventions are by definition unique, there is no classification that can account for all of the 
different patent characteristics. In classifying them, I am interested only in characteristics that 
will alter their licensing probability and timeline. 
 In addition to the patent classification using IPC classes, I have also classified them into 
types of claims by reading through the patent claims for each of the patents. I have three main 
categories -- process, object and combined process and object. It is possible that an object such 
as a new chemical composition will likely provide different strength of protection to a patent 
than a process claim for a method of treatment of a disease. Such level of protection then may 
influence whether and how soon these patents are licensed. These three categories are mutually 
exclusive.  
 I have further divided the patents into device and non-device inventions. A medical 
device is an apparatus that has human body contact and would require an FDA approval as a 
medical device. Even though there is a wide variation within medical devices with regard to their 
complexity and novelty, this classification is nevertheless useful as the approval process is quite 
similar for most devices and the types of firms that license these inventions are different from the 
firms that license non-device inventions.    
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 2.4.2 Inventor Data 
To test the importance of cross-domain experience on the team on licensing outcomes I 
use inventor educational background as an indicator of team diversity. It departs from previous 
literature where cross-functional teams have been classified as such based on different functional 
positions in the firm. Part of the reasoning has been that people with different functional 
positions would have different goals in addition to having different outlook on the world and 
these goals may be conflicting and may hinder team performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969).  
In this case, I am interested in team composition as it relates to the different types of knowledge 
team members bring to the team. Because these inventors are all at top academic medical 
centers, they have one similar goal – to advance the knowledge of the scientific community and 
publish academic articles. I assume that many MDs will also have a goal to serve their patients 
and people with MD/PhDs will have a goal to enrich their clinical work with their research work 
and their lab work with the knowledge that they get from the clinic. Note however, that while 
MDs and MD/PhDs could choose to devote their career exclusively to research, PhDs do not 
have access to the clinic. 
 To find the educational background of inventors I use a number of sources described 
below. In their invention disclosures inventors are supposed to disclose their educational degree 
which is then on record with the TLO. More than half of the information about the inventors’ 
background came from that file. However, because a few mistakes were discovered in that file, 
the data was further checked against other sources.   
For every single inventor, a search was done through the AMCs internal directories.  
Unfortunately, the directory only has current information, so the rest of the degree information 
came from web sources.  Each inventor’s name was searched through the ProQuest Dissertations 
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 and Theses Database, accessed through the Harvard University Library System.12 A search was 
then conducted for every name using Google. CVs or university biography pages were used 
when available. Often, academic articles also include a researcher’s degree and that information 
was very useful by letting us compare the date of the article and degree with the date of the 
invention. Sites such as vitals.com and healthgrades.com provide information on physician’s 
medical education as well as year of graduation and licensing and were also a good, but last 
resort, source of information.13  
Having information on graduation dates was useful in cases where a person has a patent 
and an article before getting an MD or PhD.  In a few cases there were people who were already 
in an MD or a PhD program at the time of patent filing and they were considered MDs or PhDs 
respectively. Inventors that had only a Master’s degree or a Bachelor’s degree were classified as 
“other”. For 11 of those, we were not able to ascertain the educational degree that the inventor 
had. In the dataset of 691 patents there are 1505 inventors because many patents have multiple 
inventors.   
 Team size is an important variable to control as it is potentially correlated both with team 
type and licensing outcome and can bias results. Team size is related to team type because teams 
with a higher number of inventors are more likely to be diverse. Inventions created by one 
inventor only, for example, cannot combine cross-domain expertise unless that cross-domain 
expertise is in one person. This relationship holds in my dataset as well – teams with a larger 
number of inventors are more likely to be cross-domain teams. Previous research has also found 
that patents with multiple inventors are cited more, implying that they are of a higher quality and 
as such may be more likely to get licensed (Wuchty et. al., 2007). One reason why licensing may 
                                                            
12See  http://www.proquest.com/en-US/catalogs/databases/detail/pqdt.shtml, accessed 2011 
 
13See  http://www.vitals.com and http://www.healthgrades.com, accessed 2011 
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 be affected by the number of inventors on the team may be that the more inventors there are on 
the team the more possible links there are to potential licensees through inventors’ industry 
contacts.  Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptions of team size and inventor educational degree
Table 2.1 Frequency distribution of 
number of inventors in team 











Table 2.2 Number of Inventors by 
Educational Degree 











Because about 70% of patents have more than one inventor on them I need to devise a 
composite measure for team type based on the educational background of the inventors. To test 
my hypotheses, I divide my patents into five main groups – Cross-Domain Integrated, Cross-
Domain Distributed, Single-Domain Research, Single-Domain Clinical and Other. Cross-
Domain Integrated teams are those that have people who possess knowledge of both the clinical 
and research domain based on their educational background and that knowledge is integrated in 
at least one person of the team. This implies that the team has at least one inventor with an 
MD/PhD degree (two domains integrated in one person) but it may have additional MD/PhDs, or 
MDs or PhDs on the team. Cross-Domain Distributed teams have at least one MD and at least 
one PhD on the team but no inventor with an MD/PhD. All team members in Single Domain 
Research teams have PhDs (also can have a team member with an “other” degree in addition to 
PhDs) and all team members in Single Domain Clinical teams are MDs (also can include a 
member with an “other” degree in addition to MDs). All Cross-Domain and Single-Domain 
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 teams can have researchers that are not PhDs or MDs. However, teams that have no MDs or 
PhDs are classified as “Other.”  
 It is important to note that we don’t have educational information for 11 inventors, four 
of these inventors belong to Cross-Domain Integrated teams and as such those inventions don’t 
need to be dropped. Similarly, because Cross-Domain and Single-Domain teams can have 
members with Other degrees, we have 80 such inventors and only 6 teams that are in the Other 
category – i.e. have all of their members in the Other education category. Table 3 below contains 
a frequency distribution of the types of teams in the dataset.  
Table 2.3 Frequency Distribution of Patents by Team Type 
Team Type Number of Patents 
Cross-Domain Integrated 226 
Cross-Domain Distributed 128 
Single-Domain Clinical 173 
Single-Domain Research 151 
Other 6 
At Least One Inventor with  
Unknown Degree Information and NOT 
Cross Domain Integrated 7 
Total 691 
 
For each patent, I also find out the lead inventor as noted by the TLO. The lead inventor 
(LI) is generally the Primary Investigator of the lab or the person with the most contributions to 
the patent. The lead inventor is also the one who participates most actively in patent prosecution 
and often has contacts with industry which may help during the licensing process. Some lead 
inventors have gone through the process of patent prosecution and licensing with previous 
inventions. While I don’t observe patenting at other organizations by these inventors, this 
variable is still important as, at the very least, it measures the experience of the lead inventors 
working with this TLO. There are a few patents in my dataset for which the lead inventor is 
80
 missing or is not on the patent itself. This happens when an invention is disclosed and is then 
split into multiple patents and while one person has contributed the most to the whole invention, 
he is not an inventor on a specific patent. That person still remains the lead inventor for all 
inventions on the case. Patents like these are dropped in some of the analyses where lead 
inventor variables are included.  
2.4.3 License Data 
 The information on licenses was extracted from the TLO’s database. Patents may have 
more than one license associated with them – some are licensed through non-exclusive 
agreements, some are sublicensed by the first licensor. Additionally, many licenses are 
terminated and the invention then gets relicensed to a different entity. For my study I select the 
date of the earliest license for each patent in my dataset. Even if the first license gets terminated I 
consider licensing to be a proxy for attempt at commercialization or use in industry.  
Of my 691 patents 358 (51%) are licensed at least once. Below is a table of the frequency 
distribution of licensing by team type.  
Table 2.4 Licensing by Team Type 





Cross-Domain Integrated 114 112 226
Cross-Domain Distributed 62 66 128
Single-Domain Clinical 71 102 173
Single-Domain Research 78 73 151
Other 5 1 6
Undefined 3 4 7
Total 333 358 691
 
 
2.5 Models and Results 
The data for this study is right censored – I stop observing many patents that are still 
available for licensing at the end of the data-gathering process in early 2011. Furthermore, 
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 because inventions are disclosed at different times, patents that were filed in the 1970s are 
observed until abandonment or expiration while later patents I observe for only some of their 
life. To account for all peculiarities of the data I use survival analysis models.  
Survival analysis looks at time to licensing but accounts for right censoring as well as for 
inventions that are only in the data for a short period of time but do not achieve a license. I use 
parametric and non-parametric survival analysis models as well as random effects and shared 
frailty by lead inventor. I also do robustness checks by using standard models such as OLS of 
time to license and logit of probability of licensing within 10 years of first patent filing on case.  
The simplest way to get some understanding of the distribution of survival data is to 
describe it graphically especially by separating it into the groups that we are interested in 
comparing. Below is a plot of the Kaplan-Maier estimate which is a non-parametric maximum 
likelihood estimate of the survivor function or the probability of survival past time t. It is given 
by the formula        
Ŝ(t)=∏ ሺ௡ೕିௗೕ௡ೕ௝|௧ೕஸ௧ ሻ 
where nj is the number of patents at risk at time tj and dj is the number of failures (licenses) at 
time tj.  
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 Graph 2.1 Kaplan – Meier Survival Estimates by Team Type
 
We note from the above graph that Cross-Domain Integrated (label: cd_int) and Cross-
Domain Distributed (label: cd_dist) inventions follow similar survival curves while the Single 
Domain teams are different. Inventions by Single Domain Clinical (label: sd_clin) teams seem to 
get licensed faster than the rest, especially when they first become available.  Inventions by 
Single-Domain Research teams, on the other hand, seem to be the slowest to license.    
Simple statistics of the dataset are also reported based on the survival function estimate. 
The median, based on the survival function is the time after which only 50% of the sample 
survives (i.e. remains unlicensed) and the mean is the time that the average patent survives. 
Compare that to a raw calculation of the mean time of each patent in the sample without 


















 the different team types show that they are statistically significantly different. The result is robust 
to excluding the “Other” team type.  
Table 2.6 Sample descriptive statics of survival by team type based on the Kaplan-Maier 
nonparametric estimate of the survival function. Time is reported as number of days 
















Cross Domain Integrated 226 4339 4747.456(*) 2903 
Cross Domain Distributed 128 4657 4428.759(*) 3142 
Single Domain Clinincal 173 2248 3856.621(*) 2638 
Single Domain Research 151 3851 4469.332(*) 3082 
Other 6 n/a 7063.167(*)   5703 
Whole Sample 684 3851 4586.775(*) 2937 
 * largest observed analysis time is censored, mean is underestimated 
 
Unfortunately, the non-parametric models shown above do not allow one to control for 
multiple variables. To be able to include the covariates into the regression, I use a semi-
parametric proportional hazard model – the Cox Hazard Model. It estimates a baseline non-
parametric hazard function – h0(t).  
hሺt|x୨ሻ ൌ ݄଴	ሺݐሻ݁௕ೣ	௫ೕ 
The covariates however enter the model linearly, i.e. they modify the hazard function 
multiplicatively, giving it the name proportional.  
Table 2.7a-c include results from a Cox Proportional Hazard with no lead inventor 
controls (2.7a), models stratified by lead inventor (2.7b) and random effects  models by lead 
inventor (2.7c).The random effects and stratification models are included to control for a 
potential omitted variable that is correlated both with the type of the team and the type of the 
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 invention. It is possible, for example, that certain inventors select to work on a particular 
invention type – a clinician may work mostly on medical devices while most PhD teams work on 
molecular biology problems. Also the lead inventor may choose people to contribute to the team 
based on the team needs and certain lead inventors may be better at this selection than others. At 
the same time, we expect that different types of inventions will have a different hazard of 
licensing. It becomes particularly important then to control for invention type to avoid a selection 
bias. 
It can be argued that team composition is not entirely endogenous in our sample. For one 
thing, the inventors on each particular patent are not determined by the lead inventor or by self-
selection because of the nature of inventor determination at the USPTO. A team member can 
only be named an inventor on a patent if she contributed to the conception of the invention as 
mentioned above, not just reducing the idea into practice. As one invention turns into multiple 
patents, different team members may end up as inventors on different patents depending on how 
the various invention claims get divided between different patents. Including the above controls, 
however, is still important.  
As discussed in the previous section, I use various invention type controls – I divide 
inventions into various categories based on their main USPTO classes. Those classes are 
described in Appendixes 2.1 and 2.2. Furthermore, I select the top 16 IPC codes and create 
categorical variables for whether a certain patent belongs to the particular IPC code. I further 
read and classify the patents into devices and non-devices based on whether they would require 
FDA approval for device. And lastly, I categorize patents into different groups based on whether 
they claim a process (method) or an object (composition of matter, article of manufacture or 
apparatus) or both.  
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 While none of these are perfect invention type controls, they are different ways of 
addressing the issue of potential inventor selection into different types of technologies. An even 
better test would be to assume that each lead inventor creates a specific type of invention with its 
own different hazard of licensing. The Cox model allows us to control in two ways for lead 
inventor selection of invention type and team type - by using random effects by inventor and by 
stratifying by inventor.  
Strata in a Cox Hazard model are disjointed groups based on certain characteristics – in 
this case, the lead inventor.  Stratified models estimate a separate baseline hazard function for 
each stratum. They then assume that the covariates influence each stratum equally – the variable 
“device” influences the hazard function of lead inventor A and B in the same way.  Shared frailty 
models (or the equivalent of random effects) on the other hand estimate the same baseline hazard 
function for all values of the lead inventor variable. They then assume that there is a latent 
variable that modifies the hazard function multiplicatively and has a different value for each 
group, in our case each lead inventor.   
The stratified models are the preferred ones for this paper as they control for invention 
type in the way that I expect the data to behave. However, they exclude all patents of inventors 
who have only one invention. For that reason I report both the models stratified by lead inventor 
and the random effects models.   
Table 2.7 presents the main results. In the first, third and fifth columns I compare the 
licensing hazard of all cross-domain integrated and cross-domain distributed teams to all single 
domain teams (the omitted category) using a regular Cox hazard model, a Cox Hazard model 
stratified by lead inventor and a random effects by lead inventor Cox hazard model respectively.  
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 Table 2.7 Cox Hazard Model Results of licensing. USPTO Main Patent Class based technology controls. All 
standard errors clustered by invention disclosure and reported under coefficients. LI=Lead Inventor 
  









Cross-Domain Integrated -0.409** -0.024 -1.042** -0.865* -0.585** -0.458* 
  0.190 0.213 0.436 0.481 0.256 0.279 
Cross-Domain Distributed -0.497**  -0.263  -0.250   
  0.230  0.281  0.252   
Single-Domain All  0.338  0.075  0.022 
   0.222  0.267  0.234 
Patents Cited 0.0125*** 0.0129*** 0.0182*** 0.0187*** 0.0242*** 0.0248*** 
  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Forward Citations 0.636*** 0.636*** 0.529*** 0.534*** 1.064*** 1.078*** 
  0.232 0.232 0.192 0.190 0.248 0.250 
Patent Scope 0.0416* 0.0397* 0.0748* 0.0748** 0.0813** 0.0821** 
  0.022 0.022 0.039 0.038 0.032 0.032 
Device -0.038 0.171 0.838*** 1.085*** 0.322 0.645** 
  0.293 0.267 0.310 0.260 0.336 0.304 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Integrated 
1.121** 0.903** 0.746 0.445 0.788 0.445 
0.452 0.442 0.689 0.664 0.596 0.580 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Distributed 
0.954**  0.824*  1.336***   
0.468  0.448  0.508   
Team Size 0.103 0.101 0.049 0.035 0.105 0.088 
  0.066 0.066 0.110 0.109 0.076 0.076 
Patent Filed Pre-1990 0.267 0.302 -0.932** -0.856** -0.231 -0.176 
  0.253 0.252 0.401 0.408 0.288 0.288 
Patent Filed 1990-1999 0.266 0.291 -0.387 -0.340 0.024 0.050 
  0.224 0.224 0.335 0.339 0.245 0.245 
Process Claims Only 0.184 0.178 0.591*** 0.571*** 0.413* 0.392* 
  0.174 0.173 0.154 0.153 0.212 0.210 
Process and Object Claims -0.058 -0.056 0.167 0.138 -0.076 -0.087 
  0.164 0.165 0.156 0.154 0.200 0.198 
Molecular Biology Patent 0.740** 0.714** 1.286** 1.047** 1.218*** 1.128** 
  0.367 0.362 0.514 0.446 0.437 0.443 
Drug Patent 0.671* 0.625* 1.422*** 1.201*** 0.935** 0.847** 
  0.347 0.341 0.513 0.431 0.426 0.431 
Chemistry Patent 0.865** 0.839** 1.826*** 1.588*** 1.613*** 1.522*** 
  0.380 0.374 0.510 0.439 0.443 0.451 
Surgery Patent 0.156 0.129 1.319** 1.104** 0.754* 0.656 
  0.357 0.357 0.532 0.473 0.456 0.463 
Optics/Electric Patent -0.561 -0.645 0.749 0.556 -0.409 -0.576 
  0.491 0.483 0.767 0.931 0.659 0.666 
Observations 684 684 684 684 684 684 
Num. of Inv. Disclosures 296 296 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Columns two, four and six compare cross-domain integrated teams to all other teams 
again using the respective models above. All standard errors are clustered by invention 
disclosure since multiple patents can result from one invention disclosure and the licensing 
probability of patents from the same invention disclosure may be correlated as firms often 
choose to license portfolios.  
 The models in which the omitted variable is all single-domain teams test our first 
hypothesis that all cross-domain teams’ inventions are at a greater hazard of licensing than 
single-domain teams’ inventions. The models where the omitted variable is cross-domain 
distributed teams test our second hypothesis that inventions by cross-domain integrated teams are 
at a higher hazard of licensing compared to inventions by cross-domain distributed teams.    
The results are contrary to expectations –inventions by teams with cross-domain 
expertise are at a lower hazard of licensing than inventions by single-domain teams contradicting 
our first hypothesis. This result is, in fact, driven by cross-domain integrated teams whose 
inventions are also at a lower hazard of licensing when compared only to inventions by cross-
domain distributed teams, which also contradicts our second hypothesis. Furthermore, the latter 
effect is significant in all models except for the models with no lead inventor group controls.  
It is important however, that when we interact the cross-domain integrated and cross-
domain distributed variables with the dummy variable “device” we always get positive and at 
times statistically significant results. In fact, the magnitude of that coefficient is sometimes larger 
(also in absolute value) than the magnitude of the coefficient on the team type variables. This 
indicates that while on average inventions by cross-domain teams are at a lower hazard of 
licensing, when those inventions are medical devices, they may in fact be at a higher hazard of 




















Cross‐Domain Integrated  ‐0.366*  0.020  ‐1.134**  ‐0.859*  ‐0.512**  ‐0.331 
   0.201  0.222  0.456  0.513  0.255  0.282 
Cross‐Domain Distributed  ‐0.503**  ‐0.330  ‐0.311    
   0.236  0.324  0.259    
Single‐Domain All  0.335  0.220  0.087 
   0.225  0.309  0.242 
Patents Cited  0.00684**  0.00695**  0.020***  0.021***  0.022***  0.023*** 
   0.003  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.007 
Forward Citations  0.639***  0.652***  0.429**  0.439**  0.935***  0.962*** 
   0.217  0.218  0.188  0.185  0.254  0.255 
Patent Scope  0.102  0.092  ‐0.100  ‐0.103  0.021  0.014 
   0.119  0.119  0.131  0.134  0.109  0.110 
Device  ‐0.472*  ‐0.240  0.516*  0.680***  ‐0.210  0.129 
   0.275  0.261  0.305  0.256  0.336  0.305 
Device X Cross‐Domain 
Integrated  1.135**  0.896**  0.537  0.374  0.770  0.431 
   0.467  0.454  0.646  0.638  0.572  0.556 
Device X Cross‐Domain 
Distributed  1.004**  0.496  1.286***    
   0.464  0.527  0.497    
Team Size  0.096  0.091  0.069  0.057  0.096  0.082 
   0.069  0.068  0.119  0.118  0.078  0.078 
Patent Filed Pre‐1990  0.243  0.269  ‐0.901*  ‐0.859*  ‐0.139  ‐0.098 
   0.269  0.269  0.482  0.500  0.288  0.288 
Patent Filed 1990‐1999  0.288  0.305  ‐0.367  ‐0.338  0.050  0.067 
   0.225  0.227  0.379  0.381  0.243  0.242 
Process Claims Only  0.127  0.125  0.266*  0.263*  0.108  0.099 
   0.173  0.174  0.139  0.139  0.207  0.206 
Process and Object Claims  ‐0.046  ‐0.037  ‐0.056  ‐0.069  ‐0.295  ‐0.301 
   0.167  0.167  0.141  0.140  0.186  0.185 
IPC Subclass Dummies 













Observations  684  684  684  684  684  684 
Number of groups              296  296 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The negativity of the results is robust to multiple specifications of invention type based 
on patent measures – i.e. USPTO classes vs. IPC subclasses. The only exception is the 
comparison of cross-domain integrated to cross-domain distributed teams with the IPC based 
measure in the model without controls for lead inventor groups. The coefficient on our cross-
domain team variable there is positive but very small and highly insignificant. Recall that patents 
can belong to multiple IPC subclasses but only one USPTO class.  Please see Table 2.8 above for 
comparisons.  
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 go on to explore the results further by including only patents that 
have more than one inventor. Team size is correlated with team type because patents that have 
only one inventor cannot belong to the cross-domain distributed teams. Furthermore, the use of 
cross-domain expertise may be different in single inventor teams and teams with multiple 
individuals who each have a different knowledge background.  
The results in Table 2.9 are largely consistent with our findings from the whole sample 
models in Table 2.7 but statistical significance is weaker. For example, in the models without 
lead inventor controls, when cross-domain integrated teams are compared to cross-domain 
distributed teams (column 2), the coefficient is now positive even with USPTO class controls, 
albeit very small and statistically insignificant. Similarly, in the first model, where both 
distributed and integrated cross-domain team inventions are compared to the single-domain team 
inventions, the coefficient on the cross-domain integrated team variable is not statistically 
significant any more at any of the generally accepted levels.  
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 Table 2.9 Cox Hazard Model Results of licensing. USPTO Main Patent Class based technology controls. Sample 
excludes sole inventor patents. All standard errors clustered by invention under coefficients.  LI=Lead Inventor 









Cross-Domain Integrated -0.368 0.022 -1.197** -1.202** -0.720** -0.573* 
  0.234 0.215 0.503 0.541 0.311 0.316 
Cross-Domain Distributed -0.488*  -0.077  -0.277   
  0.259  0.309  0.302   
Single-Domain All  0.301  -0.164  -0.025 
   0.248  0.299  0.274 
Patents Cited 0.0109*** 0.0113*** 0.0190*** 0.0203*** 0.0272*** 0.0286*** 
  0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Forward Citations 0.448* 0.438* 0.348* 0.321 0.852*** 0.843*** 
  0.265 0.264 0.202 0.199 0.305 0.307 
Patent Scope 0.0488* 0.044 0.0659* 0.0644* 0.057 0.055 
  0.028 0.028 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.038 
Device -0.056 0.241 0.669* 1.044*** 0.236 0.703* 
  0.373 0.323 0.370 0.317 0.420 0.364 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Integrated 
1.052* 0.737 1.700** 1.208 1.395** 0.881 
0.557 0.528 0.766 0.748 0.708 0.672 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Distributed 
0.920*  0.864  1.371**   
0.518  0.542  0.573   
Team Size 0.058 0.067 0.087 0.091 0.134 0.126 
  0.087 0.084 0.127 0.128 0.098 0.099 
Patent Filed Pre-1990 0.219 0.260 -0.806* -0.715 -0.113 -0.059 
  0.280 0.279 0.438 0.438 0.336 0.337 
Patent Filed 1990-1999 0.112 0.120 -0.098 -0.069 -0.001 0.018 
  0.241 0.242 0.331 0.336 0.279 0.278 
Process Claims Only 0.160 0.154 0.578*** 0.586*** 0.371 0.377 
  0.219 0.218 0.194 0.196 0.258 0.256 
Process and Object Claims -0.056 -0.052 0.158 0.150 -0.017 -0.002 
  0.212 0.213 0.174 0.178 0.240 0.238 
Molecular Biology Patent 0.782* 0.748* 1.759* 1.451* 1.481*** 1.346** 
  0.460 0.453 0.907 0.869 0.568 0.573 
Drug Patent 0.775* 0.709 1.795* 1.494* 1.144** 0.984* 
  0.441 0.432 0.928 0.877 0.561 0.564 
Chemistry Patent 1.114** 1.062** 2.318*** 2.009** 2.220*** 2.039*** 
  0.482 0.471 0.879 0.835 0.577 0.584 
Surgery Patent 0.437 0.413 1.463* 1.206 1.263** 1.116* 
  0.442 0.446 0.857 0.840 0.593 0.598 
Optics/Electric Patent -0.133 -0.221 1.034 0.788 0.220 -0.033 
  0.626 0.624 0.999 1.091 0.814 0.817 
Observations 469 469 469 469 469 469 
Number of groups         227 227 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 2.10 Cox Hazard Model Results of licensing. IPC Subclass based technology type controls.  Sample 
excludes sole inventor patents. All standard errors clustered by invention disclosure and reported under 
coefficients.  














Cross-Domain Integrated -0.292 0.126 -1.140** -1.067** -0.467 -0.285 
  0.238 0.223 0.498 0.517 0.294 0.305 
Cross-Domain Distributed -0.510*  -0.124  -0.270   
  0.263  0.361  0.293   
Single-Domain All   0.331  0.005  0.072 
    0.249  0.354  0.274 
Patents Cited 0.006 0.006 0.0283*** 0.0289*** 0.0240*** 0.0256*** 
  0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
Forward Citations 0.484* 0.500** 0.240 0.229 0.739** 0.749** 
  0.248 0.247 0.187 0.185 0.305 0.306 
Patent Scope 0.197 0.198 -0.068 -0.060 0.058 0.072 
  0.191 0.195 0.147 0.154 0.155 0.157 
Device -0.485 -0.142 0.330 0.580** -0.167 0.243 
  0.370 0.331 0.353 0.264 0.421 0.356 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Integrated 
1.225** 0.877* 1.278* 1.042 1.377** 0.978 
0.523 0.497 0.764 0.733 0.661 0.627 
Device X Cross-Domain 
Distributed 
0.910*  0.493  1.020*   
0.498  0.538  0.543   
Team Size 0.073 0.075 0.136 0.138 0.100 0.100 
  0.090 0.088 0.147 0.148 0.098 0.099 
Patent Filed Pre-1990 0.127 0.161 -0.821 -0.753 -0.094 -0.055 
  0.306 0.307 0.533 0.552 0.332 0.333 
Patent Filed 1990-1999 0.142 0.144 -0.218 -0.190 -0.030 -0.024 
  0.237 0.240 0.348 0.347 0.271 0.270 
Process Claims Only 0.110 0.118 0.282* 0.290* 0.138 0.156 
  0.227 0.226 0.157 0.157 0.266 0.264 
Process and Object Claims 0.005 0.011 0.035 0.021 -0.195 -0.194 
  0.215 0.216 0.175 0.173 0.232 0.229 
IPC Subclass Dummies 
(Top 16 by Frequency) 













      
Observations 469 469 469 469 469 469 
Number of groups         227 227 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Statistical significance of the team type variable coefficients disappears in most of the 
models in which the sample is restricted to teams with two or more inventors and in which IPC 
based controls are used. The coefficients on cross-domain team variables are not at all significant 
in the random effects models but still remain significant in the stratified models. The results 
imply that our negative results were driven largely by patents invented by cross-domain 
integrated teams with single inventors – i.e. lone inventors with MD/PhD degrees.  
It is important to mention that the lack of significant negative results still does not 
support our hypothesis that inventions by cross-domain teams are at a higher hazard of licensing 
than single-domain team inventions or that inventions by cross-domain integrated teams are at a 
higher hazard of licensing than inventions by cross-domain distributed teams. It alleviates 
however the problem of explaining negative results that are counter to our stated hypotheses.  
Of the control variables, one is particularly important to note – the number of patents 
cited by the focal patent which is an indicator of how pioneering the invention is. Inventions with 
fewer cited patents are more pioneering and according to previous study they are also more 
likely to be licensed (Nerkar et al., 2007). In our dataset that result does not hold. Inventions that 
cite more patents are at a higher hazard of licensing. As noted above, this could be due to the fact 
that inventions with more prior art may be citing patents by the same inventor which may imply 
a larger and potentially better protected patent portfolio. It could also imply, however, that 
industry needs time to catch up with university technology and more cutting edge patents take 
longer to be recognized. Further research to understand the mechanism behind this result is 







In this paper, I try to understand the role of cross-domain expertise on patent licensing 
from Academic Medical Centers. My results are contrary to expectations implying that 
inventions by Cross Domain teams are at a lower hazard of licensing than those by Single 
Domain teams. These results are influenced by the type of technology implying that the 
importance of cross-domain expertise on the inventing team varies by various types of inventions 
and that identifying those areas and directing MD/PhDs into them may present efficiency gains. 
Potential educational subsidies for MD/PhDs specializing in degrees that would be associated 
with future device inventions, for example, could be considered. However, more research needs 
to be done in this area before such recommendations can be made.   
Even if the results are predictive of trends in the larger population they do not imply 
causality as my teams and inventions are simultaneously determined – i.e. teams of different 
educational background are not randomly assigned to come up with a specific invention, instead 
people choose to work on a certain type of invention. Random assignment of inventors to teams 
that can then come up with a specific invention is not possible. Choice of area in which to work 
is personal and hard to control for. While I control for the technological class and subclass of a 
patent, there may be other characteristics of the invention that are correlated both with the 
inventor degrees and with licensing. 
Furthermore, lower rates of licensing may not mean that MD/PhDs or cross-domain 
teams are not crucial to the translational process. Patents and patent licensing measure only a 
certain type of creative and translational activity. It is possible that cross-domain teams are better 
at translating existing inventions into the clinic rather than coming up with new licensable ones. 
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 It could also be that even though their inventions are at a lower hazard of licensing, they may be 
faster to commercialize once licensed. 
More research is needed to understand the role of cross-domain work, teams and 
individuals for the process of translating basic science into the clinic. This paper is providing a 
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Chemistry  506  2     Other  101  1 
Chemistry  530  36     Other  198  1 
Chemistry  536  25     Other  345  3 
Chemistry  544  1     Other  564  1 
Chemistry  552  2     Other  706  1 
Chemistry  554  7     Other  5  5 
Chemistry  436  12     Other  106  1 
Chemistry  560  1     Other  210  2 
Total Chemistry  86    Other  250  2 
Drug  424  96    Other  340  1 
Drug  514  145    Other  372  1 
Total Drug  241    Other  422  2 
Molecular 
Biology  435  125    Other  427  1 
Molecular 
Biology  800  13    Other  433  2 
Total  Molecular Biology  138    Other  521  1 
Optics/Imaging  356  6    Other  522  2 
Optics/Imaging  359  2    Other  523  2 
Optics/Imaging  378  5    Other  525  2 
Optics/Imaging  382  3    Other  528  1 
Optics/Imaging  385  3    Other  623  8 
Optics/Imaging  702  3    Other  705  1 
Optics/Imaging  324  20    Total Other  41 
Total Optics/Imaging  42         
Surgery  128  14          
Surgery  600  56          
Surgery  601  7       
Surgery  604  18       
Surgery  606  37       
Surgery  607  11       














A61 K  657  C7 F  5 
A61 B  250  C8 L  5 
C7 K  248  C8 G  5 
G1 N  135  G9 G  3 
C12 N  123  A47 D  3 
C7 C  115  B6 B  3 
A61 F  58  B41 K  2 
A1 N  50  C7 J  2 
A61 M  49  B29 B  2 
A61 N  46  A1 H  2 
G1 R  44  C9 H  2 
C12 Q  39  A47 G  2 
A61 L  34  H4 N  2 
G2 B  22  G21 K  1 
C7 H  20  H4 Q  1 
C12 M  17  C2 F  1 
C7 D  13  A47 C  1 
A61 G  9  G10 K  1 
C12 P  9  B1 L  1 
G6 T  9  B65 G  1 
H4 L  8  G6 K  1 
G6 F  7  G1 S  1 
C8 B  7  B5 D  1 
C7 B  7  G1 J  1 
G1 T  6  B28 B  1 
C40 B  6  G1 F  1 
A61 Q  6  G1 V  1 
A61 C  6  C9 D  1 
A1 K  6  F2 B  1 
B29 C  6  H1 F  1 
G1 B  6  C7 G  1 
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 3. DO DIVERSITY AND FOCUS IN ROUTINE WORK INFLUENCE CREATIVE 
OUTPUT? EVIDENCE FROM CARDIAC SURGERY 
 
Ayfer Ali         Robert Huckman 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Routine, non R&D work has rarely been seen as the wellspring of innovative ideas. In 
this paper we propose that the design of routine work can influence the quantity and quality of 
innovation. We use the setting of cardiac surgery to show that a surgeon’s clinical focus – i.e. the 
quantity and type of procedures he performs -- has an influence on the quantity and quality of his 
academic article publications, which are our proxy for innovative output. We use a panel dataset 
of 162 surgeons who perform procedures at academic hospitals in New York State from 1994 to 
2004. We find that performing a more diverse set of cardiac procedures is associated with a 
higher number of articles for early-career surgeons. We also find that as the percentage of heart 
valve procedures rises as part of the surgeon’s portfolio, so does the number of cite-weighted 
articles related to heart valve procedures. This result does not hold for Coronary Artery Bypass 
Graft (CABG) procedures however – an increase in the percentage of CABG procedures that a 
surgeon performs, does not increase the number of cite-weighted CABG articles.  
3.2 Introduction  
Many workers have dual roles in their jobs.  They must not only execute routine tasks 
efficiently to ensure short-term success, but they must also creatively alter and improve the way 
they perform those tasks over the long term. At the organizational level March (1991) refers to 
these dual roles as exploitation and exploration, respectively, and describes them as competing 
for organizational resources – an organization that spends time exploiting current expertise will 
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 not spend that time exploring new ways of doing things.  The view that exploitation and 
exploration represent fundamentally different activities, suggests that individuals or 
organizations that are geared to succeed at exploitation should be less proficient at exploration 
and vice-versa.  At a minimum, one might expect that performance with respect to these two 
types of activities is uncorrelated.   
In this paper, we consider whether the relationship between exploitation and exploration 
is more nuanced than simply being uncorrelated or being a “pure tradeoff”.  Specifically, we 
examine whether the manner in which an individual’s routine work (i.e. exploitation) is 
structured influences his or her innovative performance (i.e. exploration).  We characterize the 
routine work of an individual by its degree of specialization under the assumption that greater 
specialization i.e. repeatedly performing one type of task at the expense of others, might impede 
innovative performance to the extent that it does not expose the individual to significant variety 
(Levitt and March, 1988). 
 We examine this issue within the empirical context of cardiac surgery.  We use this 
context because a relatively large percentage of cardiac surgeons are affiliated with academic 
medical centers, implying that they are responsible for both performing surgical procedures (akin 
to exploitation) and performing academic research (akin to exploration).  With respect to the 
latter activity, cardiac surgeons at academic hospitals often innovate in terms of devising new 
techniques or medical devices (Riskin et al., 2006; Chatterji et al., 2008). Furthermore, they are 
part of the larger academic community that publishes articles on new discoveries and advances in 
their field and their innovative performance is reflected in their publications (Merton, 1957; 
Stephan, 1996).  Ultimately, this context allows us to examine how the structure of an 
individual’s exploitation activities impacts his or her performance in terms of exploration. 
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  We find that the structure of routine work is indeed related to the innovative output of 
cardiac surgeons but only statistically significantly for the sample of early career surgeons. A 
more diverse set of procedures results in more articles published for early-career cardiac 
surgeons. Furthermore, innovation in certain areas (i.e. heart valve procedures) is associated with 
a higher focus in that area, while innovation in other areas (i.e. CABG procedures) is associated 
with a higher focus in related (cardiac but non-CABG) areas.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 3.3 develops our hypothesis. 
Section 3.4 describes the data and Section 3.5 shows our results. Section 3.6 concludes with a 
discussion of generalizability and limitations.  
3.3  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The idea that knowledge can be gained through work is not new.  Learning-by-doing has 
been shown to improve productivity (Wright, 1936; Arrow, 1962; Argote and Epple, 1990).  
Workers can improve performance in several ways such as by learning more-efficient ways to 
perform specific tasks, learning to use tools, or learning to work together more effectively 
(Edmondson et. al, 2003; Huckman and Pisano, 2006; Lapre and Nembhard, 2010).  New 
problems that were not anticipated can become apparent in the course of work and may need to 
be resolved, resulting in modifications in processes and tools that improve productivity (Adler 
and Clark, 1991). Though individual modifications may be incremental, they can accumulate to 
become significant innovations with a large economic value (Rosenberg, 1979; Berndt et al., 
2006).  
Innovation in task performance involves two aspects – problem discovery and problem 
solving (von Hippel and Tyre, 1995; Hyysalo, 2006). Performance with respect to both of these 
aspects may be affected by organizational issues, such as management structure or processes for 
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 resource allocation, which may either support or interfere with second-order problem solving and 
innovation (Tucker et al., 2002; Adler and Clark, 1991). In this paper, we propose that such 
innovation is also affected by the organization of routine work itself. 
The positive relationship between specialization and productivity has been previously 
shown at the organizational, divisional and plant levels (Brush and Karnani, 1996; Huckman and 
Zinner, 2007; Vokurka and Davis, 2000). Studies on individual level productivity at the team 
level have also been conducted. Narayanan et al. (2009) use team level data in a software 
maintenance firm to show that specialization improves individual productivity but exposure to 
variety at the workgroup level has non-linear effects – decreasing productivity at very high 
levels. Similarly in an experimental setting, Schilling et al. (2003) find that specialization 
improves individuals’ outcomes but only as much as doing an unrelated task. Doing a different 
but related task, on the other hand, improves outcomes much more than specialization (Schilling 
et al. 2003).  
A study by Boh et al. (2007) on the other hand, finds that while specialization increased 
productivity at the individual level, diverse but related experience is more important for team and 
organizational performance in software maintenance projects. Furthermore, Staats and Gino 
(forthcoming) show that the effect of specialization and variety may be different in the short and 
the long run – in the short run, specialization improves productivity but in the long run, variety is 
more important because workers learn how to learn better (Staats and Gino, forthcoming).  
The importance of specialization and variation in work on performance has also been 
explored in the health care industry. A study by Diwas and Staats (forthcoming) looks at the 
importance of focal and related experience on outcomes in minimally invasive cardiac surgery 
procedures to find that focal experience has a greater effect on surgeon performance than related 
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 experience. Similarly, “procedural specialization” -- i.e. the type of procedures that a surgeon 
performs rather than educational specialization – has been shown to be correlated with lower 
patient mortality rates among general surgeons (Hall et al., 2009).  
The impact of diversity on innovative performance has been studied at the organizational 
and team levels. At the organizational level the scope of R&D programs has been shown to 
positively impact innovative outcomes (Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). Theoretical work on 
team level diversity has found that a randomly chosen group of diverse problem solvers 
outperforms a select group of high ability problem solvers precisely because high ability 
problems solvers are similar to each other (Hong and Page, 2004). In reality however, teams with 
diverse members are prone to conflicts and as a result the effect of diversity on performance 
depends on team process variables (Pelled et al., 1999; Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Rico et 
al., 2007; Bettenhausen, 1991; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). For example, Ancona and 
Caldwell (1992) found that diversity had a direct negative effect on dimensions of innovation in 
new product development teams. The indirect effect of team diversity however, through external 
communication, was positive.  
Diversity of individual experience has also been studied within the context of the team 
with mixed results. In a non-innovative context, intrapersonal functional diversity in top 
management teams has been shown to have a positive effect on information sharing and unit 
performance (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002). However, in contrast to these positive findings,  
Astebro and Thompson (2011) show that people with a more varied experience in the general 
population select to be entrepreneurs but conditional on being entrepreneurs, those with more 
varied experience earn less (Astebro and Thompson, 2011). In terms of innovation, research has 
shown that the share of “multi-knowledge” individuals (those with diverse functional 
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 background) in new product development teams has an indirect positive effect on product 
innovativeness through information sharing (Park et al, 2009).  
  The impact of focus and variety in routine work on innovative outcomes at the 
individual level, however, has not been studied. Levitt and March (1988) propose that at the 
organizational level experience and improvement on an inferior task can result in a “competency 
trap” which can prevent superior procedures from being searched for and adopted (Levitt and 
March, 1988). Individual level theories have not been proposed or tested and it is unclear 
whether the focus of routine work impacts innovation at all. The direction of such a relationship 
also needs to be explored.  
There are a few ways in which the diversity of routine work can impact innovation. A 
diverse set of experiences can enable a worker to identify problems in one area of experience by 
comparing it to another. For example, a surgeon who is performing laparoscopic surgery using 
specific instruments for one area of the body and a different set of instruments for another may 
notice that the difficulty of operating varies by the type of instrument used. Had she not varied 
her work, she would not have thought about applying one set of instruments in a different setting 
to improve suboptimal outcomes. With varied experience she can suggest improvements to the 
tools (see Gauderer, 2009 p. 17 and Riskin et al., 2006 for multiple examples).  
Similarly, surgeons who do a variety of procedures may be better able to apply 
techniques learned and improved in one task of a particular procedure to problems encountered 
in a different procedure. If new problems are encountered in the process of transfer of the 
technique from one procedure to the other, further improvements may be possible. In fact, 
analogical thinking has been shown to impact problem identification, problem solution and 
innovation (Christensen and Schunn, 2007; Kalogerakis et al., 2010).    
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 A diverse set of experiences can impact innovation also by allowing workers to combine 
different ideas or techniques to create new and potentially more efficient ones. In fact 
recombination has been described as a way to create innovation in numerous previous studies 
(Schumpeter, 1939; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Fleming, 2001).  
It is possible, however, that focus in a certain area, rather than experience with a variety 
of tasks may be more important for innovation. Forgetting is a documented phenomenon both at 
the individual and at the organizational level (Johnson and Hasher, 1987; Newell and Simon, 
1972; Argote and Epple, 1990; Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990). Forgetting at the individual 
level then would imply that people are less likely to use and build on the knowledge that they 
acquire from a task if that task is followed by a much different one. In fact, Simon (1990) 
estimates that approximately seven chunks of information can be stored in an individual’s short 
term memory. Repeated exposure is then needed for patterns and rare deviations from patterns to 
be recognized (Narayanan et al. 2009). Focus, rather than varied experience, would then allow 
for such problem recognition and innovative solution.  
Because there is no previous research that would tell us in what direction diversity of 
experience may influence innovation, we propose the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis: Diversity of routine clinical work (exploitation) will influence the quantity and 
quality of innovative output (exploration) by cardiac surgeons.  
To test this hypothesis we use a dataset of cardiac surgeons in NY that work at major 
teaching hospitals. We have diagnosis and procedure information on every patient they saw 
between 1994 and 2004 as well as information on their academic publications.  Cardiac surgeons 
at major teaching hospitals have dual roles - their daily clinical work measured by the procedures 
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 that they perform represents their exploitation activity and their academic output represents a 
report of their innovative ideas and discoveries – a reflection of exploration.  
Furthermore, surgeons have a long history of innovating both in technique and in devices. 
Chatterji et al. (2008) find that 20% of medical device patents have at least one physician as an 
inventor with surgeons constituting 20% of those inventors. Furthermore, patents by physicians 
are more important and more general as seen from analysis of patent citations received (Chatterji 
et al., 2008). In cardiac surgery, for example, one of the most important medical devices – the 
cardio-pulmonary bypass machine – was created by a surgeon, John H. Gibbon who tested his 
first prototype in 1937.  
Surgeons’ expertise in devising new medical devices is also important because of the 
tacitness of the information that they possess with regard to the techniques that they employ. It is 
impossible to encode information regarding the movement of one’s hand close to a beating heart 
for example, or the way an instrument glides in relation to a blood vessel. As a result, problem 
identification almost invariably occurs by the surgeon and problem solution is often done 
iteratively with surgeons and firms working together (von Hippel, 1994; Chatterji et al., 2008).  
Besides medical devices however, surgeons routinely innovate on techniques as well. 
Examples are many and varied and span the history of surgery itself (Mehta, 2009; Riskin et al., 
2006; Gauderer, 2009). Modifications by fellow surgeons eventually make new techniques safe 
and mainstream (Starr, 2010).   
We try to understand how the diversity of clinical experience influences the quantity and 
quality of surgeons’ exploration as proxied by academic publications. This setting is particularly 
good for testing our hypotheses because surgeons’ practical experience consists of their clinical 
work while their academic output also reflects and is based on that clinical work. Practicing 
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 surgeons rarely conduct lab research unrelated to their clinical work. In addition, their academic 
work is a good proxy for innovation since peer reviewed academic journals generally publish 
work containing new ideas or findings. Furthermore, surgeons vet new ideas and techniques in 
the community through these publications.  
What is important for our setting is that surgeon innovations are reflected in academic 
articles that can be observed and whose quality can be proxied using widely accepted measures. 
Articles range from problem descriptions, longitudinal studies that identify correlations to 
descriptions of new techniques and clinical studies using those techniques. As a result, this 
provides us with the perfect setting to test our hypothesis.   
3.4 Description of Data 
3.4.1 Data on Surgeons 
The main data for our paper comes from New York State’s Statewide Planning and 
Research Cooperative System (SPARCS) and includes all inpatient hospital stays in New York 
State between 1994 and 2004.1 Each patient-stay is a unique observation and contains up to 15 
diagnoses and up to 15 procedures as well as separate attending physician and surgeon license 
numbers which we use to link to surgeons’ academic profiles.  
3.4.1.1  Surgeon Selection 
For our paper we use a sample of 162 surgeons who have worked at least one year at a 
major teaching hospital in NY and have performed at least 25 Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
(CABG) or valve procedures in at least one of the 11 years they are in our dataset.  CABG and 




 performs them. To be in our sample, these surgeons also had to be listed as thoracic, 
cardiothoracic or cardiovascular surgeons in one of three places: 1) the Cardiothoracic Surgeon 
Network website (www.ctsnet.org)2 2) the “Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery in NY State” 
reports for 1994-20043 or 3) the www.nydoctorprofile.com4  website which provides information 
on a physician’s education and specialty. They also had to 4) have performed at least one surgery 
in a major teaching hospital during this time period.  
Restrictions 1) and 2) we put in place because of intricacies of the data. The data lists a 
doctor and a surgeon responsible for the primary surgery on each patient observation. However, 
for people who had some other procedure together with a CABG or valve procedure, such as 
trauma surgery, the surgeon listed on the patient observation could be different from the cardiac 
surgeon. So based on just the first selection criterion we ended up getting about 13 other doctors 
who were cardiologists, trauma surgeons, emergency room (ER) doctors in our sample.  Since 
we are not interested in following their clinical experience as it is not comparable to the rest of 
our sample, we decided to exclude them.5  
The last restriction is put in place because we are interested in article publications and not 
all surgeons publish. Major teaching hospitals are our proxy for incentive to publish and come 
from a list by the American Hospitals Directory. They are certified by the Council of Teaching 













 hospital.6 Furthermore, surgeons who never publish are excluded from our sample because we 
rely on a panel dataset and their outcome variable does not change.   
We also exclude those surgeon-year observations in which a surgeon has fewer than 25 
total patients. Those are, with six exceptions, years in which the surgeon is first or last observed 
and we are not sure that the surgeon practiced in New York State for the whole year. For our 
analysis we are left with a sample to 1307 surgeon-year observations – an unbalanced panel of 
162 surgeons over 11 years. Similarly, we also report results with samples that include only 
surgeons who have fewer than 50% of their patients receiving non-cardiac procedures throughout 
their career. That restriction was put in place because we were worried that surgeons who were 
doing predominantly other thoracic surgery such as lung procedures were not comparable to the 
rest of the sample. 
3.4.1.2 Clinical Focus 
Once we select our sample of surgeons we proceed to select each patient that they have 
treated. Detailed patient observations are then combined to create a composite measure of the 
diversity of different types of procedures that a surgeon performs in a certain year. Each patient 
observation is a stay at a hospital (we removed duplicate observations for ancillary service use) 
and contains a number of detailed variables on patient demographics, attending physician, 
surgeon, hospital, payment as well as up to 15 diagnoses and 15 procedures performed.  For each 
patient we use the procedures reported using standard International Classification of Diseases 
Revision 9, Clinical Modification (hereafter ICD-9) codes and sum those over all patients of 




 Particularly important for our purposes is that the license numbers are reported for the 
attending physician and the surgeon that treat the patient. We use the surgeon license number to 
find additional surgeon specific information such as education, year of graduation and licensing 
and, most importantly, articles published. The data also contains information on the hospital at 
which the surgery was performed, which helps us determine whether it is a major teaching 
hospital and whether the physician has an incentive to publish or not.  
We use the 15 procedure variables to understand the make of the physician’s clinical 
work. To do this we need to first determine what procedures a cardiac surgeon would perform, 
how they are similar to each other and can be grouped together in categories.  The reason why 
we group ICD-9 procedures into different categories is that ICD-9 codes are very detailed and 
two different ICD-9 codes do not necessarily reflect very different tasks that could potentially 
result in variation in learning. For example, a surgeon may perform a CABG where he only 
bypasses one artery (ICD-9 – 3611) or one where he bypasses two arteries (ICD – 3612). While 
the second procedure is more complex, it is not very different from the first procedure if split 
into its constituent tasks. We create measures of focus based on these categories and include 
those in our models.  There are a large number of ways in which these categories can be created 
and below we report three such groupings.  
There are no previously accepted standards for determining what constitutes a cardiac 
surgeon’s work and cardiac surgeons are also trained in general surgery so could potentially 
perform other surgeries as well. In addition, while the majority of cardiac surgeons’ work is 
indeed on the heart, many cardiac surgeons are trained and often perform surgeries on the lung or 
the other thoracic organs as well. To be able to compare them we need to look at the cardiac 
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 surgeries that they perform and then compare them on those particular sets of tasks.  Below we 
report our three different measures of cardiac surgeons’ clinical focus.  
3.4.1.2.1 Task Based Focus Measure 
The first measure, which we call Task Based Focus measure is based on our own 
understanding of cardiac surgeons’ work and how the procedures they do may differ based on 
the tasks required to complete each. That measure divides the procedures into six categories – 1) 
CABG, 2) Heart Valve, 3) Heart Muscle (other than heart valve), 4) Heart Vessel (other than 
CABG), 5) Pacemaker/Defibrillator and 6) Heart Assist Device/Transplant procedures. While 
CABGs are part of the heart vessel surgeries we decided to separate them from the rest of the 
Heart Vessel procedures because of the large volume of GABG surgeries compared to other 
cardiac surgeries. For the same reason we separated Heart Valve procedures from Heart Muscle 
procedures. We also presume that routine surgeries such as CABG and Heart Valve have been 
more standardized and innovation may be less likely in them.  Below we describe the procedures 
in each of the categories. A list of the ICD-9 procedure codes that we used in each category is 
included in Appendix 3.A.  
1)  CABG - involves bypassing a section of a coronary artery with a graft from a 
different blood vessel from another part of the patient’s body  
2) Heart Valve – repair or replacement of a heart valve  
3) Pacemaker/Defibrillator insertion - simpler procedures than the rest that do not 
necessarily require opening the chest wall and can be performed by general surgeons. In our 
case, they are only included if performed by a cardiac surgeon. Often they are auxiliary to other 
surgeries.  
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 4) Heart Assist Systems /Transplant – includes insertion of left ventricular assist 
devices, other complex artificial systems that assist the heart muscle in doing its job in severely 
ill patients with congestive heart failure. These devices normally assist patients who wait for 
transplants. Because of the low volume of heart transplants, we include them in this category.   
5) Heart Muscle – these include procedures on the ventricles, heart atrium, myocardium, 
the pericardium and other muscular structures of the heart.  
6) Heart Vessel– treatments of heart and thoracic vessel aneurysms and revascularization 
other than CABG. Includes procedures performed on the thoracic aorta.  
7) Non-cardiac Procedures - includes lung cancer surgeries, other thoracic procedures 
such as on the diaphragm, trauma procedures, diagnostic procedures such as cardiac 
catheterization and anything else that does not have an ICD-9 procedure code that is related to 
open heart cardiac surgery.  
An observation (i.e. patient stay) was classified as non-cardiac if no cardiac procedure 
was reported from the ones in categories 1) through 6). We previously did have a separate “lung” 
category but our understanding at the moment of lung procedures is not sufficient to help us 
classify them into different more detailed categories within the lung surgeries group. In further 
work on this paper, we are planning on distributing a survey to a few surgeons that will ask them 
to independently assign lung procedures to different categories.  
The table below shows a frequency distribution of the six categories along with non-





 Table 3.1 Frequency distribution of cardiac procedures across Task Based Focus 
categories 
Category Number of Procedures in 
Each Category (all surgeons, 
years) 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) Procedures                                       119,879 
Valve Procedures                                         38,821 
Heart and Thoracic Vessel Procedures (no CABG) - HTV                                           6,723 
Heart Muscle Procedures Other Than Valve                                         21,791 
Heart Assist and Heart Transplant Procedures                                           9,973 
Pacemaker/Defibrillator Procedures                                         18,287 
Total Cardiac Procedures                                        215,474 
Total Cardiac Patients                                       175,484 
Non-cardiac Patients                                       41,137  
Total Patients                                       216,621 
 
Note that the total number of patients is different from the sum of the total procedures. 
This is because if a patient gets procedures from two or more different categories, we count each 
of them separately. However, if a patient gets two procedures from the same category, we don’t 
count them as two separate procedures. For example, if a person received a pacemaker and a 
defibrillator, then that would be counted as only one procedure in the Pacemaker/Defibrillator 
category. If she, however, received a valve replacement and a pacemaker, then we would count 
these procedures in each of their respective categories. From the data above, we see that our 
cardiac patients received on average cardiac procedures from 1.23 of the above categories.  
To measure the diversity of a physician’s clinical work we create a Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HHI) index based on the share of the different cardiac procedure categories above in 
her total cardiac procedure count i.e. we sum the squares of the share of Heart Assist/Transplant 
procedures, the square of the share of CABG procedures and so on with all six cardiac procedure 
categories.  In creating the shares, we use the total number of cardiac Task Based Focus category 
procedures. In this measure we exclude the Non-cardiac category. A large Non-cardiac category 
share will inflate our HHI while possibly containing a very diverse set of procedures itself. In our 
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 models we include the share of patients with no cardiac procedures along with the cardiac HHI.  
Below is the formula for our Herfindahl-Hirschman measure: 
ܪܪܫ ൌ ቀ௖೔೟ೖௌ೟ೖ ቁ
ଶ
, 
where citk is the number of procedures in cardiac category i in year t for surgeon k and Stk is the 
sum of procedures across all cardiac categories in the same year for surgeon k.  Below are graphs 
of the distribution of the HHI index based on the Task Based Focus Categories.  
Graph 3.1a Frequency Distribution of the 
HHI index based on the Task Based Focus 
categories across all 162 surgeons over 
1994-2004 
Graph 3.1b Frequency distribution of the 
Yearly Change in the HHI Index within 





3.4.1.2.3 CABG/Valve Based Focus Measure (CVL Focus) 
Because CABG and Heart Valve procedures are the main ones that the surgeons in our 
data perform, together constituting 74% of all cardiac procedures, we decided to create a 
measure that separates the categories from the Task Based Focus measure into larger groups 
centered on CABG and Heart Valve procedures. In this CVL measure we have four cardiac 
surgery categories – “CABG”, “Heart Valve”, “CABG and Valve” and— “No CABG or Valve”.  
Non-cardiac surgeries are excluded. These categories are mutually exclusive by patient – i.e. a 
patient cannot have a procedure in more than one of these categories. This is different from the 
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 simultaneously – for example in CABG, Heart Valve and Pacemaker/Defibrillator.  For that 
reason, in calculating the share of a specific category in the HHI index the numerator was the 
number of cardiac procedures in a certain category performed by the surgeon in  the specific year 
and the denominator was the total number of cardiac procedures in that year by that same 
surgeon. When we calculate shares in the CVL categories the numerator is the number of 
patients who had a procedure in the specific CVL category performed by a specific surgeon and 
the denominator will be the total number of patients that had a cardiac procedure in that year by 
that surgeon.  Below is a description of the categories in the CVL focus measure:  
1) CABG - the patient has received at least one procedure in the CABG Task Based 
Focus (TBF) category but no procedure from the Heart Valve TBF category. Patient 
may have received cardiac procedures from the other TBF categories.  
2) Valve – the patient has received at least one Heart Valve procedure but no CABG 
procedures from the TBF categories. Patient may have received more cardiac 
procedures from the other TBF categories.  
3) CABG and Valve – the patient has received both a CABG and a Heart Valve 
procedure from the TBF categories. Patient may have received cardiac procedures 
from the other TBF categories.  
4) No CABG or Valve Cardiac – the patient has received at least one cardiac procedure 
from at least one TBF category but no procedures in the CABG or Heart Valve TBF 
categories.  





 Table 3.2: Frequency distribution of cardiac procedures across CABG/Valve Focus 
Measure categories 
 
CVL Category Number of Procedures in 
Category 
Patients with  CABG                                   106,397 
Patients with Valve                                     25,339 
Patients with Both CABG and Valve                                     13,482 
Patients with Cardiac Procedures but No CABG or Valve                                     30,266 
Non-Cardiac-Surgery Patients                                     41,137 
Total Patients                                   216,621 
  
  
Graph 3.2a: Frequency distribution of the 
HHI index based on the CABG/Valve Based 
Focus categories across all 162 surgeons 
over 1994-2004 
Graph 3.2b: Frequency distribution of the 
Yearly Change in the CVL HHI Index 
within Surgeons over all surgeons, all years 
             
 
3.4.1.2.3 Clinical Classification Software (CCS) Based Focus 
Our third focus measure is based on a categorization of diseases and procedures designed 
by the Agency for Healthcare Research (AHRQ) as part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP). According to its designers, the CCS classifies diseases and procedures “into a 
smaller number of clinically meaningful categories” based on the ICD-9 codes. 7  
The CCS system has three levels of detail and for our purposes we use section 7 – 
Cardiovascular Procedures at the second level of detail. We further select only operating room 
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 such as 7.14 - Other vascular bypass and shunt; not heart or procedures that would be performed 
by cardiologists and not cardiac surgeons such as 7.5 Diagnostic cardiac catheterization; 
coronary arteriography or Percutaneous trans luminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA). 
Appendices 3.B1 and 3.B2 describe section 7 of the CCS classification at the different levels of 
detail.  For our purposes we retained five categories at the second level of section 7 of the CCS 
classification described below:  
7. 1 Heart Valve procedures 
7.2 Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG)  
7.6 Insertion; revision; replacement; removal of cardiac pacemaker or  
cardioverter/defibrillator (Pacemaker/Defibrillator) 
7.7 Other OR Heart procedures 
7.10 Aortic resection; replacement or anastomosis 
Section 7.10 –Aortic resection; replacement or anastomosis was absorbed in section 7.2 - CABG 
- as the procedures are similar and there are very few observations in 7.10 in our dataset.  
Similarly, cardiac transplant procedures are not part of section 7 of the CCS at all and there are 
again very few such procedures so they were added to the “Other OR Heart procedures” category 
The CCS categories are comparable to the Task Based Focus Measure categories but 
differ in certain significant ways. Many procedures in the TBF based Heart Vessel category are 
classified in the CABG category in the CCS classification even though they are not technically 
CABG. Similarly, a fair number of the TBF based Heart Muscle procedures are in the Heart 
Valve category according to the CCS classification. However, a large number of the TBF based 
Heart Vessel and Heart Muscle categories are also classified in the “Other OR heart procedures” 
category.  
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 Table 3.3 Frequency distribution of cardiac procedures across CCS Focus Measure 
categories 
 
CCS Category Number of Procedures in Each CCS  Category
CCS Valve Procedures                                       38,857 
CCS CABG Procedures                                     122,233 
CCS Other OR procedures                                        31,671 
CCS Pacemaker/Defibrillator Procedures                                       17,764 
CCS Total Cardiac Procedures                                     210,525 
CCS Total Cardiac Patients                                     173,716




Graph 3.3a Distribution of the HHI index 
based on the CCS classification based focus 
categories across all 162 surgeons over 
1994-2004 
 
Graph 3.3b Distribution of the  
Yearly Change in the CCS HHI  




3.4.1.3 Share of total procedures based measures 
Another way to understand the clinical work of cardiac surgeons is to examine the 
influence of specific types of procedures they perform on their innovative outcome. Some 
procedures are significantly different from others in terms of the tasks needed to complete them 
and their complexity.  Certain areas of academic inquiry and surgical innovation may be newer 
and open to more contributions because standards have not been established in the community. 
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 tend to be more complex and rarer than CABG, which due to the high incidence of 
cardiovascular disease has become a more routine procedure. Furthermore, the effect of specific 
procedures on articles related to that procedure or to other procedures could indicate experiential 
and innovative spillovers.  For that reason, we run a number of models in which we look at how 
the change in the share of a certain category of procedures in a surgeon’s work impacts the 
number and quality of articles that she publishes.  
3.4.2 Data on Academic Articles 
We measure academic output by the number of articles that a surgeon has published in 
peer-reviewed journals. We exclude editorial materials, meeting abstracts, bibliographies, letters, 
review articles or notes which do not necessarily report innovative outcomes and are not always 
peer reviewed. Our interest is in innovative output which is often measured by patents but few of 
our surgeons have actually filed patents. In addition, patents are good indicators for innovations 
involving medical devices but not for innovations in technique or procedure as the latter kind of 
patents are hard to enforce. Academic journal articles are by definition innovative because they 
put forward new insights that physicians glean from their clinical or lab work (Schroeder et al., 
1989; Merton, 1957; Stephan, 1996).  
We obtain our data from the ISI Web of Science citation index. The Web of Science 
(WOS) database provides detailed information about the articles. It includes the title of the 
article, all the authors and their addresses as supplied by them, subject and separate keywords 
reported by the authors or marked by WOS. In addition to the source and year of publication, the 
number of cites each article has received from publication till the current time (the date the data 
is gathered by me in this case) is also reported. 
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 We search for surgeon-authors in this database by their last name and a combination of 
their first and, if available, middle initial, as well as at least one address in the state of NY on the 
article. To make certain that the article belongs to the particular physician we compare each 
article’s address to the physician’s hospital at the time it was published and the year prior to 
publication. We have the name of the hospitals at which they practiced from the SPARCS dataset 
and use the Cardiothoracic Surgeons’ Network website at www.ctsnet.org as well as the NY 
State CABG reports for further checks of their hospital of practice during specific years. We also 
use additional checks such as the topic of the surgeon’s article and the availability of other 
physicians with the same last name and initials in the state. For example, there are two 
physicians named Ko Wilson (no middle initial) in NY. One is an ophthalmologist and the other 
is a cardiac surgeon and they write on two very different topics. Another example is of a father 
and a son with the same last name and two initials that match (JJ Rose).  One is a plastic surgeon 
and the other is a cardiac surgeon. At some point in their career they also work at the same 
university hospital. A detailed review of the articles based on the points above lets us make the 
correct article attribution. 
Our article data spans the years from 1994 through 2004. In our models we lag our focus 
data by a year in comparison to our article data based on the assumption that articles conceived 
in a certain year will be published in the next one. This is reasonable given the fact that the 
turnaround time for medical journal articles is about 7 months8, much shorter than that for 





 In our models we use citations as an indicator of innovativeness and quality of a 
surgeon’s research (Adams and Griliches, 1996; Azoulay, P, 2002).9 They are, however, a very 
imperfect measure of quality. One of the biggest criticisms has been that citations do not 
necessarily reflect building on knowledge. For example, citations may reflect a scientific fad that 
is not based on the merit of ideas. Self-citations pose additional problems. Furthermore, citation 
propensity likely varies by field and subfield. Additionally, articles that report on more basic 
science have been found to be cited more than articles on more applied and narrower topics 
which can be just as valuable from society’s point of view (Lindsey, 1989; Cockburn et al., 
1999).  However, we believe that in our case articles are a good proxy for the quality and 
innovativeness of published research as they are in the same field and most likely occupy a 
similar space in the basic/applied research continuum.  Also, they have a strong history of use in 
economics and management literature (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Azoulay, 2002).   
From the article data, we create two measures of a physician’s academic output. The first 
one is a yearly variable that measures the number of articles a surgeon has written in each year. 
To control for the fact that many medical articles have more than one author and that more 
authors imply that an article has received less input from each specific author, each author gets 
credit for only 1/n-th of an article that has n authors. This is based on the fact that in the sciences 
and to a large extent in medicine as well, the names of all the lab or departmental collaborators 
will be on the article with the first author being the person in charge of the experiments and the 







 Our second outcome measure uses article cites to quantify the quality and innovativeness 
of each physician’s academic output. This measure counts the citations an article has received 
per year since its publication and is also divided by the number of authors.  It is then summed 
over all the articles the surgeon has published in a given year to yield a cite-weighted article 
count.  This measure does not control for the number of articles a surgeon has written in a given 
year.  For example, a surgeon who has written 5 articles that each received 2 citations per year 
will have the same value as a surgeon who wrote 2 articles that each received 5 citations per 
year.  In that way, this is a measure of the quality of the overall research of a surgeon per year. 
This measure also helps compare research quality among people who publish on many different 
topics and those that publish only on a few. This means that a surgeon who only performs 
CABGs and may only write on the topic of CABG but write high quality articles will be the 
same on this measure as someone who does many different procedures in different categories 
and writes less important articles on each of the different topics – i.e. CABG, valve, heart 
transplant etc. This controls for the fact that surgeons who work in different areas have the 
opportunity to publish in many different areas as well.  
Due to data constraints, we are only able to get information for number of citations as of 
June 2008 (when we finalized the data gathering process).  We then use the years passed since 
the publication of the article to find the average citations per year. This assumes that citations are 
uniformly distributed over the years. There is no data to support or disprove this assumption. It is 
possible, for example, that articles reach a peak yearly citation rate at some time after they are 
published possibly at 5 years after publication.  For articles that have been out for less than 5 
years then, we may be under-representing their quality. This is a shortcoming of our data.  
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 For some of our analyses we also divide the articles by topic. We use only two topics – 
valve and CABG since the rest are hard to classify into meaningful but small number of 
categories. We use a number of keywords in the title, subject, keyword or abstract to classify 
articles into these two categories. Below are some summary statistics about our articles and a 
graph of their frequency distribution:   
 Table 3.4 Article Publications Data  
Category          1994-2004 
Total number of articles by authors in our dataset 2486 
Total CABG articles 396 
Total Valve Articles 349 
Total First Author articles by surgeons in our data 274 
Lowest number of articles per year per surgeon 0 
Highest number of articles per year per surgeon [not divided 
by number of authors per article] 28 
 
Graph 3.4 Frequency Distribution of Article Publications per Year per Surgeon 
 
 
3.4.2 Data for Control Variables 
In our models we also include a few procedure related and surgeon related control 
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 focus. As mentioned before, we have a panel dataset and our dependent variable is the yearly 
change in (cite-weighted) article publications by a specific surgeon and our independent variable 
of interest is the change in the surgeon’s clinical focus. However, over time, as surgeons advance 
in their career and are more sought after by patients they may have more influence over the  
procedures that they elect to perform and hence over their clinical focus. For that reason we 
control for the surgeon’s career age. This variable is defined as the time from the surgeon’s 
graduation from medical school and was obtained from the New York State Department of 
Education Professional Licensing Office web site.10 Data were checked and complemented by 
surgeon self-reported graduation dates from the Cardiothoracic Surgery Network (CTS) 
website.11  
There are certain problems with measuring career age from time of medical school 
graduation rather than the starting date of practicing as a cardiothoracic surgeon. Some may 
decide to become cardiac surgeons and start their training right after medical school while others 
may have practiced as general surgeons for some years before becoming cardiothoracic 
surgeons. In terms of career age and influence on patient mix then, they would not be similar in 
our dataset even if they graduated at the same time from medical school. Unfortunately, this is 
the best data that is available. We considered professional licensing data but that licensing is 
often received immediately after medical school graduation, not at the start of a cardiothoracic 
career.  There is also an additional downside to using licensing data because it is by state and 
surgeons who practiced in a different state before coming to NY and received they NY State 






 school graduation and professional MD licensing are also highly correlated – with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.87. 
Another variable that we suspect is correlated with both the mix of procedures that a 
surgeon performs and her academic articles is the complexity of the types of procedures that she 
performs. A surgeon who performs more complex surgeries may also have an opportunity to 
learn and innovate more. We measure complexity by the number of procedures from different 
task based focus categories that the surgeon performs on each patient – a patient that receives 
both a Heart Valve and a CABG procedure would be a more complex case than a patient who 
just received a CABG procedure. Note, however, that multiple procedures from the same focus 
category on the same patient will be only counted as one procedure. To get our surgeon year 
value of complexity we count the procedures that each patient received from our different 
categories and average them over the total number of patients for each surgeon. Our complexity 
variable has a range between 1 and 1.84.  
This complexity measure is re-calculated for our CCS focus measure because the main 
categories are different from the Task Based Focus measure. For example, many cardiac vessel 
procedures that would be in the Heart Vessel category in our Task Based Focus measure are 
included in the CABG category. As a result, the complexity measure is different for patients who 
would have had procedures in two different Task Based Focus categories but now have 
procedures only in one CCS category. The range of the CCS complexity measure is 1 to 1.68 due 
to the smaller number of different categories.   
Our CABG/Valve based focus measure is designed in such a way that each patient 
belongs to one of four categories, rather than procedures belonging to categories. The four 
categories are defined based on whether the patient received: “CABG”, “Heart Valve”, “CABG 
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 and Valve” and “Cardiac, but No CABG or Valve” procedures. As a result, complexity cannot be 
defined using the four patient categories above. We thus use the Task Based Focus categories to 
create a complexity measure and include it in addition to the CABG/Valve based focus measure 
in these models. Our results remain the same in direction and statistical significance if we do not 
include a complexity measure at all in the CABG/Valve focus specification.  
3.5  Models and Results 
In all our models, we use Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimation with surgeon 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors by surgeon. The Poisson QML is a count model with 
estimates that are consistent without the assumption of a particular underlying distribution of our 
variables. Fixed effects OLS provides very similar results which have not been reported here. 
Because it is a fixed effects model, the XTPQML model drops all surgeons who have no article 
publications or cites in the respective models throughout their career.   
For our identification strategy, we use within surgeon variation of clinical and academic 
measures across different years.  Our goal is to avoid potential omitted variable bias such as 
surgeon innate ability or curiosity which may be responsible both for someone’s higher diversity 
or focus of clinical work and higher publication output. We also include a yearly trend variable 
by introducing surgeon’s professional experience which measures the time elapsed since a 
surgeon graduated from medical school and changes every year as one more year is added to her 
experience.  
Our main results are reported in Tables 3.5a-3.5c. Each of the tables contains results with 
two different dependent variables: all cite-weighted articles per year per surgeon in the first three 
columns and the raw number of all articles per year per surgeon in the last three columns. The 
main variable of interest – our HHI based focus measure, differs in each table based on the 
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 categories used to construct it. In Table 3.5a – we use our own knowledge of cardiac surgery to 
classify each procedure into one of the Task Based Focus cardiac categories – CABG, Valve, 
Heart Muscle, Heart Vessel, Heart Assist/Transplant and Pacemaker/Defibrillator. We then use 
the share of each of these categories in a surgeon’s total volume of heart procedures to construct 
a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) which we include as our main independent variable. In 
Table 3.5b the HHI is based on dividing the above categories into coarser groups where each 
cardiac patient belongs to one of four categories - CABG, Valve, CABG and Valve, Other 
Cardiac patient. The last HHI in Table 5c is created by using the CCS categories with small 
modifications explained in our data section.  
In each of the tables, the first and fourth columns include results from the whole sample. 
The rest of the models are run on subsamples of early-career and late-career surgeons. The 
division between the early and late career surgeons is made by taking the years since graduation 
variable for each surgeon at the time when he enters the dataset. The distribution is skewed with 
a mean of 15.4 and a median of 14 years. We select the median as our division point. Surgeons 
with experience of less than 14 years at time of entry into the dataset are classified as early-
career surgeons and those with 14 or more are classified as late-career surgeons. Below is a 
histogram of the years since graduation variable for each of the 162 surgeons in our dataset. It is 
measured at the time when we first start observing them.  Tables 3.5a, 3.5b and 3.5c with our 














From Tables 3.5 a-c we note that a higher focus is associated with both fewer articles and 
fewer cites for the surgeons in our dataset but that result is only statistically significant for the 
early career surgeons for articles in all models. The coefficient for this variable is marginally 
statistically significant for cite-weighted articles for the Task Based Focus HHI. This implies that 
variation early in the career is associated with a higher quantity of articles but not once these 
articles are quality weighted. Lower clinical focus is not associated with more articles  once the 
surgeon has accumulated a certain amount of experience. It is important to point out that the 
significance of the coefficients on the focus variable on the quantity of articles varies with the 
type of measure used. The level of significance goes down with the CABG/Valve based measure 
in which the categories are much less detailed.  We consider the Task-Based Focus categories to 
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 Tables 3.5 a-c. Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index Models  
 
Table 3.5a. Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure - HHI of Task Based 
Focus Categories. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by surgeon 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted Articles Articles 











Task Based Focus 
HHI 
-0.385 -1.618* 0.102 -0.214 -1.800** 0.638 
(0.506) (0.053) (0.859) (0.716) (0.030) (0.335) 
Share Non-Cardiac 
Patients 
-0.255 0.209 -0.322 -0.403 0.130 -0.316 
(0.684) (0.896) (0.592) (0.286) (0.864) (0.455) 
Total Number of 
Patients 
0.00303*** 0.00264*** 0.00437*** 0.00238*** 0.0016*** 0.00398*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
Cardiac Complexity 
(TBF) 
0.295 -1.577* 1.003 -0.486 -2.232*** 0.292 
(0.686) (0.059) (0.241) (0.355) (0.002) (0.614) 
Years Since 
Graduation 
0.002 -0.018 0.029 0.007 0.011 0.027 
(0.941) (0.638) (0.333) (0.676) (0.504) (0.254) 
Number of Unique 
Surgeons 115 53 62 118 55 63 
Number of 
Observations 952 397 555 964 406 558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Table 3.5b. Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure - HHI of 
CABG/Valve Based Focus Categories. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by 
surgeon 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted Articles Articles 















-0.266 -1.143 -0.14 -0.373 -1.197* -0.098 
(0.750) (0.289) (0.884) (0.549) (0.073) (0.915) 
Share Non-Cardiac 
Patients 
-0.213 0.146 -0.387 -0.430 0.060 -0.489 
(0.753) (0.926) (0.557) (0.274) (0.934) (0.294) 
Total Number of 
Patients 
0.00309*** 0.00252*** 0.00439*** 0.00244*** 0.00147*** 0.00390*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) 
Cardiac Complexity 
(TBF Based) 
0.399 -1.311 0.863 -0.541 -1.870*** -0.131 
(0.614) (0.178) (0.340) (0.263) (0.009) (0.829) 
Years Since 
Graduation 
0.001 -0.026 0.031 0.007 0.002 0.030 
(0.974) (0.478) (0.336) (0.686) (0.924) (0.206) 
Number of Unique 
Surgeons 115 53 62 118 55 63 
Number of 
Observations 952 397 555 964 406 558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 3.5c. Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure - HHI of CCS Based 
Focus Categories. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by surgeon 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted Articles Articles 











CCS Based Focus 
HHI 
-0.213 -1.396 0.239 -0.344 -1.622** 0.346 
0.758 0.190 0.760 0.587 0.039 0.691 
Share Non-Cardiac 
Patients 
-0.222 0.412 -0.341 -0.373 0.266 -0.334 
0.712 0.792 0.602 0.306 0.738 0.484 
Total Number of 
Patients 
0.00298*** 0.00256*** 0.00430*** 0.00241*** 0.00157*** 0.00394*** 
0.008 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.001 
Cardiac Complexity 
(CCS Based) 
0.292 -1.214 0.989 -0.481 -2.180** 0.309 
0.730 0.135 0.386 0.415 0.014 0.664 
Years Since 
Graduation 
0.002 -0.025 0.031 0.006 0.004 0.027 
0.937 0.476 0.313 0.715 0.793 0.243 
Number of Unique 
Surgeons 115 53 62 118 55 63 
Number of Obs 952 397 555 964 406 558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Another interesting result is that for the early career group, higher cardiac complexity, 
measured here as the average number of cardiac procedure categories per patient, is associated 
with a lower number of articles in all models and fewer cite-weighted articles in one of the 
models. The only variable that is associated very strongly with higher number of raw and cite-
weighted articles is the number of cardiac patients. It is somewhat surprising that a higher 
number of patients and articles are positively correlated as both writing and operating are time-
consuming activities.  It implies that doing more surgeries is the only consistent predictor of 
increased innovative outcomes as measured by articles published which hints at a “learning to 
innovate by doing more routine work” phenomenon. 
Our next set of results in Tables 3.6a-3.6c is from a sample of surgeons who do 
predominantly cardiac procedures. Excluded are all surgeons who over their years in our sample 
have on average more than 50% of their patients receiving only non-cardiac procedures such as 
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 lung procedures, other thoracic or vascular procedures and so on. Since we only use each 
surgeon’s cardiac procedures to construct the HHI variables in each model, we believe that the 
excluded surgeons are not necessarily comparable to the predominantly cardiac surgeons and this 
specification gives us a better understating of the effect of clinical focus among predominantly 
cardiac surgeons.  
Our results are similar to those based on the whole sample. One difference is that a higher 
focus measured by the HHI is associated with a lower number of cite-weighed articles among 
early-career surgeons not only using the Task Based categories but also the CCS based 
categories and the results are highly significant. Also, a higher focus negatively impacts cite-
weighted articles in the whole sample models, rather than just the early career samples, in both 
the Task Based Focus and the CABG/Valve models.  
Table 3.6a:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure is HHI of Task 
Based Focus Categories.  Sample Restricted to surgeons with more than 50% of their patients receiving 





















‐1.417*  ‐2.715***  ‐0.622  ‐1.063  ‐3.330***  0.112 
0.065  0.000  0.582  0.192  0.002  0.909 
Share Non‐Cardiac 
Patients 
‐0.984*  ‐0.666  ‐0.89  ‐0.820**  ‐0.523  ‐0.597 
0.083  0.721  0.124  0.038  0.6  0.226 
Total Number of 
Patients 
0.00246***  0.00280***  0.00337** 0.00221***  0.00172***  0.00367***
0.005  0.002  0.013  0.004  0.007  0.007 
Cardiac Complexity  ‐0.244  ‐1.699**  0.418  ‐0.625  ‐2.615***  0.266 
0.727  0.041  0.599  0.286  0.000  0.676 
Years Since 
Graduation 
‐0.007  ‐0.022  0.013  0.001  0.014  0.016 
0.772  0.551  0.708  0.946  0.387  0.474 
        
Number of Groups  107  47  60  109  48  61 




 Table 3.6b:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure - HHI of CABG/Valve 
Based Focus Categories. Sample Restricted to surgeons with more than 50% of their patients receiving cardiac 
















CABG/Valve Based HHI  ‐1.574**  ‐1.829  ‐1.527  ‐1.268*  ‐1.790*  ‐1.034 
0.0458  0.111  0.168  0.062  0.063  0.267 
Share Non‐Cardiac 
Patients 
‐1.161**  ‐0.716  ‐1.180*  ‐0.954**  ‐0.387  ‐0.874* 
0.048  0.714  0.061  0.011  0.703  0.091 
Total Number of 
Patients 
0.0026***  0.0026***  0.0036***  0.0023***  0.0014**  0.0038*** 
0.006  0.006  0.007  0.003  0.013  0.002 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
‐0.222  ‐1.275  0.162  ‐0.617  ‐2.004***  ‐0.12 
0.762  0.195  0.852  0.254  0.006  0.863 
Years Since Graduation  ‐0.014  ‐0.035  0.012  ‐0.003  ‐0.001  0.018 
0.597  0.336  0.728  0.839  0.964  0.419 
              
Observations  881  348  533  888  352  536 
Number of Groups  107  47  60  109  48  61 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.6c:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Focus Measure - HHI of CCS Based Focus 
Categories. Sample Restricted to surgeons with more than 50% of their patients receiving cardiac surgery. P-values 


















‐1.351  ‐2.942***  ‐0.577  ‐1.437*  ‐3.020**  ‐0.592 
0.127  0.009  0.618  0.061  0.019  0.517 
Share Non‐Cardiac 
Patients 
‐0.948  ‐0.488  ‐0.939  ‐0.796*  ‐0.257  ‐0.616 
0.113  0.792  0.200  0.066  0.806  0.328 
Total Number of Patients 
  
0.00236**  0.00266***  0.00332**  0.00217***  0.00156***  0.00357***
0.013  0.005  0.012  0.006  0.004  0.008 
Cardiac Complexity CCS 
  
‐0.412  ‐1.497*  0.175  ‐0.714  ‐2.561***  0.155 
0.606  0.074  0.879  0.248  0.007  0.837 
Years Since Graduation 
  
‐0.009  ‐0.035  0.015  ‐0.002  0.002  0.016 
0.730  0.348  0.661  0.915  0.906  0.480 
           
Observations  881  348  533 888  352  536




The other important difference is that we find that a higher share of non-cardiac patients 
is negatively associated with number of articles in all focus measure specifications and cite-
weighted articles in the CABG/Valve focus measure specification. This implies that for those 
surgeons that are not focusing on non-cardiac areas having a higher portion of non-cardiac 
patients is associated with lower innovative output. This implies that specialization in cardiac 
surgery is good for innovative output if the surgeon is already specialized in cardiac surgery by 
having more than 50% of his patients already in cardiac surgery. 
In the rest of our models we use a different measure of specialization – we include the 
share of each of the specific categories in the surgeon’s procedure or patient (in CABG/valve) 
volume. The omitted category is Pacemaker/Defibrillator in the Task Based and the CCS 
categories and Cardiac without CABG or Valve in the CABG/Valve categories.  
We find, in Table 3.7a that an increase in the share of all categories at the expense of the 
Pacemaker/Defibrillator category is associated with an increased number of cite-weighted 
articles for the late-career surgeons and the whole sample of surgeons.  However, the result is not 
significant for the Heart Valve category for late-career surgeons and Heart Valve and CABG 
categories for the whole sample. This result is probably due to the fact that the procedures in the 
Pacemaker-Defibrillator category are the least complex ones and as a result do not allow for the 























1.430  ‐1.212 3.467*** 0.589 0.083  1.817*
0.103  0.306  0.000 0.369 0.944  0.086
Share Valve 
Procedures 
0.627  ‐1.522 2.325 1.084 ‐0.162  1.940
0.654  0.560  0.190 0.347 0.924  0.178
Share HTV 
Procedures 
2.294*  0.241  4.724** 0.829 1.385  ‐0.035
0.097  0.895  0.031 0.453 0.194  0.989
Share Heart Muscle 
Procedures 
1.840**  0.319  3.704*** 1.091* 0.114  2.210**
0.036  0.847  0.000 0.091 0.918  0.022
Share Heart Assist 
Transplant Proc  
3.189*  ‐2.907 6.348*** 1.618 ‐2.396**  2.467
0.064  0.301  0.002 0.103 0.031  0.243
Share Non‐cardiac 
Patients 
‐0.540  ‐0.495 ‐0.587* ‐0.574 ‐0.137  ‐0.468
0.300  0.787  0.094 0.108 0.889  0.199
Total Patients  0.0033***  0.0027*** 0.00491*** 0.00250*** 0.00137*  0.00427***
0.001  0.010  0.000 0.002 0.056  0.001
Cardiac Complexity  0.438  ‐0.253 0.616 ‐0.507 ‐0.823  0.253
0.622  0.824  0.635 0.440 0.257  0.815
Years Since 
Graduation 
0.015  ‐0.046 0.044 0.003 ‐0.021  0.028
0.565  0.268  0.141 0.894 0.425  0.245
Number of Groups  115  53  62 118 55 63 
Number of  Obs  952  397  555 964 406 558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is surprising that trading off any of the categories against the easy Pacemaker/Defibrillator 
category does not result in higher innovative output for early-career surgeons. In fact one of the 
most complex categories Heart Assists and Transplants is associated with a lower number of 
articles for early career surgeons and the result is statistically significant. This implies that a 















Share CABG Patients ‐0.079  ‐1.848 0.346 ‐0.235 ‐0.081  ‐0.039
0.854  0.128 0.241 0.542 0.917  0.948
Share Valve Patients ‐1.445*  ‐3.152 ‐1.204 ‐0.181 0.189  ‐0.188
0.091  0.210 0.297 0.811 0.870  0.870
Share CABG and 
Valve Patients 
‐0.307  3.646 0.287 0.649 ‐1.348  2.539




‐0.383  ‐1.315 ‐0.280 ‐0.520 ‐0.032  ‐0.506
0.510  0.567 0.519 0.173 0.973  0.247
Total Patients  0.00289***  0.002 0.00428*** 0.00233*** 0.00148*  0.00407***
0.008  0.112 0.000 0.005 0.051  0.001
Cardiac Complexity  0.828  ‐1.161 1.095 ‐0.535 ‐0.750  ‐0.634
0.373  0.600 0.183 0.327 0.434  0.340
Years Since 
Graduation 
0.017  ‐0.021 0.048 0.004 0.001  0.032
0.534  0.489 0.106 0.831 0.973  0.207
Number of Groups  115  53 62 118 55 63
Number of Obs  952  397 555 964 406  558
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
In the CABG/Valve Category results, we see that a higher share of Valve Patients at the 
expense of Cardiac without CABG or Valve is associated with a significantly lower number of 
cite-weighted articles. In fact even a higher share of CABG is associated with a lower number of 
cite-weighted articles, even though the result is insignificant implying that it is the rarer and 
potentially more complex procedures on patients that do not receive CABG and/or Valve that 
increase innovative output as measured by cite-weighted articles 
In the CCS category, late-career surgeon results are consistent with those from the Task 
Based Focus category model – increases in the shares of CABG and Other Cardiac OR 
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 procedures (but not Valve) at the expense of Pacemaker/Defibrillator are associated with a 














Share CABG Procedures 0.793  ‐1.971 2.669*** 0.463 0.303  1.432
0.332  0.134 0.000 0.460 0.769  0.163
Share Valve Procedures ‐0.268  ‐1.198 1.130 0.991 0.707  1.970
0.844  0.628 0.526 0.403 0.652  0.231
Share Other OR 
Procedures 
0.915  ‐1.356 2.617*** 1.018* ‐0.134  2.087**




‐0.305  0.139 ‐0.357 ‐0.565* 0.285  ‐0.603*
0.544  0.937 0.337 0.089 0.768  0.066
Total Patients 
  
0.00307***  0.00245** 0.00495*** 0.00244*** 0.00132**  0.00429***
0.008  0.013 0.000 0.004 0.029  0.002
Cardiac Complexity 
  
0.823  ‐0.763 1.452* ‐0.455 ‐1.253  ‐0.073
0.273  0.455 0.067 0.370 0.108  0.912
Years Since Graduation 
  
0.008  ‐0.029 0.043 ‐0.003 ‐0.004  0.021
0.763  0.343 0.169 0.881 0.859  0.425
Number of Groups  115  53 62 118 55  63
Number of Observations  952  397 555 964 406  558
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
The last two sets of models in Tables 3.8a-c and 3.9a-c have as outcome variables raw 
and cite-weighted articles in specific fields – CABG and Heart Valve respectively. You will note 
that the number of observations is fewer and that is because our models drop surgeons who do 
not have any articles or any cites over their time in our dataset in the specific CABG and Heart 
Valve fields.  We are specifically interested in these models to understand how work in related 
fields influences innovative output in a specific category.  
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 3.8 Models Based on Share of Total Procedures in Category. CABG Articles Only 
Table 3.8a:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Task Based Focus Categories. CABG 
Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted CABG Articles CABG Articles 














Share CABG Procedures -0.554 -2.612*** 3.031** 0.004 0.292 0.985 
0.790 0.000 0.015 0.998 0.904 0.615 
Share Valve Procedures 4.858 -3.584 11.53*** 1.111 -5.881 3.875 
0.110 0.448 0.000 0.644 0.185 0.161 
Share HTV Procedures 4.714 -5.598 16.10** -3.856 -0.830 -6.514 
0.327 0.259 0.011 0.204 0.826 0.175 
Share Heart Muscle 
Procedures 
2.562 -2.023 7.596*** 1.754 0.459 2.983 
0.415 0.495 0.008 0.366 0.879 0.224 
Share Heart Assist 
Procedures 
  
2.890 -9.230 10.62* 1.268 -3.571 1.140 
0.523 0.177 0.070 0.706 0.474 0.803 
Share Non-cardiac Patients -0.503 2.970 -1.345 -1.195 -4.170 -0.114 
  0.722 0.211 0.341 0.547 0.244 0.952 
Total Patients 0.00366** 0.00806*** 0.00533*** 0.00316** 0.001 0.00397* 
  0.034 0.001 0.008 0.040 0.602 0.060 
Cardiac Complexity 1.070 2.500 1.027 2.575 2.111 4.272* 
  0.595 0.416 0.637 0.156 0.420 0.078 
Years Since Graduation 0.011 -0.019 -0.004 0.021 0.079 -0.019 
  0.839 0.841 0.947 0.592 0.158 0.731 
Number of Groups 70 29 41 74 32 42 
Number of Observations 605 228 377 638 256 382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We find that in the Task Based and CCS Based Category models, an increase in the share 
of any category at the expense of Pacemaker/Defibrillator increases the number of cite-weighted 
CABG articles (but not raw articles) for the late-career surgeons. However, for early-career 
surgeons, a higher number of CABG procedures at the expense of the respective omitted 
category in each table is associated with a lower number of cite-weighted CABG articles. This 
result is surprising. But given the fact that CABG surgeries constitute the vast majority of cardiac 
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 surgeries for most surgeons it may imply that in diversifying away from CABG is what leads to 
more article in CABG, potentially hinting at cross-pollination between CABG and other 
procedures. 
Table 3.8b:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. CABG/Valve Based Focus Categories. 
CABG Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted CABG Articles CABG Articles 












Share CABG Patients 
  
-0.738 -2.011* 0.237 -0.584 0.336 -0.691 
0.605 0.052 0.872 0.648 0.844 0.671 
Share Valve Patients 
  
4.454** 2.152 6.665*** 0.777 -1.173 1.921 
0.026 0.574 0.002 0.657 0.697 0.368 
Share CABG and Valve 
Patients 
  
-2.007 -6.460 -1.379 -0.441 -7.771 2.620 




0.492 3.520** 1.157 -1.105 -3.337 -0.188 
0.734 0.034 0.478 0.578 0.326 0.931 
Total Patients 
  
0.00356** 0.00961*** 0.004 0.00298** 0.002 0.003 
0.037 0.000 0.123 0.040 0.409 0.121 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
3.128* 1.051 4.668*** 2.439 2.105 2.873* 
0.067 0.761 0.005 0.104 0.479 0.086 
Years Since Graduation 
  
-0.008 -0.022 -0.033 0.019 0.072 -0.018 
0.900 0.817 0.679 0.644 0.194 0.765 
Number of Groups 70 29 41 74 32 42 
Number of Observations 605 228 377 638 256 382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
   
Also surprisingly, an increase in the Valve category in all models is associated with a 
higher number of CABG articles. That a result is not statistically significant in the Task Based 
Focus models and is really driven by late-career surgeons. This implies that there is cross-
pollination from the Heart Valve to the CABG categories meaning that doing more Heart Valve 
procedures may increase surgeons’ insight in CABG surgeries and subsequently help them 
publish articles in that field. But it is also important to remember that our omitted variable is 
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 Pacemaker/Defibrillator so this result means that if innovative outcomes in CABG are the 
desired outcome, then surgeons should substitute Heart Valve procedures rather than CABG 
procedures for Pacemaker/Defibrillator procedures.  
Table 3.8c:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. CCS Based Focus Categories. CABG 
Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust  standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted CABG Articles CABG Articles 















Share  CABG Procedures 
(CCS based)  
-0.289 -3.192*** 3.797** 0.009 -0.118 1.202 
0.898 0.000 0.011 0.996 0.962 0.551 
Share Valve Procedures 
(CCS Based)  
5.059* -1.592 11.21*** 1.366 -5.092 4.609* 
0.085 0.654 0.000 0.569 0.196 0.089 
Share Other OR  
Procedures (CCS Based) 
3.010 -0.908 7.971** 2.116 1.065 3.471 
0.386 0.836 0.021 0.330 0.754 0.222 
Share Noncardiac  
(CCS Based) 
-0.218 2.946 -0.259 -1.456 -4.427 -0.397 
0.863 0.206 0.852 0.459 0.258 0.842 
Total Patients 
  
0.00388** 0.00846*** 0.00622*** 0.00307** 0.001 0.00401* 
0.036 0.000 0.001 0.042 0.543 0.072 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
1.441 0.353 2.531 1.947 1.441 3.108* 
0.419 0.894 0.172 0.181 0.537 0.091 
Years Since Graduation 
  
0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.018 0.087 -0.018 
0.915 0.968 0.942 0.649 0.109 0.750 
Number of Groups 70 29 41 74 32 42 
Number of Observations 605 228 377 638 256 382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from the models that have Heart Valve articles as a dependent variable in 
Tables 3.9a-c are less surprising. We find that increasing the share of any cardiac procedure at 
the expense of Pacemaker/Defibrillator increases cite-weighted Heart Valve articles. The results 
are statistically significant  for the whole sample and late-career surgeons sample of the Heart 
For early-career surgeons, it is increasing experience in the specific category i.e. Heart Valve 
that is related to a higher number of cite-weighted Heart Valve articles in all models. This may 
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 imply that insights gained doing other kind of cardiac surgery are less easily transferrable to 
Heart Valve related innovations.  
3.9. Models Based on Share of Total Procedures in Category. Valve Articles Only 
Table 3.9a:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. Task Based Focus Categories. Valve 
Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted Valve Articles Valve Articles 












Share CABG Procedures 
  
6.316*** 4.062 9.033** 2.363 1.322 1.946 
0.002 0.136 0.019 0.221 0.652 0.553 
Share Heart Valve 
Procedures 
  
4.634*** 11.29*** 5.519* 1.099 2.917 0.654 
0.003 0.000 0.063 0.611 0.290 0.852 
Share Heart Vessel 
Procedures 
4.945* 5.785* 8.869** -4.559 -0.874 -5.913 
0.065 0.069 0.048 0.196 0.816 0.353 
Share Heart Muscle 
Procedures 
  
8.006*** 1.426 10.88*** 1.156 -3.771 2.270 
0.000 0.694 0.001 0.604 0.231 0.547 
Share Heart Assist 
Procedures 
  
0.735 4.136 4.762 -4.405 -4.545 -4.682 




-8.256*** -6.801* -8.160** -1.599 2.628 -3.083* 
0.001 0.066 0.018 0.333 0.392 0.082 
Total Patients 
  
0.00563** 0.00597** 0.006 0.002 0.00388* 0.001 
0.014 0.032 0.101 0.198 0.070 0.712 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
-0.035 -1.425 -0.445 1.250 -0.451 1.115 
0.979 0.347 0.800 0.284 0.811 0.487 
Years Since Graduation 
  
0.154*** 0.123* 0.169*** 0.116*** 0.106 0.112** 
0.000 0.076 0.005 0.003 0.120 0.029 
Number of Groups 52 23 29 55 23 32 
Number of Observations 439 168 271 461 168 293 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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 It is also important to note that an increase in the number of Non-Cardiac procedures is 
related to a lower number of Heart Valve articles. Also our career-age variable is significant and 
positive in all of the models meaning that more experience is the only variable that is 
consistently related to a higher number of Heart Valve articles.  
Table 3.9b:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. CABG/Valve Based Focus Categories. 
Valve Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted Valve Articles Valve Articles 














Share CABG Patients 
  
-0.191 1.668 -0.690 0.688 2.634* -0.541 
0.927 0.415 0.809 0.508 0.057 0.718 
Share Valve Patients 
  
-1.088 5.779*** -2.810 -0.172 1.512 -1.087 
0.571 0.002 0.225 0.914 0.544 0.527 
Share CABG and Valve 
Patients 
  
4.466 11.89** 1.350 7.511*** 14.01*** 4.798 
0.159 0.036 0.686 0.006 0.002 0.107 
Share Non-cardiac 
Patients 
-8.057*** -6.152** -8.556** -1.884 0.193 -2.955 
0.003 0.049 0.018 0.261 0.944 0.136 
Total Patients  
  
0.00436** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 
0.045 0.107 0.181 0.191 0.198 0.977 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
-1.934 -3.968* -1.360 -2.162** -3.583** -1.986* 
0.139 0.068 0.376 0.021 0.017 0.095 
Years Since Graduation 
  
0.151*** 0.126** 0.170*** 0.128*** 0.140** 0.114** 
0.000 0.041 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.022 
Number of Groups 52 23 29 55 23 32 
Number of Observations 439 168 271 461 168 293 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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 Table 3.9c:  Fixed Effects Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood Model. CCS Based Focus Categories. Valve 
Articles Only. P-values under coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by surgeon. 
Dependent Variable: Cite-Weighted  Valve Articles Valve Articles 
















Share CABG Procedures  5.648*** 3.934 8.445** 2.560 2.924* 1.684 
0.005 0.107 0.031 0.193 0.057 0.637 
Share Heart Valve  
Procedures 
4.845*** 10.63*** 5.400* 2.441 4.787* 1.526 
0.009 0.000 0.086 0.297 0.056 0.673 
Share Other OR Cardiac 
Procedures 
  
7.746*** 2.000 10.24*** 2.205 -0.896 2.869 
0.000 0.590 0.004 0.358 0.632 0.484 
Share Non-cardiac 
Procedures (CCS Based) 
-8.537*** -6.546* -8.231** -1.993 1.487 -2.972 
0.001 0.055 0.033 0.245 0.610 0.144 
Total Patients 0.00535** 0.00599** 0.005 0.00269* 0.00462*** 0.001 
0.014 0.028 0.113 0.052 0.008 0.737 
Cardiac Complexity 
  
-0.828 -1.533 -0.617 -0.282 -0.476 -0.763 
0.484 0.251 0.664 0.779 0.668 0.511 
Years Since Graduation 
  
0.153*** 0.127** 0.162*** 0.120*** 0.123** 0.103** 
0.000 0.043 0.007 0.001 0.018 0.044 
Number of Groups 52 23 29 55 23 32 
Number of Observations 439 168 271 461 168 293 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
3.6 Discussion 
In this paper we tried to answer the question: “Does the composition of routine work, 
specifically its diversity, influence innovative outcomes?” Our results indicate that innovation by 
early-career workers may benefit from a diverse set of routine tasks. We also find that innovation 
in certain tasks (Heart Valve) may benefit more from experience in the focal task while 
innovation in other tasks (CABG) may benefit from related experience.  
We tested our results on a sample of cardiac surgeons whose work is based on constant 
fast paced decision making in life and death situations. Even the most routine procedures in this 
setting require alertness and continuous problem solving. Arguably, each patient is unique and 
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 may require modifications of the procedure on the spot.12 As such, our results may not 
necessarily be generalizable to settings where tasks are more monotonous and standardized and 
alterations are not needed– for example, entering a form into the computer. However, we believe 
that the results apply to situations where the inputs are not identical, where problem solving and 
decision making are necessary and innovation is encouraged.  
One of the limitations of our work is that we measure focus and diversity of work as a 
yearly variable for each surgeon. It is possible (not likely) that a surgeon may perform only 
CABGs in the spring, only Heart Valve procedures in the summer and so on. A better measure of 
how insight from one task could be transferred to another or how multiple identical procedures in 
a row are better for gaining a new insight would be to track how tasks alternate, i.e. whether a 
Heart Valve procedure is followed by a CABG procedure and so on.   
We believe that this work is important as a first attempt to understand the importance of 
work specialization and diversity on innovative outcomes at the individual level. Our various 
results are difficult to interpret and do not always point to one answer but instead show that 
many different variables such as procedure complexity can be important. We hope that future 
work will elucidate better the mechanisms by which work diversity or focus may influence 
innovation. We also hope that future research will explore other settings in which the results may 




12 Note however, that some may argue that not all patients are unique and that procedures and patient care 
can also be standardized.  
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Appendix 3.A International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification 
(ICD-9-CM) procedure codes used in constructing the categories of the Task Based Focus 
measure 
 
1. Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting (CABG) Procedures 
361, 3610, 3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3619 
 
2. Valve procedures 
 350, 3500, 3501, 3502, 3503, 3504, 351, 3510, 3511, 3512, 3513, 3514, 352, 3520, 3521, 
3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3527, 3528, 3599 
 
3. Heart Muscle Procedures  
353, 3531, 3532, 3533, 3534, 3535, 3539, 354, 3541, 3542, 355, 3550, 3551, 3552, 3553, 
3554, 356, 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 357, 3570, 3571, 3572, 3573, 358, 3581, 3582, 3583, 
3584, 359, 3591, 3592, 3593, 3594, 3595, 3598, 371, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3724, 3725, 373, 
3731, 3732, 3733, 3735, 3749, 374 
 
4. Heart Vessel Procedures other than CABG 
3603, 362, 363, 3631, 3632, 3639, 369, 3691, 3699, 3834, 3835, 3844, 3845  
 
5. Heart Assist and Heart Transplant Procedures  
3741, 3752, 3753, 3754, 376, 3761, 3762, 3763, 3764, 3765, 3766, 3767, 3751, 336  
  
6. Pacemaker and Defibrillator Procedures  
 377, 3770, 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 378, 3780, 3781, 3782, 
3783, 3784, 3785, 3786, 3787, 3789, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 0050, 0051, 0052, 








 Appendix 3.B1 Description of CCS level 2 Categories. Those Included in our focus measure 
are in bold.  Category 16.1 is also included in our measure in category 7.7 and comes from 
section 16.  Miscellaneous diagnostic and therapeutic procedures  
 
Section 7.  Operations on the cardiovascular system  
CCS LVL 
2 CCS LVL 2 LABEL 
7.1 Heart valve procedures [43.] 
7.2 Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) [44.] 
7.3 Percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) [45.] 
7.4 Coronary thrombolysis [46.] 
7.5 Diagnostic cardiac catheterization; coronary arteriography [47.] 
7.6 Insertion; revision; replacement; removal of cardiac pacemaker or 
cardioverter/defibr 
7.7 Other OR heart procedures [49.] 
7.8 Extracorporeal circulation auxiliary to open heart procedures [50.] 
7.9 Endarterectomy; vessel of head and neck [51.] 
7.10 Aortic resection; replacement or anastomosis [52.] 
7.11 Varicose vein stripping; lower limb [53.] 
7.12 Other vascular catheterization; not heart [54.] 
7.13 Peripheral vascular bypass [55.] 
7.14 Other vascular bypass and shunt; not heart [56.] 
7.15 Creation; revision and removal of arteriovenous fistula or vessel-to-vessel cannula 
7.16 Hemodialysis [58.] 
7.17 Other OR procedures on vessels of head and neck [59.] 
7.18 Embolectomy and endarterectomy of lower limbs [60.] 
7.19 Other OR procedures on vessels other than head and neck [61.] 
7.20 Other diagnostic cardiovascular procedures [62.] 
7.21 Other non-OR therapeutic cardiovascular procedures [63.] 
  
 Section 16: Miscellaneous diagnostic and therapeutic procedures 




 Appendix 3.B2 International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification 
(ICD-9-CM) procedure codes used in constructing the categories and focus measure based 
on the Clinical Classification Software (CCS) system 
7.1 Heart valve procedures 3500, 3501, 3502, 3503, 3504, 3505, 3506, 3507, 3508, 3509, 3510, 
3511, 3512, 3513, 3514, 3520, 3521, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3527, 3528, 3596, 3597, 
3599 
 
7.2 Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) - includes 7.10 Aortic resection; replacement or 
anastomosis marked in bold  
3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3610, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3619, 362, 3620, 363,  3630, 3631, 3632, 3633, 
3634, 3639, 3834, 3844,  3864, 3971, 3973, 3978 
 
7.6 Insertion; revision; replacement; removal of cardiac pacemaker or cardioverter/defibr 
0050, 0051, 0052, 0053, 0054, 0056, 0057, 3770, 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 
3778, 3779, 3826, 3780, 3781, 3782, 3783, 3785, 3786, 3787, 3789, 1751, 1752, 3794, 3795, 
3796, 3797, 3798, 3531 
 
7.7 Other OR heart procedures – also includes 16.1 Other organ transplantation ,  marked 
in bold 3532, 3533, 3534, 3535, 3539, 3541, 3542, 3550, 3551, 3552, 3553, 3554, 3555, 3560, 
3561, 3562, 3563, 3570, 3571, 3572, 3573, 3581, 3582, 3583, 3584, 3591, 3592, 3593, 3594, 
3595, 3598, 3600, 3603, 3609, 3691, 3699, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3731, 3732, 3733, 3734, 3735, 
3736, 3737, 374, 3740, 3741, 3749, 3752, 3753, 3754, 3755, 3760, 3761, 3762, 3763, 3764, 
3765, 3766, 3767, 3768, 3790, 3791, 3799, 375 , 3750, 3751, 336 , 3360 
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